Counsel And Conscience

In Lutheran Germany of the post-Reformation era (ca. 1580–1750), a genre of pastoral, ethical writings arose that consisted in casuistry and in topically or thematically related theological counsels. In this first volume of the new Refo500 series Mayes shows that this casuistry literature was intended to instruct and comfort the consciences of Christians. Lutheran casuistry, related to but also distinct from Roman Catholic and Reformed counterparts, arose especially as pastors looked within Holy Scripture, the medieval tradition, and the writings of Martin Luther and other Lutheran authorities for answers to ethical problems and doctrinal disputes, and then catalogued their findings. As an extensive example from this genre Mayes examines the Thesaurus Consiliorum Et Decisionum, published in 1671 by Georg Dedekenn and Johann Ernst Gerhard. This Thesaurus was an anthology of wise advice from Lutheran theologians and jurists, published to encourage readers to avoid individualistic ethical choices and instead to engage in an "aristocratic" process of moral decision making in which one would consult the wise men of the past and present. The counsels included in the Thesaurus address inter-confessional disputes, intra-Lutheran disputes, sacraments, church government, pastoral ministry, social ethics, marriage, sexual ethics, and many other topics. The topics of divorce and remarriage, especially, show the different ways in which Lutherans reasoned about moral matters. The author shows that in the Thesaurus the Lutheran casuistry literature, which has been overlooked in most scholarship of the 20th and 21st centuries, was in bloom. It arose to meet the needs of people who had doubts, and it continued to instruct and console Christian consciences for many generations.

On trial practice, defense lawyers, and legal ethics, by discussing the murder of Lord William Russell in London, May 5, 1840, and a reconstruction of the trial of his valet, Benjamin François Courvoisier.

In 1776, Thomas Paine declared the end of royal rule in the United States. Instead, “law is king,” for the people rule themselves. Paine’s declaration is the dominant American understanding of how political power is exercised. In making law king, American lawyers became integral to the exercise of political power, so integral to law that legal ethics philosopher David Luban concluded, “lawyers are the law.” American lawyers have defended the exercise of this power from the Revolution to the present by arguing their work is channeled by the profession’s standards of ethical behavior. Those standards demand that lawyers serve the public interest and the interests of their paying clients before themselves. The duties owed both to the public and to clients meant lawyers were in the marketplace selling their services, but not of the marketplace. This is the story of power and the limits of ethical constraints to ensure such power is properly wielded. The Lawyer’s Conscience is the first book examining the history of American lawyer ethics, ranging from the mid-eighteenth century to the “professionalism” crisis facing lawyers today.

Voices of Conscience analyzes how the link between politics and conscience was articulated and shaped throughout the seventeenth century by confessors who acted as counsellors to monarchs. Against the backdrop of the momentous intellectual, theological, and political shifts that marked this period, the study examines comparatively how the ethical challenges of political action were confronted in Spain and France and how questions of conscience became a major argument in the hegemonic struggle between the two competing Catholic powers. As Nicole Reinhardt demonstrates, 'counsel of conscience' was not a peripheral feature of early-modern political culture, but fundamental for the definition of politics and conscience. Tracing the rise and fall of confessors as counsellors reveals the parallel transformation of both, approaching a historical understanding of the modernisation of politics with the idea of an 'individual conscience' at its heart. Placed at the junction of norms and practices, royal confessors, directly or in oblique reflection, shaped the ways in which the royal conscience was identified and scrutinized. By the same token, the royal confessors' expertise and activities remained a source of anxiety and conflict that triggered wide debate on the relationship between State and Church, religion and politics. The notion of 'counsel of conscience', of which this book provides the first in-depth analysis, allows the reader to re-examine and challenge fundamental historical paradigms such as the emergence of 'absolutism', individualisation, and the division of public and private. Putting theological concepts and religious dimensions back into political theory and practice sheds new light, not only on the importance of counselling for early modern statecraft, but also on the reconfiguration of the normative frameworks underlying it.

An examination of a fundamental aspect of the intellectual history of early modern Europe.

In Western thought, it has been persistently assumed that in moral and political matters, people should rely on the inner voice of conscience rather than on external authorities, laws, and regulations. This volume investigates this concept, examining the development of the Western politics of conscience, from Socrates to the present, and the formation of the Western ethico-political subject. The work opens with a discussion of the ambiguous role of conscience in politics, contesting the claim that it is the best defense against totalitarianism. It then look back at canonical authors, from the Church Fathers and Luther to Rousseau and Derrida, to show how the experience of conscience constitutes the foundation of Western ethics and politics. This unique work not only synthesizes philosophical and political insights, but also pays attention to political theology to provide a compelling and innovative argument that the experience of conscience has always been at the core of the political Western tradition. An engaging and accessible text, it will appeal to political theorists and philosophers as well as theologians and those interested in the critique of the Western civilization.

Clifford Judkins Durr was an Alabama lawyer who played an important role in defending activists and other accused of disloyalty during the New Deal and McCarthy eras. His uncompromising commitment to civil liberties and civic decency caused him to often take unpopular positions. In 1933, Durr moved to Washington to work as a lawyer for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a creation of Roosevelt’s new Democratic administration, becoming a dedicated New Dealer in the process. He was then appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), a politically sensitive position as FDR sought to counter the increasing power and concentration of broadcasters, many of whom were opponents of the New Deal. Durr resigned from the FCC in 1948 and after brief employment with the National Farmers Union in Colorado, the Durrs eventually returned to Montgomery, Alabama in the hope of returning to a more prosperous, less controversial life. Durr continued to practice in Montgomery as counsel for black citizens whose rights had been violated and ultimately, in December, 1955, when police arrested Rosa Parks for refusing to give her bus seat to a white man he stepped in and lent his extensive legal prowess to her case and the continuing quest for civil rights. Closing his firm in 1964 Durr began to lecture in the United States and abroad. He died at his grandfather's farm in 1975

A discussion on the tradition of American legal positivism--the theory that ""it is necessary, in working with law, to set morals aside."" Notre Dame law professor Shaffer argues that modern-day attorney-client relationships are characterized either by the ""ethics of role"" (the lawyer does what the client wants, or tells the client what to do) or by the ""ethics of isolation"" (moral statements, but no dialogue). It is a delusion, Shaffer suggests, to pretend that conscience has nothing to do with serving a client or that lawyer and client do not influence each other. In place of ""adversary ethics,"" Shaffer urges the profession to adopt an ""ethics of care"": a professional relation marked by openness in moral dialogue, in which the lawyer's calling becomes a form of ministry. Telling the client, ""it's up to you,"" after a full exchange of views, is not the same as saying ""whatever you want.""For Shaffer, the American legal system's avoidance of moral ""witnessing"" is nurtured by the legal education; the (often unstated) choice is not against morals, but ""against morals as having intellectual importance."" Law-school instruction either flatly avoids moral questions or, by failing to explore students' stated moral positions, suggests that there is no discipline in moral discourse. Law school is where things have to begin changing: there, ""we can still try to tell the truth to one another."" In elaborating his ethical view, Shaffer segues neatly from Barth to Buber to Trollope's Orley Farm to American legal history to the lives of Thomas More and Franz Jagerstatter. This is an unremittingly ""learned"" book--tough sledding for the intellectually unprepared--but intelligent, well-argued, and bound to become controversial among law-and-ethics scholars.