Collection Lags And The Optimal Inflation Tax

The observation that collection lags combine with inflation to erode fiscal revenues has long been a strong argument against seigniorage (Tanzi (1978)). However, with the exception of Dixit (1991), who used a general equilibrium model to reject this argument, the optimal tax literature has not analyzed how collection lags affect desired tax structures. In this paper, this issue is re-examined using an overlapping generations version of Dixit’s model. It is shown that depending on the specification of the collection cost function and the size of government spending in GDP, collection lags may increase, leave unchanged, or reduce the desired rate of inflation.

When there are collection lags in the tax system, inflation reduces the real revenues. This is often offered as an argument for less reliance on the inflation tax. But the optimal rates of other taxes should also be reconsidered in the light of collection lags. When this is done, the focus shifts from the revenues (which can be recouped by changing the rates of these taxes), to the associated costs of collection. In a benchmark case where the average costs of collection are constant, the optimal inflation tax is independent of the collection lag.

The observation that collection lags combine with inflation to erode fiscal revenues has long been a strong argument against seigniorage (Tanzi (1978)). However, with the exception of Dixit (1991), who used a general equilibrium model to reject this argument, the optimal tax literature has not analyzed how collection lags affect desired tax structures. In this paper, this issue is re-examined using an overlapping generations version of Dixit`s model. It is shown that depending on the specification of the collection cost function and the size of government spending in GDP, collection lags may increase, leave unchanged, or reduce the desired rate of inflation.

When there are collection lags in the tax system, inflation reduces the real revenues. This is often offered as an argument for less reliance on the inflation tax. But the optimal rates of other taxes should also be reconsidered in the light of collection lags. When this is done, the focus shifts from the revenues (which can be recouped by changing the rates of these taxes), to the associated costs of collection. In a benchmark case where the average costs of collection are constant, the optimal inflation tax is independent of the collection lag.

The paper provides empirical evidence on collection lags in major categories of government revenue and analyzes the estimated revenue-eroding effects of inflation within the standard model of inflationary finance. The evidence indicates a wide variation in collection lags among the categories of revenues. The estimated erosion of real fiscal revenue, although varied in the sample countries, appears to have substantially offset gains from the inflation tax, thereby severely restricting the use of this form of taxation in generating resources.

This paper analyzes the optimal rate of monetary expansion when government resorts to inflationary finance to generate additional investment for enhancing growth. If there are lags in tax collection, an increase in inflation erodes real fiscal revenue, thereby worsening the current balance while reducing government investment. This impedes capital accumulation as well as increases the welfare cost of inflation. As such, the optimal rate of monetary expansion, equilibrium capital-labor ratio and output are lower while the marginal cost of inflationary finance is higher than they would be without collection lags. Simulations are performed to highlight empirical implications.

The paper provides empirical evidence on collection lags in major categories of government revenue and analyzes the estimated revenue-eroding effects of inflation within the standard model of inflationary finance. The evidence indicates a wide variation in collection lags among the categories of revenues. The estimated erosion of real fiscal revenue, although varied in the sample countries, appears to have substantially offset gains from the inflation tax, thereby severely restricting the use of this form of taxation in generating resources.