Compellence And The Strategic Culture Of Imperial Japan

Compellence is a fundamental tool of international security policy. This study explains how culture shapes the ways that decision-makers respond to the threat of force. First, Morgan builds a theoretical framework, next he analyzes three cases in which states attempted to compel Japan to change its behavior. The first is an in-depth analysis of the 1895 triple intervention in which Russia, Germany, and France forced Japanese leaders to return the Liaotung Peninsula to China following the first Sino-Japanese War. The second and third relate to World War II: the 1941 oil embargo intended to coerce Tokyo to withdraw its military from China and Washington's 1945 efforts to force Japan to end the war. These cases explain much of the seemingly irrational behavior previously attributed to Japanese leaders. Morgan demonstrates that culture clearly influenced outcomes in all three cases by conditioning Japanese perceptions, strategic preferences, and governmental processes. These findings are relevant today, and recent conflicts suggest that they will be increasingly important into the 21st century. This book offers policy makers a much-needed method for employing strategic culture analysis to develop more effective security strategies—strategies that will be of vital importance in an increasingly volatile world.

A much-needed survey and synopsis of literature on strategic culture and ways of war. It clearly shows how national strategies and approaches to warfare are, to a significant extent, culturally determined. The concept of national ‘ways of war’ dates from the 1930s, when Basil H. Liddell Hart theorized that there was a ‘British Way in Warfare’. The concept of "strategic culture" dates from the 1970s, when Jack Snyder introduced it to explain why leaders of the Soviet Union did not behave according to rational choice theory. These ideas have gained wide acceptance among historians of international politics and warfare, and remain controversial for political scientists seeking general or universal theoretical understanding of such subjects. Because political scientists have focused on strategic culture and historians on ways of war, this work will greatly benefit both audiences and provide each with valuable exposure to the ideas of the other.

This book describes strategic culture and its value as a methodological approach to the study of International Relations. In particular, the book uses strategic culture to illuminate a number of case studies on countries that have made decisions regarding the acquisition, proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction.

The Elusive Enemy explores the evolution of U.S. intelligence concerning the combat capabilities of the Imperial Japanese Navy and its air arm during the interwar period and the Pacific War. Ford contends that the US Navy could not accurately determine the fighting efficiency of Japan’s forces until it engaged them in actual battle conditions over an extended period. As the conflict progressed, the Americans were able to rely on a growing array of intelligence material, including POWs, captured documents, and specimens of captured enemy weapons. These sources often revealed valuable information on the characteristics of Japanese equipment, as well as some of the ideas and doctrines which governed how they carried out their operations. First-hand observations of the Japanese navy’s performance in battle were the most frequently used source of intelligence which enabled the US Navy to develop a more informed assessment of its opponent. Ship crews, along with US aviators, were tasked to collect information by making a thorough observation of how the Japanese fought. Action reports described how the Imperial fleet demonstrated a number of weaknesses, the most important of which was a shortage of modern equipment and, after 1942, diminished air power. Yet, he demonstrates how the Japanese remained a resilient enemy who could be defeated only when the Americans deployed sufficient equipment and used it in an appropriate manner. The Office of Naval Intelligence, as well as the intelligence services operating in the Pacific theater, thus had to assess a wide array of conflicting characteristics, and provide a balanced evaluation concerning the strengths and weaknesses of the Imperial navy. At the same time, a large part of the intelligence analysis was undertaken by commanders in the Pacific Fleet. Naval personnel and aircrews assessed the information gained through encounters with the enemy so that they could develop a set of methods whereby US forces were able defeat the Japanese without incurring excessive casualties and losses. The intelligence services, in turn, played an important role in disseminating the information on the most efficient tactics and weapons that could be used to defeat the Imperial Fleet. The Elusive Enemy aims to explain how American perceptions concerning the Japanese navy evolved during the conflict, with a particular focus on the role of intelligence. It also seeks to introduce a new perspective on the question as to why the U.S. Navy carried out its campaigns during the Pacific War in the manner that it did.

Perspectives on Strategy examines in depth five aspects of strategy. Strategic thought and behaviour are explored and explained from the perspectives of intellect, morality, culture, geography, and technology. Each perspective has attracted persisting controversy. Perspectives on Strategy is strongly complementary to the author's previous book, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (OUP, 2010). This new work takes a notably holistic view of strategic phenomena, which serves as a master framework within which detailed examination of strategic history and issues can usefully be pursued in the light of particular perspectives. Foundational for the argument in Perspectives on Strategy is the proposition that distinctive aspects of strategy (e.g. ethics, culture, inter alia) can only be appreciated properly when they are regarded in context. The author shares this view with T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia), who wrote of the 'whole house of war'. Perspectives on Strategy gratefully adapts Lawrence and writes about the 'whole house of strategy'. The book insists that the nature of strategy is best represented by a Venn diagram that shows overlapping perspectives. Thus, the subject of each chapter is shown as having meaning for, and in turn is influenced by, the subjects of the other chapters. For example, the book explores the importance of strategic ideas relative to the significance of the material weapons of war. The author poses the hardest of questions pertinent to each chosen perspective (e.g. do ideas matter more than muscle?—in practice how robust is the ethical code with which warfare is waged?—is geography destiny, as some theorists have claimed?—and do technically superior weapons win wars?)Perspectives on Strategy demonstrates that it is possible to look closely at strategic matters from limited but arguably powerful perspectives, without being captured by them. This book asks and answers the most challenging and rewarding questions that can be posed in order to reveal the persisting universal nature, but ever changing character, of strategy.

As India rises to great power status in the emerging multipolar world order, what influence will its rich and ancient culture have on the country’s foreign policy? This book reveals that cultural values have greater explanatory power than previously thought and describes the nature of their influence. Excavating thousands of years of history, the monograph identifies enduring values that are relevant to contemporary foreign policy. It examines three critical areas of Indian foreign policy – nuclear policy, humanitarian intervention and relations with the Middle East. Major decisions were shaped by cultural values – sometimes at the expense of strategic interests. India’s choice to test nuclear weapons was not purely because of China or Pakistan: hierarchy also played a role. From a hierarchical worldview shaping Delhi’s approach to international law on arms control to pluralism facilitating simultaneous friendships with America and Iran, values thread their way throughout India’s foreign relations. Non-violence underpins Delhi’s soft power in both the West and the Middle East, while having spurred India’s opposition to Western intervention in Iraq. Analyzing state behavior and interviewing diplomats, the book charts culture’s evolving influence from Rajiv Gandhi to Narendra Modi.