Comparative History And Legal Theory

It is a commonplace of Schmitt scholarship that the controversial thinker sought to recapture some of the elan of the pre-Weimar state through his advocacy of effectively almost unlimited presidential government. Seitzer demonstrates how Schmitt believed comparative history itself could reinvigorate the ailing German state by subtly altering prevailing understandings of the relation of theory and practice in law and politics. Treating Schmitt's Constitutional Theory and Guardian of the Constitution as methodologically sophisticated comparative histories, Seitzer turns Schmitt's argument against itself. He shows how Schmitt's comparative histories, when properly executed, support a decentralized solution to the Republic's difficulties directly contrary to Schmitt's in terms of its purpose and effect. Problem-oriented, comparative-historical studies of key features of the Weimar system suggest that the dispersion of political power facilitates an institutional dialogue over constitutional principle and practice that better provides for political stability and democratic experimentation. These studies also suggest that linking forms of justification with institutions establishes a productive tension among norms and institutions that is essential to maintaining the viability of constitutional democracy, both in the short- and long-term. This work will be of considerable value to Schmitt scholars and those interested in German legal and political theory as well as those concerned with broad issues in comparative law and European history and political theory.

The specially commissioned papers in this book lay a solid theoretical foundation for comparative legal history as a distinct academic discipline. While facilitating a much needed dialogue between comparatists and legal historians, this research handbook examines methodologies in this emerging field and reconsiders legal concepts and institutions like custom, civil procedure, and codification from a comparative legal history perspective.

This book uses the philosophy of Thomas Kuhn to provide a new vision of the development of European comparative law that will challenge and inspire scholars in the field. With the 'empathic' use of some ideas from Kuhn's theories on the history of science – paradigm, paradigm-shift, puzzle-solving research and incommensurability – the book rethinks the modern history of European comparative law from the late 19th century to the modern day. It argues that three major paradigms determine modern comparative law: - historical and comparative jurisprudence, - droit comparé, and - post-World War II comparative law. It concludes that contemporary methodological trends are not signs of a paradigm-shift toward a postmodern and culturalist understanding of comparative law, but that the new approach spreads the idea of methodological plurality.

The primary aim of this book is to provide clear and reliable information on a number of central topics in comparative law. At a time when global society is increasingly mobile and legal life is internationalized, the role of comparative law is gaining importance. While the growing interest in this field may well be attributed to the dramatic increase in international legal transactions, this empirical parameter is only part of the explanation. The other part, and (at least) equally important, has to do with the expectation of gaining a deeper understanding of law as a social phenomenon and a fresh insight into the current state and future direction of one’s own legal system. In response to the internationalization of legal practice and theory, law schools around the world have expanded their comparative law programs. Within the legal subjects that form the core of the curriculum there is a greater interest in comparative legal analysis, as well as greater attention to how global developments and international actors and institutions affect domestic law. Transnational legal education based on comparative reasoning is intended to help shape a new generation of lawyers, public servants and other professionals who recognize and respect cultural diversity in an interconnected world. The central topics discussed in this book include: the nature and scope of comparative legal inquiries; the relationship of comparative law to other fields of legal study; the aims and uses of comparative law; the origins and historical development of comparative law; and the evolution and defining features of some of the world’s predominant legal traditions. It also deals with selected theoretical aspects, such as the problem of comparability of legal events; the classification of legal systems into families of law; and the topics of legal transplants, harmonization and convergence of laws. Chiefly intended for students, the book also discusses a number of fundamental issues concerning the development of comparative law, and devotes certain sections to reviewing the salient features of the relevant literature on definitional, terminological, methodological and historical issues.

Now in its second edition, this textbook presents a critical rethinking of the study of comparative law and legal theory in a globalising world, and proposes an alternative model. It highlights the inadequacies of current Western theoretical approaches in comparative law, international law, legal theory and jurisprudence, especially for studying Asian and African laws, arguing that they are too parochial and eurocentric to meet global challenges. Menski argues for combining modern natural law theories with positivist and socio-legal traditions, building an interactive, triangular concept of legal pluralism. Advocated as the fourth major approach to legal theory, this model is applied in analysing the historical and conceptual development of Hindu law, Muslim law, African laws and Chinese law.

This collection brings together a group of international legal historians to further scholarship in different areas of comparative and regional legal history. Authors are drawn from Europe, Asia, and the Americas to produce new insights into the relationship between law and society across time and space. The book is divided into three parts: legal history and legal culture across borders; constitutional experiences in global perspective; and the history of judicial experiences. The three themes, and the chapters corresponding to each, provide a balance between public law and private law topics, and reflect a variety of methodologies, both empirical and theoretical. The volume highlights the gains that may be made by comparing the development of law in different countries and different time periods. The book will be of interest to an international readership in Legal History, Comparative Law, Law and Society, and History.

"... to be consulted before any significant legal debate." W. J. Stewart in: Scots Law Times 1995This volume is concerned with the history of the concept of, or of the remedies for, unjust enrichment in the Civil law and the Common law. But this history is radically different in the two systems - different both in the starting point of each system and in the methods by which progress from that starting point was made.What for the Civil law is the starting point is for the Common law the ultimate outcome. The Civil law from its earliest medieval beginnings had before its eyes, at least as a potential unifying principle, the concept of unjust enrichment which it found in the Corpus Iuris, whereas it is only very recently (and outside the chronological scope of this volume) that the Common law has come to accept such a principle.The methods by which the Civil lawyers progressed from their starting point towards the well articulated concepts of the modern law were those of the interpreter and elaborator of texts which had their own unquestioned authority. And their discussions, which were those of the scholar and the school-room, are well documented.For the Common lawyers, on the other hand, the starting point was nothing but the practice of the courts and their methods were those appropriate to that practice. The plaintiff's remedy in a particular case was everything. Moreover, since the practice of the courts until very recent times is very imperfectly evidenced, the course of the development of the Common law is often difficult to trace. The researches contained in this volume show that it is only with benefit of hindsight, and then only to very limited extent, that one can see that development as leading to the recent acceptance of a doctrine of unjust enrichment.

This collection of original essays brings together leading legal historians and theorists to explore the oft-neglected but important relationship between these two disciplines. Legal historians have often been sceptical of theory. The methodology which informs their own work is often said to be an empirical one, of gathering information from the archives and presenting it in a narrative form. The narrative produced by history is often said to be provisional, insofar as further research in the archives might falsify present understandings and demand revisions. On the other side, legal theorists are often dismissive of historical works. History itself seems to many theorists not to offer any jurisprudential insights of use for their projects: at best, history is a repository of data and examples, which may be drawn on by the theorist for her own purposes. The aim of this collection is to invite participants from both sides to ask what lessons legal history can bring to legal theory, and what legal theory can bring to history. What is the theorist to do with the empirical data generated by archival research? What theories should drive the historical enterprise, and what wider lessons can be learned from it? This collection brings together a number of major theorists and legal historians to debate these ideas.