Conceptions Of Personhood Can The Idea Of Individual Responsibility Remain Morally Relevant

Essay from the year 2017 in the subject Politics - Political Theory and the History of Ideas Journal, grade: High Merit, London School of Economics (Department of Government), course: Modern African Political Philosophy, language: English, abstract: A central element of African thought is the conception of communal personhood. In this essay, we will examine three such communal conceptions of personhood in light of their interrelation with individual responsibility. First, we will have a closer look on Menkiti’s communal conception of personhood and will argue that his account alone is not able to justify individual moral responsibility, but that it is compatible with Gyekye’s communal conception of personhood that underlines certain mental features that hold communal agents individually responsible for their actions. After having discussed and responded to the problem regarding the extent to which a person’s reasoning and her moral sense is shaped by the communal culture she was socialized in, we will have a look on the third communal conception of personhood that arises in a Yoruba allegory and will discuss its implications for individual responsibility. At first, we extract the preferred Yoruba communal conception of personhood out of the allegory. Then, we apply our finding of ‘self-determined but communal’ action on three possible options of receiving one’s destiny in heaven and clarify for each the realm of individual responsibility.

The first book-length treatment of a central concept in Hegel's practical philosophy - the theory of responsibility. This theory is both original and radical in its emphasis on the role and importance of social and historical conditions as a context for our actions.

In a crisp, original style the author approaches the crucial question of moral theory, the `is--ought' problem via communicative argumentation. Moving to the end of Habermas's conception of the communicative action, he introduces the concept of `radical choice' as the key to the transition from the descriptive to the normative. Phenomenological subjectivity of the intersubjective life-world is being vindicated as the `arch-value' of all derivative values, or the first principle for all normative precepts. With exceptional acumen and mastery of the philosophical argument, the author -- a young native Chinese lately trained in a Western university -- delineates a fascinating route along which the philosophical question of justification raised in the analytic tradition can be answered on the basis of phenomenology. A noteworthy contribution to the interplay between the Anglo--American and Continental schools of philosophy.

PERSONHOOD AND HEALTH CARE This book arose as a result of a pre-conference devoted to the topic held June 28, 1999 in Paris, France. The pre-conference preceded the Annual Congress of the International Academy ofLaw and Mental Health. Other chapters were solicited after the conference in order to more completely explore the relation of personhood to health care. The pre conference was held in honor of Yves Pelicier who led so many of our French colleagues in medicine, philosophy, and ethics as Christian Herve notes in his Tribute. As health care is aimed at healing persons, it is important to realize how difficult it is to construct a theory of personhood for health care, and thus, a theory of how healing in health care comes about or ought to occur. The book is divided into four parts, Concepts of the Person, Theories of Personhood in Relation to Health Care and Bioethics, Person and Identity, and Personhood and Hs Relations. Each section explores a critical arena in constructing the relation of personhood to health care. Although no exploration ofthis nature can be exhaustive, every effort was made to present both conflicting and complementary views of personhood from within similar and different philosophical and religious traditions. PART ONE: CONCEPTS OF THE PERSON Tracing the origins of the concept of person from antiquity through present day, Jean Delemeau provides an historical sketch of the development of a wide range of meanings.

This handbook explores essential philosophical questions about the experience of difference and the other in African societies. The contributions go beyond a mere discussion of empirical manifestations. They offer a critical analysis of, among other things, the very nature and essence of difference that makes such manifestations possible. Coverage examines the philosophical basis for the African contexts of gender differences, bodily differences and disability; racial, religious, and cultural differences; xenophobia and xenophilia; and issues of the otherings of non-human beings from human beings. These insightful analyses detail the ontological, epistemological, and moral foundations of difference and alterity in African societies, both traditional and modern. Readers will gain a deeper understanding into such questions as: What value is placed on the other in African societies? What is the ethics and burden of care for those considered different in African societies? What role does language play in the othering of the other in African societies? What is the nature and challenges of the alleged White-Black difference. This exploration offers a vital contribution to the philosophy of difference. It not only shows the importance of place in such theorization. It also contributes significantly to African philosophical discourse. This handbook will interest both undergraduate, postgraduate students, and researchers in such fields as African studies/philosophy, identity, racism and alterity studies in sociology, feminism and LGBT studies.

This book presents a theory of personhood and moral personhood using results from recent work on intentionality in the philosophy of mind. An account of intentional kinds, causation, and explanation is provided to resolve some current issues in moral and legal theory, and to examine questions raised in law and medicine where it is necessary to deal with human individuals at the boundaries of their lives. Topics discussed include abortion, death, euthanasia, personal identity, rights -- including the right to privacy and the right to die -- servility, and suicide.

Présentation de l'éditeur: "This work offers a new theory of what it means to be a legal person and suggests that it is best understood as a cluster property. The book explores the origins of legal personhood, the issues afflicting a traditional understanding of the concept, and the numerous debates surrounding the topic."

The social practice of forming, shaping, expressing, contesting, and maintaining personal identities makes human interaction, and therefore society, possible. Our identities give us our sense of how we are supposed to act and how we may or must treat others, so how we hold each other in our identities is of crucial moral importance. To hold someone in her identity is to treat her according to the stories one uses to make sense of who she is. Done well, holding allows individuals to flourish personally and in their interactions with others; done poorly, it diminishes their self-respect and restricts their participation in social life. If the identity is to represent accurately the person who bears it, the tissue of stories that constitute it must continue to change as the person grows and changes. Here, good holding is a matter of retaining the stories that still depict the person but letting go of the ones that no longer do. The book begins with a puzzling instance of personhood, where the work of holding someone in her identity is tragically one-sided. It then traces this work of holding and letting go over the human life span, paying special attention to its implications for bioethics. A pregnant woman starts to call her fetus into personhood. Children develop their moral agency as they learn to hold themselves and others in their identities. Ordinary adults hold and let go, sometimes well and sometimes badly. People bearing damaged or liminal identities leave others uncertain how to hold and what to let go. Identities are called into question at the end of life, and persist after the person has died. In all, the book offers a glimpse into a fascinating moral terrain that is ripe for philosophical exploration.