Command Of The Air

In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.

"This reprint of the 1942 English translation of Douhet's works, while titled Command of the Air, actually consists of five separate works: the original 1921 edition of Command of the Air, a second edition of 1927, a 1928 monograph titled 'Probable Aspects of Future War', a polemical article of 1929 called 'Recapitulation,' and the 1930 study 'The War of 19-.' The volume is reprinted by the Office of Air Force History as part of Project Warrior. By transporting ourselves back to the 1920s, past not only the Vietnam and Korean Wars, but nearly two decades before World War II, we become silent observers of the unfolding drama of airpower's history. Knowing that transpired after Douhet wrote, we can test our understanding, find the assumptions and conclusions of Douhet that proved false, and read with wonder those that proved true. Some of what he wrote today seems almost timeless, 'principles' perhaps of the employment of aircraft in war. Giulio Douhet was a prophet. From the perspective of today, he still bears pondering. Serious thinking about the nature of war and the role of aerospace power will not in our lifetime cease to be of value." -- Abstract.

Reprint of the 1983 translation by staff of the United States Office of Air Force History.

This widely praised study draws from both American and German sources to show how the U.S. Army Air Forces cleared the way for the successful Allied invasion of France. In 1944 a revitalized American leadership abandoned the unsuccessful approach of strategic bombing and instead focused on air superiority, practically chasing the enemy out of the sky and eliminating Germany's supply of trained pilots. Examining the people, technologies, command decisions, and key events of the war over Germany, the authors prove conclusively that the winning of air superiority -- not the success of strategic bombing -- played a more essential part in the Allied victory in Europe

Beskriver det amerikanske flyvevåbens Strategic Air Command (SAC) herunder flytyper, missiler, organisation, opgaver med mere.

The 1940 Ogdensburg Agreement entrenched a formal defence relationship between Canada and the United States – but was Canadian sovereignty upheld? Sovereignty and Command combines historical narrative with conceptual analysis of sovereignty, command and control systems, military professionalism, and civil-military relations to document the sometimes fractious Canada–US continental air defence relationship. Richard Goette argues that a functional military transition from an air defence system based on cooperation to one based on integrated and centralized command and control under NORAD allowed Canada to retain command of its forces and thus protect Canadian sovereignty.