Combating Illicit Trafficking In Nuclear And Other Radioactive Material

This publication is intended for individuals and organizations that may be called upon to deal with the detection of and response to criminal or unauthorized acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material. It will also be useful for legislators, law enforcement agencies, government officials, technical experts, lawyers, diplomats and users of nuclear technology. In addition, the manual emphasizes the international initiatives for improving the security of nuclear and other radioactive material, and considers a variety of elements that are recognized as being essential for dealing with incidents of criminal or unauthorized acts involving such material.

This publication presents the outcome of an IAEA coordinated research project (CRP), which served as a technical forum for sharing international experiences in the field of nuclear forensics with a focus on improved procedures and techniques, optimization of nuclear forensic analysis, preservation of evidence, and provision of support to Member States. The CRP results address both technical needs to develop the discipline of nuclear forensics as well as to promote confidence in the application of analytical methods and understanding of the nuclear fuel cycle applied to nuclear forensics. Topics include instrumentation and field work for evidence collection, novel laboratory methods supporting a nuclear forensic examination, and modeling for interpretation of nuclear forensic results.

Illicit trafficking in or smuggling of nuclear & other radioactive materials has increased in recent years. Many nuclear smuggling cases have been traced to nuclear material that originated in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The U.S., has helped these countries secure nuclear material at civilian & defense facilities, but these assistance efforts face daunting challenges. This report addresses U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling by: identifying the U.S. Fed. programs tasked with combating the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials & the amount of U.S. funding spent on this effort; determines how well the U.S. assistance is coordinated among Fed. agencies; & assesses the effectiveness of the equipment & training provided by the U.S.

This publication will primarily be of interest to customs, border police and other law enforcement bodies. It outlines the typical regulatory framework so that customs, police and other law enforcement staff are aware of the measures being taken to prevent loss of control. It also deals with the roles of customs, border police and other law enforcement bodies in the prevention of the inadvertent movement and illicit trafficking of radioactive materials.

Illicit trafficking in or smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials occurs worldwide and has reportedly increased in recent years. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency1 (IAEA), as of December 31, 2001, there had been 151 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear material since 1993. (See app. I for more information about nuclear smuggling cases.) A significant number of the cases reported by IAEA involved material that could be used to produce a nuclear weapon or a device that uses conventional explosives with radioactive material ("dirty bomb") to spread radioactive contamination over a wide area. Nuclear material can be smuggled across a country's border through a variety of means: it can be hidden in a car, train, or ship, carried in personal luggage through an airport, or walked across an unprotected border. Many nuclear smuggling cases have been traced to nuclear material that originated in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The United States, through the Department of Energy's Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC & A) program, has helped these countries secure nuclear material at civilian and defense facilities-this effort is considered the first line of defense against potential theft and/or diversion of nuclear materials. To address the threat posed by nuclear smuggling, the United States is helping these countries improve their border security-a second line of defense-but these assistance efforts face daunting challenges3. For example, Russia alone has almost 12,500 miles of borders with 14 countries, including North Korea. It is also in close geographical proximity to Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq.

This publication contains the papers presented at an international conference organized by the IAEA and held in Stockholm in 2001. The papers cover the threat of nuclear terrorism involving nuclear and other radioactive material, and the national and international responses, including physical protection. The conference papers also focus on the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials and on the national and international measures to combat such trafficking.

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there have been 181 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials between 1993 and December 31, 2001. Nuclear materials can be smuggled across a country's border through a variety of means: they can be hidden in a car, train, or ship, carried in personal luggage through an airport; or walked across an unprotected border. U.S. efforts to help other countries combat nuclear smuggling are divided among six federal agencies--the Departments of Energy (DOE); State; and Defense (DOD); the U.S. Customs Service; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the U.S. Coast Guard. From fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2001, the six agencies spent about $86 million to help 30 countries, mostly in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, combat the threat of smuggling nuclear and other materials that could be used in weapons of mass destruction. Assistance provided by six agencies includes installing radiation detection equipment, helping countries improve their ability to control the export of goods and technologies that could be used to develop nuclear weapons, and providing other equipment and training to improve countries' ability to prevent nuclear smuggling. Although an interagency group, chaired by the Department of State, exists to coordinate U.S. assistance efforts, the six agencies do not always work in unison. The most troubling consequence of the lack of coordination is that DOE, State, and DOD have pursued separate approaches to installing radiation detection equipment at countries' border crossings. While U.S. assistance helps countries combat the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials, serious problems exist with the installation, use, and maintenance of equipment which has undermined U.S. efforts. Customs relies on a three-part strategy to combat nuclear smuggling: training, targeting, and technology. Customs officials rely on radiation pagers--personal radiation detectors designed to be worn on a belt--as the primary equipment to detect nuclear material. However, DOE officials view the pagers as personal safety devices, not search instruments, and that they are not designed to detect weapons-usable nuclear material.

Radiological crime scene management is the process used to ensure safe, secure, effective and efficient operations at a crime scene where nuclear or other radioactive materials are known, or suspected, to be present. Managing a radiological crime scene is a key part of responding to a nuclear security event. Evidence collection at radiological crime scenes may share a wide range of characteristics with that at conventional crime scenes, such as evidence search patterns, geographical scene modelling and evidence recording, whether or not explosives are involved. This publication focuses on the framework and functional elements for managing a radiological crime scene that are distinct from any other crime scene. It assumes that States have a capability for managing conventional crime scenes.