Comparative Corporate Governance In China

The analysis is notable for its insistence that, for a corporate governance system to work, the principles and practicalities of that system must be derived from customary cultural norms. Experience shows that imported models, although they may be enshrined in law, lead to economic stagnation unless actual practice is monitored and reformed and the laws change to reflect these necessary adjustments. Thus the model proposed here begins with the Company Law of 1994, and proceeds to show how practical experience is already providing valuable data for the task of improving the law.

An insightful overview of the political, legal and social perspectives which inform corporate governance in China, this book examines the challenges of corporate governance faced by Chinese corporations and international corporations operating in China. Unlike other texts that tend to focus solely on the board of directors and the takeover market, Yu has enlarged the scope of this study to cover both market forces and contractual mechanisms, providing readers with an extended and comprehensive discussion of the pertinent issues. It explores a range of issues and their role in corporate governance models, including: executive compensation takeover markets the securities market insolvency issues venture capital market Examining the current climate and making the case that comparative corporate governance studies have significant policy implications for China’s transitional economy, Yu has put together a book that is a valuable resource for students and those working in Asian business, corporate governance and commercial law.

This research handbook provides a state-of-the-art perspective on how corporate governance differs between countries around the world. It covers highly topical issues including corporate purpose, corporate social responsibility and shareholder activism.

The business corporation is one of the greatest organizational inventions, but it creates risks both for shareholders and for third parties. To mitigate these risks, legislators, judges, and corporate lawyers have tried to learn from foreign experiences and adapt their regulatory regimes to them. In the last three decades, this approach has led to a stream of corporate and capital market law reforms unseen before. Corporate governance, the system by which companies are directed and controlled, is today a key topic for legislation, practice, and academia all over the world. Corporate scandals and financial crises have repeatedly highlighted the need to better understand the economic, social, political, and legal determinants of corporate governance in individual countries. Comparative Corporate Governance furthers this goal by bringing together current scholarship in law and economics with the expertise of local corporate governance specialists from twenty-three countries.

This book investigates the key factors shaping corporate governance in China and presents a sophisticated study of corporate governance in China from a comparative and historical perspective. Drawing on extensive corporate governance literature, this book articulates why path dependence theory is the most effective framework for interpreting the development path of Chinese corporate governance. Chenxia Shi reviews the historical role of government in commercial development and regulation in dynastic China and in early corporate law-making, followed by an account of China’s legal and economic development over the last three decades. This historical inquiry identifies government control as the key feature of economic and market regulation in China. In particular, this book canvasses the evolution of governance of State-Owned Enterprises and listed companies, major corporate governance problems, regulatory challenges posed by China’s increasing participation in economic globalization, and enforcement difficulties particularly in relation to investor protection, directors’ duties and accountability. Ultimately, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance in China demonstrates that corporate governance in China is largely determined by political imperatives and those political imperatives have been shaped and re-shaped in a historical process.

This book examines corporate governance rules in China, and highlights the deficiencies in current company law, with the purpose of arguing for a more effective derivative action mechanism, for the benefit of shareholders and their companies.

Provides a comparative overview of corporate governance frameworks and practices in major Asian countries.

Examining derivative action, which enables shareholders to gain redress for wrongs done to their company and deters breaches of directors' fiduciary duties, this book considers the use of such measures in China, which lacks adequate corporate governance tools.