Criminal Jurisdiction Under The United States Philippine Military Bases Agreement

The peace time stationing for collective security purposes of large numbers of military personnel of one country in the territory of an other country constitutes one of the most significant developments of postwar international relations. The United States, for example, has stationed nearly one half of its active military forces in over seventy 1 countries since the Korean War broke out. Stambuk noted that al though the theories rationalizing this situation have changed, "the overseas bases and forces remain. "2 As a direct result of this stationing of large numbers of troops in foreign countries numerous bilateral and multilateral status of forces agreements have been put into force. One aspect of these agreements which has attracted considerable attention is the provisions dealing with the right to exercise criminal juris 3 diction. As might be expected, a host of jurisdictional problems has arisen concerning whether jurisdictional rights lie with the states sending or the states receiving military personnel, the accompanying civilian component, and their dependents. As Snee and Pye have pointed out: "For the first time in the modern era, the sometimes radically different systems of law of two sovereign nations are operating within the same territory and in respect to the same individuals. "4 Thus a situation has arisen in which the relationships between the military authorities of the 1 George Stambuk, American Military Forces Abroad (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State Vni versity Press, 1963), pp. 3-4.

Since the end of World War II, protests against U.S. military base and related policies have occurred in several Asian host countries. How much influence have these protests had on the p;olicy regarding U.S. military bases? What conditions make protests more likely to influence policy? Protests Against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia answers these questions by examining state response to twelve major protests in Asia since the end of World War II—in the Philippines, Okinawa, and South Korea. Yuko Kawato lays out the conditions under which protesters' normative arguments can and cannot persuade policy-makers to change base policy, and how protests can still generate some political or military incentives for policy-makers to adjust policy when persuasion fails. Kawato also shows that when policy-makers decide not to change policy, they can offer symbolic concessions to appear norm-abiding and to secure a smoother implementation of policies that protesters oppose. While the findings will be of considerable interest to academics and students, perhaps their largest impact will be on policy makers and activists, for whom Kawato offers recommendations for their future decision-making and actions.