Crafting Civilian Control Of The Military In Venezuela

Unlike most other emerging South American democracies, Venezuela has not succumbed to a successful military coup d'etat during four decades of democratic rule. What drives armed forces to follow the orders of elected leaders? And how do emerging democracies gain that control over their military establishments? Harold Trinkunas answers these questions in an examination of Venezuela's transition to democracy following military rule and its attempts to institutionalize civilian control of the military over the past sixty years, a period that included three regime changes. Trinkunas first focuses on the strategic choices democratizers make about the military and how these affect the internal civil-military balance of power in a new regime. He then analyzes a regime's capacity to institutionalize civilian control, looking specifically at Venezuela's failures and successes in this arena during three periods of intense change: the October revolution (1945-48), the Pact of Punto Fijo period (1958-98), and the Fifth Republic under President Hugo Chavez (1998 to the present). Placing Venezuela in comparative perspective with Argentina, Chile, and Spain, Trinkunas identifies the bureaucratic mechanisms democracies need in order to sustain civilian authority over the armed forces.

This second edition of The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations offers a wide-ranging, internationally focused overview of the field of civil-military relations. The armed forces are central actors in most societies and are involved in many different roles. Amongst other activities, they engage in peace operations, support the police in fighting crime, support civilian authorities in dealing with natural disasters, and fight against terrorists and in internal conflicts. The existing literature on this subject is limited in its discussion of warfighting and thus does not do justice to the variety of roles. This second edition not only fills this important lacuna but offers an up-to-date comparative analysis and provides a conceptual framework to analyze how strategies can realistically be implemented. Amalgamating ideas from key thinkers in the field, the book is organized into three main thematic parts: Part I: Civil-Military Relations in Non-Democratic States and Illiberal Democracies; Part II: Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies; Part III: Civil-Military Relations in Established Democracies. This handbook will be essential reading for students and practitioners in the fields of civil-military relations, defense studies, war and conflict studies, international security, and IR in general.

The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations not only fills this important lacuna, but offers an up-to-date comparative analysis which identifies three essential components in civil-military relations: (1) democratic civilian control; (2) operational effectiveness; and (3) the efficiency of the security institutions. This Handbook will be essential reading for students and practitioners in the fields of civil-military relations.

This book argues that for a nation to become fully democratic, it must strengthen the interactions between its soldiers, politicians, and civilians.

Despite the decline in the number of military coups since the 1960s and 1970s, Militaries continue to be crucial political actors in many world regions. Their impact on the democratic development of nations, however, has been mixed. On the one hand, coups against democratically elected leaders in Mali (2012), Egypt (2013), and Thailand (2014) have spelled doom for these countries’ nascent democratic regimes and have ushered in new periods of military dominance in politics. The cases of Portugal (1974), the Philippines (1986), and Tunisia (2011), on the other hand, show that the military’s decision not to defend authoritarian leaders against mass protests contributed crucially to the fall of dictatorships and facilitated transitions to democracy. This volume addresses the military’s ambivalent role as "midwife" or "gravedigger" of democracy and highlights the often multi-layered and complex relationship between militaries’ political behaviour and democratization. The chapters were originally published in a special issue of Democratization.

Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras are four Spanish speaking countries in Central America that possess uniformed military institutions. These four countries represent different approaches to reforms of civil-military relations, and embody varying degrees of success in both institutional democratization and the managing of security forces. In this book, Orlando J. Pérez expertly examines the competing theories of civil-military relations in Central America to advance our understanding of the origins, consequences and persistence of militarism in Latin America. Divided into four parts, Pérez begins by proposing a theoretical framework for analyzing civil-military relations, including an analysis of how U.S. foreign and military policy affects the establishment of stable civilian supremacy over the armed forces. Part Two examines the institutional and legal structures under which civil-military relations are carried out revealing in Part Three the reorientation of the missions and roles performed by the armed forces in each country. The concluding part analyzes the role beliefs of members of the military and public opinion about the armed forces in relation to other institutions. Combining both qualitative and quantitative data, Pérez bridges the gap between structural and cultural analyses for a more comprehensive understanding of the links between micro and macro level factors that influence civil-military relations and democratic governance.

Bringing together leading scholars from across the world, this comprehensive Research Handbook analyses key problems, subjects, regions, and countries in civil-military relations. Showcasing cutting-edge research developments, it illustrates the deeply complex nature of the field and analyses important topics in need of renewed consideration.

This book examines the conditions under which new democracies succeed or fail in establishing firm and lasting civilian control of the military. David Kuehn and Aurel Croissant introduce a multi-dimensional conceptual framework to evaluate the degree of civilian control in new democracies and to trace developments over time. The theory of civilian control in new democracies that they propose integrates rationalist, structuralist, and institutionalist arguments into a coherent model to explain when, how, and through which causal mechanism new democracies succeed or fail in establishing and sustaining civilian control over the military. This theory is tested on an original dataset on civilian control over the military in 66 countries that have made the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule at least once in the period from 1974 to 2010. The study traces the effects of different degrees of civilian control on the survival and democratic quality of third wave democracies, combining large-N statistical analyses with detailed case study narratives of several countries. The book establishes a comprehensive understanding of the conditions and processes under which third wave democracies succeeded or failed in establishing firm and lasting civilian control of the military-and its consequences for the survival and quality of the new democratic structures, processes, and practices.