Cultural Rights As Collective Rights

Cultural Rights as Collective Rights offers a comprehensive analysis of the conceptualisation and operationalisation of collective cultural rights in distinct areas of international law. It also provides a wide panorama of case-law from every region of the world.

Using Italy and the Roma as a case study, this book proves that non-discrimination provisions are not sufficient to protect the cultural identity of minorities: a system encompassing also the use of collective rights is better suited for this purpose.

What is the relationship between culture and human rights? Can the idea of cultural rights, which are predicated on the distinctiveness and exclusivity of a communitya (TM)s beliefs and traditions, be compatible with the concept of human rights, which are universal and a ~inherenta (TM) to all human beings? If we accept such compatibility, what is the actual content of cultural rights? Who are their beneficiaries: individuals, or peoples or groups as collective entities? And what precise obligations do cultural rights pose upon states or other actors in international law, or for the international community as a whole? International instruments on the protection of human rights do not provide self-evident answers to these questions. This book seeks to analyse these dilemmas and to assess the impact that they are having on international law and the development of a coherent category of cultural human rights.

Drawing from a comprehensive review of legal instruments, practice, jurisprudence and literature, and using a multidisciplinary approach, this unique book brings forth the full spectrum of cultural rights, as individual and collective human rights, and offers a compelling vision for public policy.

In Cultural Rights in International Law and Discourse, Pok Yin S. Chow explains why the very understanding of ‘culture’ as described in international human rights law failed to capture and address the cultural concerns of groups and communities worldwide.

Most states are multination states, and most peoples are stateless peoples. Just as collectives can behave as sovereign states only if they are recognized by the international community, liberal multination states must recognize stateless peoples in order to determine their political status within that state. There is, however, no agreement on the kind of principles that should be considered, especially under classical liberalism, which gives individuals preeminence over groups. Liberal theories that attempt to accommodate collective rights are often based on a comprehensive version of liberalism that subscribes to moral individualism. Within such a framework, they develop a watered-down concept of collective rights. In A Liberal Theory of Collective Rights Michel Seymour explores the theoretical resources of John Rawls’s political liberalism and shows that this particular approach can accommodate genuine collective rights. By Rawls’s account, Seymour explains, peoples are moral agents and sources of valid moral claims and are therefore entitled to collective rights. These kinds of rights translate, in the constitution of the multination state, to a true political recognition for stateless peoples. Ultimately, A Liberal Theory of Collective Rights answers three important questions: Who is the subject of collective rights? What is the object of collective rights? And can they be institutionalized in real politics?

Explores the meaning of culture, identity and community in a Pacific context.