Constitutional Conventions In Westminster Systems

Constitutional conventions precede law and make law making possible, but attempting to define them is politically risky yet increasingly necessary.

This book explores how the governmental elites in Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa understand their Westminster system. It examines in detail four interrelated features of Westminster systems. Firstly, the increasing centralisation in collective, responsible cabinet government. Second, the constitutional convention of ministerial and collective responsibility. Third, the role of a professional, non-partisan public service. And finally, parliament's relationship to the executive. The authors explain the changes that have occured in the Westminster model by analysing four traditions: royal prerogative, responsible government, constitutional bureaucracy, and representative government. They suggest that each tradition has a recurring dilemma, between centralisation and decentralisation, party government and ministerial responsibility, professionalisation and politicisation, and finally elitism and participation. They go on to argue that these dilemmas recur in four present-day debates: the growth of prime ministerial power, the decline in individual and collective ministerial accountability, politicisation of the public service, and executive dominance of the legislature. They conclude by identifying five meanings of - or narratives about - Westminster. Firstly, 'Westminster as heritage' - elite actors' shared governmental narrative understood as both precedents and nostalgia. Second, 'Westminster as political tool' - the expedient cloak worn by governments and politicians to defend themselves and criticise opponents. Third, 'Westminster as legitimising tradition' - providing legitimacy and a context for elite actions, serving as a point of reference to navigate this uncertain world. Fourth, 'Westminster as institutional category' - it remains a useful descriptor of a loose family of governments with shared origins and characteristics. Finally, 'Westminster as an effective political system' - it is a more effective and efficient political system than consensual parliamentary governments. Westminster is a flexible family of ideas that is useful for many purposes and survives, even thrives, because of its meaning in use to élite actors.

The extension to other Realms of the reserve power to refuse a dissolution

This book illuminates how law and politics interact in the judicial doctrines and explores how democracy sustains and is sustained by the exercise of judicial power.

This book examines New Zealand's constitution, through the lens of constitutional realism. It looks at the practices, habits, conventions and norms of constitutional life. It focuses on the structures, processes and culture that govern the exercise of public power – a perspective that is necessary to explore and account for a lived, rather than textual, constitution. New Zealand's constitution is unique. One of three remaining unwritten democratic constitutions in the world, it is characterised by a charming set of anachronistic contrasts. “Unwritten”, but much found in various written sources. Built on a network of Westminster constitutional conventions but generously tailored to local conditions. Proudly independent, yet perhaps a purer Westminster model than its British parent. Flexible and vulnerable, while oddly enduring. It looks to the centralised authority that comes with a strong executive, strict parliamentary sovereignty, and a unitary state. However, its populace insists on egalitarian values and representative democracy, with elections fiercely conducted nowadays under a system of proportional representation. The interests of indigenous Maori are protected largely through democratic majority rule. A reputation for upholding the rule of law, yet few institutional safeguards to ensure compliance.

A much-needed historical perspective in the highly relevant contemporary debates around these two notions by contextualising their discussion from ancient Greece to Soviet Russia.

The foundations upon which our democracies stand are inherently flawed, vulnerable to corrosion from within. What is the remedy? A. C. Grayling makes the case for a clear, consistent, principled and written constitution, and sets out the reforms necessary – among them addressing the imbalance of power between government and Parliament, imposing fixed terms for MPs, introducing proportional representation and lowering the voting age to 16 (the age at which you can marry, gamble, join the army and must pay taxes if you work) – to ensure the intentions of such a constitution could not be subverted or ignored. As democracies around the world show signs of decay, the issue of what makes a good state, one that is democratic in the fullest sense of the word, could not be more important. To take just one example: by the simplest of measures, neither Britain nor the United States can claim to be truly democratic. The most basic tenet of democracy is that no voice be louder than any other. Yet in our ‘first past the post’ electoral systems a voter supporting a losing candidate is unrepresented, his or her voice unequal to one supporting a winning candidate, who frequently does not gain a majority of the votes cast. This is just one of a number of problems, all of them showing that democratic reform is a necessity in our contemporary world.