Corporate Governance And China S H Share Market

Using detailed case studies of the first nine mainland Chinese companies to be listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange (1993 94), Alice de Jonge examines the evolution of corporate governance law and culture in China s H-share market. A story emerges not of tensions between ideas of corporate governance from two different legal systems Hong Kong vs. mainland Chinese nor about legal convergence as China adopts concepts from Anglo-American jurisdictions. Rather, it is a story of individual firms being pragmatic in mediating the different agendas of state-agencies that own or control them. Corporate Governance and China s H-Share Market looks at corporate governance in a cross-border context is unique in providing a detailed understanding of China s H-share market reveals why a beer company was the first ever Chinese firm to be listed overseas. This fascinating work will appeal to postgraduate students and scholars of corporate governance, Asian law and legal systems and Asian business, as well as Chinese scholars more generally. Professionals such as law practitioners working in Chinese law will also find the book of interest.

As China has aligned itself more closely with the international economy, it has also sought to adopt more Western-style corporate governance mechanisms. This report provides an overview of overview of corporate governance mechanisms in China, as well as an examination of continuing challenges and policy implications.

ÔDing ChenÕs detailed institutional analysis of the development of the Chinese stock market brings the question of enforcement to centre stage. In doing so, she not only introduces readers to the particularities of the Chinese system; she also sheds new light on conventional debates about the law and economics of corporate governance.Õ Ð Andrew Johnston, University of Sheffield, UK ÔIn this book Dr Ding Chen has made an important theoretical contribution to our understanding of corporate governance in transitional economies and of corporate governance in China especially. Drawing upon the insights of New Institutional Economics theory she examines the interplay between formal and informal enforcement mechanisms relating to corporate governance in China. To support this argument the book breaks new ground by providing a comprehensive examination of enforcement actions in ChinaÕs stock market; her findings are at variance from conclusions found in other research, such as in the law and finance literature. Rather than simply imitating the dominant Anglo-American model of corporate governance, she argues that local conditions will greatly affect the choice of the most appropriate governance models. This has been especially so in China.Õ Ð Roman Tomasic, University of South Australia and Durham Law School, UK This important new book attempts to establish a fresh conceptual framework for the study of corporate governance by employing the new institutional economics of contract enforcement. This framework helps to clarify two critical issues including the role of law in financial development and whether there is an optimal corporate governance model that should be followed by countries attempting to develop their own stock markets. Applying this novel framework, the author conducts a comprehensive study on Chinese corporate governance and discovers that the Chinese stock market has rapidly expanded even in the absence of any effective institutions. She provides a credible explanation to this ÔChina puzzleÕ by arguing that the growth of the stock market is mainly driven by state guarantees, institutional rent seeking by state-owned companies, financial repression and investorsÕ speculation. Indeed, there is probably nowhere better to look than ChinaÕs stock market to assess the limits of the gradualist approach to financial development. As the book explains, the potential efficiency gains that could be created by a healthy, well-functioning stock market have been completely outweighed by the consideration of maintaining the existing political system. This book will appeal to scholars and students of economics and law with an interest in corporate governance, Chinese economic development and new institutional economics.

Listing by companies from one country on the stock market of another country is a device often used both to raise capital in, and to increase bonding with, the target country. This book examines the listing by Chinese companies on the Hong Kong stock market. It discusses the extent of the phenomenon, compares the two different regulatory regimes, and explores the motivations for the cross-listing. It argues that a key factor, in addition to raising capital and bonding with the Hong Kong market, is Chinese companies’ desire to encourage legal and regulatory reforms along Hong Kong lines in mainland China, in order to develop and open up China’s domestic capital markets.

This book examines the nature of the marketization of corporate boards following the introduction of the split share reform, corporate board and shareholder relations, corporate performance, and risk-taking conduct in China. The chapters cover topics such as determinants of corporate board size and independence, corporate risk-taking conduct under different controlling shareholder types. The book deepens our understanding of corporate governance mechanisms as most previous studies have limited their findings using mainstream perspectives grounded on neoclassical theory. It outlines that China’s corporate board composition is determined by the board’s scope of operation, monitoring, bargaining power, and other governance mechanisms and regulations. It also offers a comparison between China’s experience with other economies in general and other transition economies in particular. As such, the book represents an essential overview of the current concerns regarding corporate governance in China. It is of great interest to legal researchers, policymakers, and legal practitioners working with business investments in China.

A timely evaluation of rapidly globalizing governance mechanisms in China and Japan. This book looks at how corporate governance practices in these countries are adapting to Anglo-American practices, but argues that these adaptations are selective, and both countries continue to retain their own local corporate governance practices in some areas.