Defending The Ypres Front 1914 1918

Published by the Memorial Museum Passchendaele in 2016 in Dutch as Bouwen aan het front, this book examines how the German army developed field fortifications to hold what can loosely be described as the Ypres Front. With the decision by Falkenhayn in 1915 to concentrate Germanys offensive efforts largely in the east, the German defenders around Ypres set to developing their lines for semi-permanent occupation. The sub soil around the Salient generally made it difficult to construct and maintain mined (i.e. deep) dugouts—unlike on, for example the Somme, with easily worked chalk not far below the surface. The only practicable alternative was to use reinforced concrete.In this book the authors (both with many years of experience in researching and working on matters Great War, particularly the German army in Belgium) have examined in detail an impressive range of primary sources to provide a narrative of what the Germans built, how they built it (the logistical challenge was enormous) and how the designs and requirements of bunkers (for example, forward medical bunkers, artillery shelters, machine gun and observation bunkers) changed as the war progressed and as the military situation on the front dictated. There are many photographs, largely unseen by British readers, design diagrams and maps to supplement the text; whilst the activities of selected particular formations are examined in detail to provide an example of the effort that was put into the work.Additions to the Dutch edition will include a tours section, taking a visitor to accessible remaining structures in the Salient area; and a glossary of terms and their English equivalent. The book will be in full color throughout.

Of the many hard-fought battles on the Western Front, Ypres stands out as an example of almost inhuman endeavour. For four long years it was the focal point of desperate fighting. Officially there were four main battles in 1914, 1915, 1917 and 1918; these were more accurately peaks in a continuing struggle, for Ypres symbolised Belgian defiance, and the British continued to expend disproportionate resources on defending it. It never fell, although the Germans came close to its gates, and indeed its loss would have been a severe blow to morale.??The Battle Book of Ypres, originally published in 1927 and now presented again as a special Centenary Edition, comprises a chronological account of the fighting in the Ypres Salient during the First World War, followed by a useful and unique alphabetical reference to the events in and around each hamlet, village or wood Ð names familiar to those who fought or followed the course of war all those years ago, names now once again lost in insignificance. The names given to each stage of the struggle by the Battle Nomenclature Committee are listed in the appendix. Also included is an index of formations and units, an annotated bibliography and a new Foreword by military historian Nigel Cave.

Of the many hard-fought battles on the Western Front, Ypres stands out as an example of almost inhuman endeavour. For four long years it was the focal point of desperate fighting. Officially there were four main battles in 1914, 1915, 1917 and 1918; these were more accurately peaks in a continuing struggle, for Ypres symbolised Belgian defiance, and the British continued to expend disproportionate resources on defending it. It never fell, although the Germans came close to its gates, and indeed its loss would have been a severe blow to morale.The Battle Book of Ypres, originally published in 1927 and now presented again as a special Centenary Edition, comprises a chronological account of the fighting in the Ypres Salient during the First World War, followed by a useful and unique alphabetical reference to the events in and around each hamlet, village or wood names familiar to those who fought or followed the course of war all those years ago, names now once again lost in insignificance. The names given to each stage of the struggle by the Battle Nomenclature Committee are listed in the appendix. Also included is an index of formations and units, an annotated bibliography and a new Foreword by military historian Nigel Cave.

These three Battleground Europe books on Ypres 1914 mark the centenary of the final major battle of the 1914 campaign on the Western Front. Although fought over a relatively small area and short time span, the fighting was even more than usually chaotic and the stakes were extremely high. Authors Nigel Cave and Jack Sheldon combine their respective expertise to tell the story of the men British, French, Indian and German - who fought over the unremarkable undulating ground that was to become firmly placed in British national conscience ever afterwards.When, in October 1914, the newly created German Fourth Army attacked west to seize crossings over the Yser, prior to sweeping south in an attempt to surround the BEF, two things prevented it. To the north, it was the efforts of the Belgian army, reinforced by French troops, coupled with controlled flooding of the polders but, further south, the truly heroic defence of Langemarck, for three days by the BEF and then by the French army, was of decisive importance. The village stood as a bulwark against any further advance to the river or the town of Ypres. Here the German regiments bled to death in the face of resolute Allied defence and any remaining hope of forcing a decision in the west turned to dust.

An excerpt from a review in the Naval Institute Proceedings, Volume 47, Issues 1: THE THREE ERRORS THERE were three great German offensives on the Western Front, we are told, in each of which Germany made a great strategical blunder: the first Marne, the Verdun campaign of 1916, and the offensive begun in March, 1918. The first alleged error was in attempting the strategical offensive on two fronts at the same time. The Western Front, only one hundred and fifty miles long, was protected by the Moselle and Metz, backed by the Rhine and Strassburg; it could not have been turned by France without violating the neutrality of Belgium or Switzerland. Had Germany held this line defensively with a small part of her combatant forces while she defeated her other enemies in detail, the war would not have lasted more than two years. Thus the Germans would have avoided violating the neutrality of Belgium and the consequential British and American hostility. The failure of the western offensive is attributed particularly to the strength of Belfort, which commands the narrow pass into France between the Vosges and Jura ranges. "Had the Germans been able to capture this fortress," Sargent says, "the way would have been opened for turning the Vosges and the fortresses of Épinal, Toul and Verdun and for the envelopment of the French right wing, which, with the left wing and the little British and Belgian armies already enveloped, would no doubt have resulted in the final surrender of the French army and the capture of Paris." The Second Error: After the battle of the Marne Germany remained on the defensive on the Western Front for about eighteen months, during which she was considerably outnumbered by the Allies. She assumed the offensive in other parts of the theatre of war with successful campaigns against the Russians and Serbians. But before she had entirely disposed of Russia, Serbia and Italy, she again assumed the offensive in the West by way of the Crown Prince's tremendous campaign for Verdun—one of the most formidable in history—which failed. This is charged as a mistake because with the same effort and less loss Germany could "have completed her victories in the Eastern Front, destroyed the army at Salonica, and captured that important seaport; then with greatly superior forces have struck and crushed the Italian army; and then, with all her enemies disposed of outside of France and Belgium, have returned to the Western Front with an enormous preponderance of forces." The Third Error: After the failure at Verdun the Germans again consigned the West to the defensive role, and resumed the offensive against Russia, Romania, and Italy. But here again the Germans were not persistent, for if they had massed their available forces in turn against Salonica and Italy, probably both would have been disposed of, the Germans would have occupied Greece and the valley of the Po, and would have advanced to the French and Maritime Alps for an invasion of France via Nice. Instead of following up her advantages in the Near East and in Italy, Germany precipitated her offense of 1918 in the West, beginning on March 21, with her powerful thrust at Amiens, followed by the attack against the British around Ypres and two attacks against the French between Reimes and Montdidier towards Chateau-Thierry, in none of which attacks was she able to make a sufficiently broad rupture in the line to allow resumption of a war of movement.

The battle for Ypres in October and November 1914 represented the last opportunity for open, mobile warfare on the Western Front. In the first study of First Ypres for almost 40 years, Ian Beckett draws on a wide range of sources never previously used to reappraise the conduct of the battle, its significance and its legacy.