Contract Law Without Foundations

This book advances a theoretical account of contract law, grounded in value pluralism. Arguing against attempts to delineate branches of legal doctrine by reference to single unifying values, the book suggests that a field such as contract law can only be explained and justified by the interaction of a multiplicity of moral values. In recent times, the philosophy of contract law has been dominated by the 'promise theory', according to which the morality of promise provides a 'blueprint' for the structure, shape, and content that contract law rules and doctrines should take. The promise theory is an example of what this book calls a 'foundationalist' theory, whereby areas of law reflect or are underlain by particular moral principles or sets of such principles. By considering contract law from the point of view of its theory, rules and doctrines, and broader political context, the book argues that the promise theory can only ever offer part of the picture. The book claims that 'top-down' theories of contract law such as the promise theory and its bitter rival the economic analysis of law seriously mishandle legal doctrine by ignoring or underplaying the irreducible plurality of values that shape contract law. The book defends the role of this multiplicity of values in forging contract doctrine by developing from the 'ground-up' a radical and distinctly republican reinterpretation of the field. The book encourages readers to move away from a 'top-down' theory of contract law such as the promise theory and instead embrace a distinctly republican approach to contract law that would justify the legal rules and doctrines we find in particular jurisdictions at particular times.

The 17 essays of this collection explore key philosophical questions underlying the institution of contract, and the philosophical issues arising in specific contract law doctrines, including contract formation, contract interpretation, unfair terms, the principle of good faith, defences, and remedies.

These essays have been specifically selected to further students' understanding of the basics of contract law, and they cover a wide range of topics. The text serves as an excellent facilitator for thought-provoking classroom discussions. Topics include contract formation, remedies for breach, and defenses.

"This book reconsiders the foundations of contract law by clarifying the meaning of fairness and choice. It shows how these ideas were muddled with rise of voluntarism and conceptualism in the nineteenth century. Contract was defined in term of the will of the parties, even though often the parties are bound by terms to which they did not consciously assent and sometimes they are not bound by harsh terms to which they assented. Rules were formulated without regard to the purposes that contract law serves. Current theory and practice recognize these problems but cannot resolve them because they lack a clear idea of fairness in exchange. They approach them by manipulating the idea of choice, or by creating exceptions to previously accepted rules, or by introducing vaguely conceived policy considerations. Economic approaches disregard fairness entirely. This book revives a pre-nineteenth century idea of fairness in exchange. This idea is consistent with modern economic thought and can reconcile concerns about fairness, party autonomy, and the purposes that a contact serves for society and the parties themselves. This book presents an account of contract law that is principled, comprehensive, systematic, and operational in the sense that it explains or criticizes what courts actually do. It seeks to explain the enforceability of contracts, unconscionability, the effect of mistake, and changed circumstances, and problems of assent, interpretation, good faith, and remedies"--

This book advances a theoretical account of contract law, grounded in value pluralism. Arguing against attempts to delineate branches of legal doctrine by reference to single unifying values, the book suggests that a field such as contract law can only be explained and justified by the interaction of a multiplicity of moral values. In recent times, the philosophy of contract law has been dominated by the 'promise theory', according to which the morality of promise provides a 'blueprint' for the structure, shape, and content that contract law rules and doctrines should take. The promise theory is an example of what this book calls a 'foundationalist' theory, whereby areas of law reflect or are underlain by particular moral principles or sets of such principles. By considering contract law from the point of view of its theory, rules and doctrines, and broader political context, the book argues that the promise theory can only ever offer part of the picture. The book claims that 'top-down' theories of contract law such as the promise theory and its bitter rival the economic analysis of law seriously mishandle legal doctrine by ignoring or underplaying the irreducible plurality of values that shape contract law. The book defends the role of this multiplicity of values in forging contract doctrine by developing from the 'ground-up' a radical and distinctly republican reinterpretation of the field. The book encourages readers to move away from a 'top-down' theory of contract law such as the promise theory and instead embrace a distinctly republican approach to contract law that would justify the legal rules and doctrines we find in particular jurisdictions at particular times.

Foundations of Private Law is a treatise on the Western law of property, contract, tort and unjust enrichment in both common law systems and civil law systems. The thesis of the book is that underlying these fields of law are common principles, and that these principles can be used to explain the history and development of these areas. These underlying common principles are matters of common sense, which were given their archetypal expression by older jurists who wrote in the Aristotelian tradition. These principles shaped the development of Western law but can resolve legal problems which these older writers did not confront.