Controlling Modern Government

'This book takes the comparative study of regulation to a new level. Working with contributions across three domains by a number of national experts, the authors weave a dazzling account of the rich variety of oversight mechanisms in public services and central government. the book provides not only detailed cross-national empirical analysis but also a compelling theoretical lens for the comparative analysis of regulatory systems. Superbly written, this is simply a must for every scholar and policymaker with a serious interest in the nature of regulatory and control practices.' - Michael Power, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK 'This book sets a new standard for systematic use of comparative information in studies on accountability and control. It is a welcome change from the past tendency in this field to build theoretical mountains on empirical molehills.' - Charles Polidano, Office of the Prime Minister, Malta Are public sector institutions being exposed to ever-greater oversight, audit and inspection in the name of efficiency, accountability and risk management? Controlling Modern Government explores the long-term development of controls over government across five major state traditions in developed democracies - US, Japan, variants of continental-European models, a Scandinavian case and variants of the Westminster model.

Are public sector institutions being exposed to ever-greater oversight, audit and inspection in the name of efficiency, accountability and risk management? "Controlling Modern Government" explores the long-term development of controls over government across five major state traditions in developed democracies - US, Japan, variants of continental-European models, a Scandinavian case and variants of the Westminster model. A central aspect of the study is an eight country comparison of variety in the use of controls based in oversight, competition, mutuality and contrived randomness in the selected domains of the high bureaucracy at the core of the state, the higher education sector and the prison sector. Countries covered include Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, the UK and the USA. Providing a comparison of trends in the last quarter century in control over public sector activities in OECD countries, this book will be invaluable reading for academics and graduate students focussing on political science and public administration, as well as policymakers in OECD countries.

"The author treats the classic problem of achieving democratic control over powerful bureaucracies very successfully both by treating familiar material in a new and important way and by presenting new empirical evidence on the problem. . . . This is the most sophisticated and systematic work on the subject. . . . exceedingly well written--succinct, direct, and even graceful."--Dale Rogers Marshall, University of California, Davis "The author treats the classic problem of achieving democratic control over powerful bureaucracies very successfully both by treating familiar material in a new and important way and by presenting new empirical evidence on the problem. . . . This is the most sophisticated and systematic work on the subject. . . . exceedingly well written--succinct, direct, and even graceful."--Dale Rogers Marshall, University of California, Davis

This book examines the development of the theory and practice of constitutionalism, defined as a political system in which the coercive power of the state is controlled through a pluralistic distribution of political power. It explores the main venues of constitutional practice in ancient Athens, Republican Rome, Renaissance Venice, the Dutch Republic, seventeenth-century England, and eighteenth-century America. From its beginning in Polybius' interpretation of the classical concept of mixed government, the author traces the theory of constitutionalism through its late medieval appearance in the Conciliar Movement of church reform and in the Huguenot defense of minority rights. After noting its suppression with the emergence of the nation-state and the Bodinian doctrine of sovereignty, the author describes how constitutionalism was revived in the English conflict between king and Parliament in the early Stuart era, and how it has developed since then into the modern concept of constitutional democracy.

Although the growth of bureaucracy has accompanied modernization throughout the world, it has been especially unsettling for America's particular system of democracy. American government has adapted to the rise of the administrative state through three, often-conflicting, means of promoting accountability. It has sought to ensure desired qualities in agency decision making through participatory opportunities and standards of rationality that are enforced through the courts. And both the president and Congress have sought to monitor and shape agencies' actions in accordance with their own policy preferences. Each of these controls has received considerable attention, but there are few up-to-date discussions of all three. This book fills that void by providing a balanced overview of the institutional powers and resources associated with administrative due process and executive and legislative oversight at the federal level.