Combined Arms

The original version of this text was published in 1984 as a textbook on military history for officers in the U.S. Army. The revised version includes an appendix of terms and acronyms, and concepts are explained in nontechnical terms, making it more comprehensible to the general reader. Also incorporated is a description of combined arms warfare from the late-1970s to the end of the 20th century, which takes into account developments that were not obvious in 1984. The main topics are how the major armies of the world fight on the battlefield; what concepts, weapons, and organizations have developed for this purpose; and how the different armies have influenced each other in these developments. House is a former military officer and analyst for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. c. Book News Inc.

Volume 2, Bringing Order to Chaos: Combined Arms Maneuver in Large Scale Combat Operations, opens a dialogue with the Army. Are we ready for the significantly increased casualties inherent to intensive combat between large formations, the constant paralyzing stress of continual contact with a peer enemy, and the difficult nature of command and control while attempting division and corps combined arms maneuver to destroy that enemy? The chapters in this volume answer these questions for combat operations while spanning military history from 1917 through 2003. These accounts tell the challenges of intense combat, the drain of heavy casualties, the difficulty of commanding and controlling huge formations in contact, the effective use of direct and indirect fires, the need for high quality leadership, thoughtful application of sound doctrine, and logistical sustainment up to the task. No large scale combat engagement, battle, or campaign of the last one hundred years has been successful without being better than the enemy in these critical capabilities. What can we learn from the past to help us make the transition to ready to fight tonight?

The thirty-six chapters reflect changes in the military art. Each chapter deals with one case drawn from recent military history that illustrates and illuminates a problem with which a modern professional soldier may have to contend. Each case is set in its strategic and operational context, explained in detail, and briefly analyzed.

The book Infantry in battle by George Marshall was the inspiration for this book which has been written to reflect its own times, not Marshall's. The thirty-six chapters that follow have been chosen to reflect changes in the military art since Marshall's times. Each chapter deals with one case drawn from recent military history that illustrates and illuminates a problem with which a modern professional soldier may someday have to contend. Each case is set in its strategic and operational context, explained in detail, and briefly analyzed. The book is intentionally designed to be read piecemeal, a chapter at a time, in order to make it as broadly useful to professional soldiers no matter where or in what capacity they are serving-in the field, on the staff, or in the Army's institutions of higher military education. Recognizing that some readers may want to know more about a particular case, a bibliography following each is included.

Combined Arms Warfare in Ancient Greece examines the timelines of military developments that led from the hoplite-based armies of the ancient Greeks to the hugely successful and multi-faceted armies of Philip II, Alexander the Great, and his Successors. It concentrates on the introduction and development of individual units and their tactical coordination and use in battle in what is termed "combined arms": the effective integration of different unit types into one cohesive battle plan and army allowing each unit to focus on its strengths without having to worry about its weaknesses. This volume traces the development, and argues for the vital importance, of the use of combined arms in Greek warfare from the Archaic period onwards, especially concerning the Macedonian hegemony, through to its developmental completion in the form of fully "integrated warfare" at the battle of Ipsus in 301 BCE. It argues crucially that warfare should never be viewed in isolation in individual states, regions, conflicts or periods but taken as a collective whole tracing the mutual influence of other cultures and the successful innovations that always result. Wrightson analyses Greek and Macedonian warfare through the lens of modern military theoretical terminology, making this study accessible to those with a general interest in military history as well as those studying this specific period.