Covert Rearmament In Germany 1919 1939

"Beginning with an investigation of the interwar neglect that left the Allied militaries incapable of defeating Nazi aggression at the start of World War II, Hart examines the wartime paths the Allies took toward improved military effectiveness. He also explores the continuous German adaptation that prolonged the war and increased the price of eventual Allied victory.

Written by the undisputed dean of U.S. denial and deception experts, Practise to Deceive is the most in-depth look at deception as a military strategy. Barton Whaley knew the history of denial and deception across time, disciplines, and culture. He was the foremost authority on the intricacies of denial and deception strategy and tactics. For Whaley, deception was a mind-game, requiring imagination, deep critical thought, a profound understanding of the enemy as well as one’s self (a variation of Sun Tzu), and patience and fortitude. This book presents 88 vividly descriptive case studies to serve as a handbook for intelligence and military professionals. In Whaley’s analysis, variations in guilefulness between opposing individuals or groups can be crucial in deciding who achieves victory in combat.

Published in 2004, Military Deception and Strategic Surprise! is a valuable contribution to the field of Military and Strategic Studies.

Securitizing Balance of Power Theory: A Polymorphic Reconceptualization by Ilai Z. Saltzman presents a cutting-edge attempt to re-conceptualize one of the fundamental concepts of International Relations theory--balance of power theory--by examining insights from historical analysis of interwar and post-Cold War cases.

Deterrence, Coercion, and Appeasement presents a compelling and original survey of British grand strategy in the inter-war period. Whereas most existing accounts privilege either diplomacy and foreign affairs, intelligence, or military affairs more narrowly, this study underlines the inexorable relationships between foreign policy, grand strategy, military force, intelligence, finance and not least, domestic politics and public opinion. Britain was the world's only global power in the inter-war period, and it confronted problems on a global scale. Policy-makers sought two goals: peace with security. They did so successfully in the 1920s, partly due to favourable circumstances that made their task relatively easy, and partly because they understood the strengths and limitations of British power and knew how to wield them. The situation deteriorated rapidly in the 1930s, however, as the international system became increasingly unfavourable to Britain. Policy-makers proved less adept than their predecessors at meeting these new challenges, partly because those challenges were more formidable, but also because they lacked the self-confidence of their predecessors, who had held high office during the most difficult years of the First World War and who lacked their understanding of how to wield the lever of international power. The study ends by providing a new and more sophisticated account of how and why Neville Chamberlain appeased the fascist powers in the late 1930s, and why Winston Churchill opposed him and eventually supplanted him in May 1940.