Consciousness And Action Control

The basic nuts and bolts underlying human behavior remain mysterious from a scientific point of view. Everyday acts — naming an object, suppressing the urge to say something, or grabbing a waiter’s attention with a “cappuccino, please” — remain difficult to understand from a mechanistic standpoint. Despite these challenges, research has begun to illuminate, not only the basic processes underlying human action production, but the role of conscious processing in the control of behavior. This Research Topic, “Consciousness and the Control of Action,” is devoted to surveying and synthesizing these developments from disparate fields of study.

"It is not thought as such that can move anything, but thought which is for the sake of something and is practical." This discerning insight, which dates back more than 2000years to Aristotle, seems to have been ignored by most psycholo gists. For more than 40years theories of human action have assumed that cogni tion and action are merely two sides of the same coin. Approaches as different as S-O-R behaviorism,social learning theory, consistency theories,and expectancy value theories of motivation and decision making have one thing in common: they all assume that "thought (or any other type of cognition) can move any thing," that there is a direct path from cognition to behavior. In recent years, we have become more and more aware of the complexities in volved in the relationship between cognition and behavior. People do not always do what they intend to do. Aside from several nonpsychological factors capable of reducing cognition-behavior consistency, there seems to be a set of complex psychological mechanisms which intervene between action-related cognitions, such as beliefs, expectancies, values, and intentions,and the enactment of the be havior suggested by those cognitions. In our recent research we have focused on volitional mechanismus which presumably enhance cognition-behavior consistency by supporting the main tenance of activated intentions and prevent them from being pushed aside by competing action tendencies.

In this book, an international group of leading scientists present perspectives on the control of human behavior, awareness, consciousness, and the meaning and function of perceived control or self-efficacy in people's lives. The book breaks down the barriers between subdisciplines, and thus constitutes an occasion to reflect on various facets of control in human life. Each expert reviews his or her field through the lens of perceived control and shows how these insights can be applied in practice.

This textbook provides a comprehensive introduction into the areas of human action planning and action control. It discusses the basic theoretical issues and questions in understanding the planning and control of human goal-directed action. The authors begin by presenting an integrative theoretical framework and the neurobiological foundations of action planning and execution. Subsequent chapters discuss how goals are represented and how they guide action control; how perception and action interact; how simple and complex actions are selected and planned; how multitasking works; and how actions are monitored. Topics of interest include: stimulus-triggered selections, rule-based selections, intentional action selections, and intuitive decision-making. Human Action Control is a must-have resource for advanced undergraduates, graduates, and doctorate students in cognitive psychology and related areas, such as the cognitive neurosciences, and developmental and social psychology.

This new study presents exciting international research developments on personal control and self-regulation. Each chapter examines the subject at a different level of analysis to foster a complete understanding. Brief synopses of each chapter are provided as introductions to the three major sections of the book. These sections cover the person as an agent of control, affective and cognitive mechanisms of executive agency, and reactions to threatened control.

Volumes 2 and 3.

Mental action deserves a place among foundational topics in action theory and philosophy of mind. Recent accounts of human agency tend to overlook the role of conscious mental action in our daily lives, while contemporary accounts of the conscious mind often ignore the role of mental action and agency in shaping consciousness. This collection aims to establish the centrality of mental action for discussions of agency and mind. The thirteen original essays provide a wide-ranging vision of the various and nuanced philosophical issues at stake. Among the questions explored by the contributors are: Which aspects of our conscious mental lives are agential? Can mental action be reduced to and explained in terms of non-agential mental states, processes, or events? Must mental action be included among the ontological categories required for understanding and explaining the conscious mind more generally? Does mental action have implications for related topics, such as attention, self-knowledge, self-control, or the mind-body problem? By investigating the nature, scope, and explanation of mental action, the essays presented here aim to demonstrate the significance of conscious mental action for discussions of agency and mind. Mental Action and the Conscious Mind will be of interest to scholars and graduate students working in philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, and philosophy of agency, as well as to philosophically inclined cognitive scientists.

Not nothing without you but not the same Erich Fried (1979) How do I know that I am the person who is moving? The neuroscience of action has identified specific cognitive processes that allow the organism to refer the cause or origin of an action to its agent. This sense of agency has been defined as the sense that I am the one who is causing or generating an action or a certain thought in my stream of consciousness. As such, one can distinguish actions that are self-generated from those generated by others, giving rise to the experience of a self-other disti- tion in the domain of action. A tentative list of the features distinguishing the concept of agency includes awareness of a goal, of an intention to act, and of initiation of action; awareness of movements; a sense of activity, of mental effort, and of control; and the concept of authorship. However, it remains unclear how these various aspects of action and agency are related, to what extent they are dissociable, and whether some are more basic than others. Their sources remain to be specified and their relationship to action specification and action control mechanism is as yet unknown.