Conscience And Love In Making Judicial Decisions

THE CONSCIENCE OF JUDGES AND APPLICA nON OF LEGAL RULES The book is devoted to the problem of the influence of moral judgements on the result of judicial decision-making in the process of application of the established (positive) law. It is the conscience of judges that takes the central place in the research. Conscience is understood in the meaning developed in the theory of Thomas Aquinas as the complex capacity of the human being to make moral judgements which represent acts of reason on the question of what is right or wrong in a particular situation. The reason why we need a theory of conscience in making judicial decisions lies in the nature of the positive law itself. On the one hand, there is an intrinsic conflict between the law as the body of rigid rules and the law as an living experience of those who are involved in social relationships. This conflict particularly finds its expression in the collision of strict justice and equity. The idea of equity does not reject the importance of rules in legal life. What is rejected is an idolatrous attitude to the rules when the uniqueness of a human being, his well being and happiness are disregarded and sacrificed in order to fulfil the observance of the rules. The rules themselves are neither good or bad. What makes them good or bad is their application.

This pioneering scholarly oeuvre evaluates the major comparative philosophy of Islamic international criminal justice. It represents an in-depth analysis of the necessities of creating an Islamic international criminal court, its possible jurisdiction, proceedings, judgments, and sanctions. It implies a court functioning under the legal personality of the International Criminal Court, with comparative international criminal lawyers with basic knowledge of Shariah contributing to the prevention of crimes and impunity at an international level. The morality and philosophy of Islamic justice are highly relevant with reference to the atrocities committed explicitly or implicitly under the pretext of Islamic rules by superiors, groups and governments. The volume focuses on substantive criminal law and three methods of the criminal procedure, namely the inquisitorial, adversarial, and adquisitorial. The first two constitute the corpus juris of civil and common law systems. The third term presents a hybrid of the first two methods. The intention is to enhance the scope of each method of the criminal procedure comprehensively. The volume examines their variations and effects on a shared system of international criminal justice. The inherence of comparable norms in the foundation of Islamic and international criminal law affirms their efficiency in the implementation of the essence of the complementarity principle. This book will appeal to readers who are interested in comparative criminal law, international criminal justice, and Shariah criminal law. It is recommended for course literature.

This edited volume examines the very essence of the function of judges, building upon developments in the quality of justice research throughout Europe. Distinguished authors address a gap in the literature by considering the standards that individual judgments should meet, presenting both academic and practical perspectives. Readers are invited to consider such questions as: What is expected from judicial reasoning? Is there a general concept of good quality with regard to judicial reasoning? Are there any attempts being made to measure the quality of judicial reasoning? The focus here is on judges meeting the highest standards possible in adjudication and how they may be held to account for the way they reason. The contributions examine theoretical questions surrounding the measurement of the quality of judicial reasoning, practices and legal systems across Europe, and judicial reasoning in various international courts. Six legal systems in Europe are featured: England and Wales, Finland, Italy, the Czech Republic, France and Hungary as well as three non-domestic levels of court jurisdictions, including the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The depth and breadth of subject matter presented in this volume ensure its relevance for many years to come. All those with an interest in benchmarking the quality of judicial reasoning, including judges themselves, academics, students and legal practitioners, can find something of value in this book.

The legitimacy and performance of the traditional criminal justice system is the subject of intense scrutiny as the world economic crisis continues to put pressure on governments to cut the costs of the criminal justice system. This volume brings together the leading work on restorative justice to achieve two objectives: to construct a comprehensive and up-to-date conceptual framework for restorative justice suitable even for newcomers; and to challenge the barriers of restorative justice in the hope of taking its theory and practice a step further. The selected articles start by answering some fundamental questions about restorative justice regarding its historical and philosophical origins, and challenge the concept by bringing into the debate the human rights and equality discourses. Also included is material based on empirical testing of restorative justice claims especially those impacting on reoffending rates, victim satisfaction and reintegration. The volume concludes with a critique of restorative justice as well as with analytical thinking that aims to push its barriers. It is hoped that the investigations offered by this volume not only offer hope for a better system for abolitionists and reformists, but also new and convincing evidence to persuade the sceptics in the debate over restorative justice.

Being Apart from Reasons deals with the question of how we should go about using reasons to decide what to do. More particularly, the book presents objections to the most common response given by contemporary legal and political theorists to the moral complexity of decision-making in modern societies, namely: the attempt to release public agents from their argumentative burden by insulating a particular set of reasons from the general pool of reasons and assigning the former systematic priority over all other reasons. That strategy is apparent both in Rawls’ claim that reasons concerning the right are systematically prior to reasons concerning the good and in Raz’s claim that pre-emptive reasons are systematically prior to first-order reasons. The same strategy is also instantiated by certain arguments for the procedural value of law, such as Jeremy Waldron’s. In the book, each of those arguments for the insulation of reasons is objected to in order to defend the thesis the reasoning by public agents must always be as comprehensive as possible. The remaining chapters object to those arguments mentioned above which aim at justifying the exclusion of certain reasons from public agents' decision-making.

This book of legal philosophy contends that positive law is better understood if it is not too easily equated with power, force, or command. Law is more a matter of discourse and deliberation than of sheer decision or of power relations. Here is thought-provoking reading for lawyers, advocates, scholars of jurisprudence, students of law, philosophy and political science, and general readers concerned with the future of the constitutional state.

Studies in Legal Logic is a collection of nine interrelated papers about the logic, epistemology and ontology of law. All of the papers were written after the publication of the author’s Reasoning with Rules and supplement the issues addressed therein. Some of the papers are new; others have been revised substantially after the publication of their original versions. The emphasis is on analysis, not on logical technicalities. Studies in Legal Logic contains chapters about the nature of norms, the role of coherence in the law, the nature of defeasibility, the role of dialectics in law and artificial intelligence, the statics and dynamics of the law, and the consistency of rules. Moreover, it contains a new, simplified and yet more powerful version of Reason-based Logic and extensive examples of how it can be used for the analysis of legal reasoning. The examples deal with legal theory construction, case-based reasoning, and judicial proof.

Building on his contributions to institutional legal theory in Institutional Legal Facts of 1993 (Law and Philosophy Library, volume 18), the author presents a comprehensive theory of legal institutions. To that end, the initial theoretical approach, which mainly concentrated on problems connected with legal powers and legal acts (acts-in-law), is widened to allow for the development of a theory of legal judgements capable of accounting not only for enacted but also unwritten law (legal principles and customary law). With the use of the concept of institutional legal facts, the structure of legal institutions is analyzed in detail. In addition to that, a classification of legal institutions is provided. Extensive attention is given to logical, as well as doctrinal problems connected with a conception of legal validity as the mode of existence of legal conditions rather than as a value of legal norms similar to the truth of propositions. The study results in an elaborate conceptual framework for institutional analysis of positive law. In a final chapter the analytical potential of the framework is put to the test by applying it to the branch of public international law known as the `law of treaties'. Readership: Specialists in legal theory and lawyers interested in theoretical issues, particularly in linguistic approaches and questions related to the institutional nature of law.