Counterinsurgency And Counterterrorism

This book illustrates how Africa’s defence and security domains have been radically altered by drastic changes in world politics and local ramifications. First, the contributions of numerous authors highlight the transnational dimensions of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in Africa and reveal the roles played by African states and regional organisations in the global war on terror. Second, the volume critically evaluates the emerging regional architectures of countering terrorism, insurgency, and organised violence on the continent through the African Union Counterterrorism Framework (AU-CTF) and Regional Security Complexes (RSC). Third, the book sheds light on the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency (CT-COIN) structures and mechanisms established by specific African states to contain, degrade, and eliminate terrorism, insurgency, and organised violence on the continent, particularly the successes, constraints, and challenges of the emerging CT-COIN mechanisms. Finally, the volume highlights the entry of non-state actors – such as civil society, volunteer groups, private security companies, and defence contractors – into the theatre of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in Africa through volunteerism, community support for state-led CT-COIN Operations, and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). This book will be of use to students and scholars of security studies, African studies, international relations, and terrorism studies, and to practitioners of development, defence, security, and strategy.

What do we know about effectively countering terrorism? What are the characteristics of successful or unsuccessful counter terrorism campaigns? This title addresses these and related questions, contributing to national security policy as well as to our understanding of the terrorist threat and how it can be defeated.

The United States has long faced numerous problems when fighting insurgencies. Many of these concern the performance of local allies, who typically playa leading role in counterinsurgency. In this monograph, Dr. Daniel Hyman reviews the problems common to the security forces of local allies that have fought or may soon fight insurgencies linked to al-Qa'ida. He argues that these problems stem from deep structural weaknesses, such as the regime's perceived illegitimacy, poor civil-military relations, an undeveloped economy and discriminatory societies. Together, they greatly inhibit the allied armed forces' effectiveness in fighting the insurgents. Various U.S. programs designed to work with allied security forces, at best, can reduce some of these issues. To be effective, any program to assist allied counterinsurgency forces should factor in the allies' weaknesses.

This study examines the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaign against al Shabaab in Somalia. It concludes that, while al Shabaab was weakened between 2011 and 2016, it could resurge if urgent steps are not taken to address key challenges.

This study has been undertaken as the first ever joint research publication between defence institutions in Denmark and Pakistan. Given the development in international security politics in the last few years, it is fair to argue that both Denmark and Pakistan are at a point where future security challenges require a development of policies and strategies. Though the roles of Denmark and Pakistan respectively are different in nature, a lot of commonalities in conceptual thoughts and actions were found between the two countries at all levels. The book at hand gathers a number of lessons identified from Afghanistan and Pakistan with the objective of promoting sustainable regional peace building and developing military and civilian cooperation strategies for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.

The single greatest national security question currently facing the U.S. National Command Authority is how best to counter violent extremism. The National Command Authority has four broad strategies through which it may employ military forces to counter violent extremism: counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, support to insurgency, and antiterrorism. The Long War is anticipated to continue for decades, perhaps generations. Thus, it is imperative to select the best strategy or strategies for employing military forces. Based on historical lessons in combating terrorism, the best strategy is efficient and sustainable and avoids overreacting, acting incompetently, or appearing to be either over reactive or incompetent. Counterinsurgency is neither efficient nor sustainable from a military, economic, or political perspective. It is a high risk strategy because it is a large, highly visible undertaking through which the United States may easily overreact, act incompetently, or be perceived as overreacting or being incompetent. Counterterrorism, support to insurgency, and antiterrorism are each both efficient and sustainable from a military and economic perspective. These three strategies each have inherent political concerns, hazards, or constraints. However it is considerably less likely that the United States will overreact, behave incompetently, or be perceived as overreacting or being incompetent through engaging in one or more of these three strategies than by engaging in counterinsurgency. Support to insurgencies is economically and militarily efficient and sustainable, but it carries substantial political risks. Thus, an overall strategy combining counterterrorism and antiterrorism is the best means of employing military forces to counter violent extremism.

Product Description: Discussion of armed groups which are considered to include classic insurgents, terrorists, guerrillas, militias, police agencies, criminal organizations, war-lords, privatized military organizations, mercenaries, pirates, drug cartels, apocalyptic religious extremists, orchestrated rioters and mobs, and tribal factions. To study armed groups use of history, political science, anthropology, sociology, theology, and economics are traditional areas of research. The book also delves into matters of ethics, technology, intelligence, education, the law, diplomacy, military science, and even mythology. The book is divided into five sections: History and armed groups, Present context and environment, Religion and inspiration, thinking differently about armed groups, the shpae of things to come.

This book critically explores the emerging architecture of regional security in Africa with particular reference to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in the Lake Chad Basin Region. In New Architecture of Regional Security in Africa, the contributors--scholars, policy-makers, and defense/security practitioners from both within and outside Africa--examine the evolution, dynamics, and working mechanisms for peace and security or emerging regional security architecture for regional security in the region. The volume will be essential reading for all academics, scholars, and researchers in academia and NGOs with interests in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism related issues in the Lake Chad Basin region. Additionally, the volume will also be useful for students of counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, small wars, terrorism and strategic studies, and defense and security studies. It will also provide invaluable reference material for policy practitioners working on the activities in the contemporary operating environment within the Lake Chad Basin region. This book offers innovative perspectives on the emerging architecture for regional security in Africa, with a focus on how member states of the Lake Chad Basin Commission are coping with the challenges of terrorism and insurgency. Edited by Usman A. Tar and Bashir Bala, the volume is the first to critically document regional security in the Lake Chad Basin.