Competition Policy And The Control Of Buyer Power

This book provides a comprehensive overview of the economic and competition policy issues that buyer power creates. Drawing on economic analysis and cases from around the world, it explains why conventional seller side standards and analyses do not provide an adequate framework for responding to the problems that buyer power can create. Based on evidence that abuse of buyer power is a serious problem for the competitive process, the book evaluates the potential for competition law to deal directly with the problems of abuse either through conventional competition law or special rules aimed at abusive conduct. The author also examines controls over buying groups and mergers as potentially more useful responses to risks created by undue buyer power.

Neumann (economics, U. Erlangen-Nurnberg, Germany) examines the history of competition policy in the US and Europe to demonstrate how far a convergence of principles has developed. He then outlines the theory of industrial organization as a tool to devise an appropriate policy. Neumann also discusses the practice of competition policy in the US, individual European countries, and the EC as a whole, in terms of collusion, mergers, and vertical restraints. The final section places competition policy within the social framework, treating such issues as property rights, international trade policy, and social justice. Annotation copyrighted by Book News Inc., Portland, OR

This outstanding collection of original essays brings together some of the leading experts in competition economics, policy and law. They examine what lies at the core of the .economic approach to competition law' and deal with its normative and institutional limitations. In recent years the more .economic approach' has led to a modernisation of competition law throughout the world. This book comprehensivelyexamines for the first time, the foundations and limitations of the approach and will be of great interest to scholars of competition policy no matter what discipline. Competition Policy and the Economic Approach will appeal to academics in competition economics and law, policy-makers and practitioners in the field of antitrust/competition law as well as postgraduate students in competition law and economics. Those interested in the interplay of law and economicsin the field of competition will also find this book invaluable.

Although it is commonly assumed that consumers benefit from the application of competition law, this is not necessarily always the case. Economic efficiency is paramount; thus, competition law in Europe and antitrust law in the United States are designed primarily to protect business competitors (and in Europe to promote market integration), and it is only incidentally that such law may also serve to protect consumers. That is the essential starting point of this penetrating critique. The author explores the extent to which US antitrust law and EC competition law adequately safeguard consumer interests. Specifically, he shows how the two jurisdictions have gone about evaluating collusive practices, abusive conduct by dominant firms and merger activity, and how the policies thus formed have impacted upon the promotion of consumer interests. He argues that unless consumer interests are directly and specifically addressed in the assessment process, maximization of consumer welfare is not sufficiently achieved. Using rigorous analysis he develops legal arguments that can accomplish such goals as the following: replace the economic theory of ‘consumer welfare’ with a principle of consumer well-being; build consumer benefits into specific areas of competition policy; assess competition cases so that income distribution effects are more beneficial to consumers; and control mergers in such a way that efficiencies are passed directly to consumers. The author argues that, in the last analysis, the promotion of consumer well-being should be the sole or at least the primary goal of any antitrust regime. Lawyers and scholars interested in the application and development and reform of competition law and policy will welcome this book. They will find not only a fresh approach to interpretation and practice in their field – comparing and contrasting two major systems of competition law – but also an extremely lucid analysis of the various economic arguments used to highlight the consumer welfare enhancing or welfare reducing effects of business practices.

There is ongoing debate as to what competition law and policy is most suitable for developing jurisdictions. This book argues that the unique characteristics of developing jurisdictions matter when crafting and enforcing competition law and these shoul

The book is well written and readable by non economists. The approaches, questions, methodology, and basis for selection of cases/interviewees are clearly explained and justified. This book is a valuable contribution to the literature. Rhonda Smith, Competition and Consumer Law Journal Recent years have seen a trend toward an economics-based approach to the enforcement of European competition law. But what is meant by economics-based , and how does this approach sit with legal and enforcement practice? This book seeks to place in perspective the growing use of economics in European competition law enforcement by examining precisely how economics contributes to the enforcement activity of the European Commission and Courts. Christopher Decker provides unique empirical insights as to how economic theory, thinking, techniques and data have featured in decision-making in the area of co-ordinated effects. The role of economics is examined throughout the entire enforcement process, from the decision to initiate an investigation to the design and implementation of remedies, and its conclusions are of general relevance to all areas of competition law enforcement where economics is used. Utilising a broad and multifaceted conception of economics, this book is essential reading for academics and students interested in European competition law, EC competition lawyers, applied industrial economists and enforcement officials. It will also be an invaluable tool for academic libraries and institutes, government agencies, law firms and economic consultancies.

Co-written by an expert lawyer and economist, this book provides a thorough guide to the economic theory behind the regulation of mergers. The economic theory is then used to analyse the current state of European competition law, and test the success of the European Commission's search for a 'more economic approach' to merger regulation.

Competition between firms is usually the most effective way of delivering economic efficiency and what consumers want. However, there is a balance to be struck. Firms must not be over-regulated and so hampered in their development of innovative products and new strategies to compete for customers. Nor must they be completely free to satisfy a natural preference for monopoly, which would give them higher profits and a quieter life. The economic role of competition policy (control of anticompetitive agreements, mergers and abusive practices) is to maintain this balance, and an effective policy requires a nuanced understanding of the economics of industrial organization. Cases in European Competition Policy demonstrates how economics is used (and sometimes abused) in competition cases in practical competition policy across Europe. Each chapter summarizes a real case investigated by the European Commission or a national authority, and provides a critique of key aspects of the economic analysis.