Deference In International Courts And Tribunals

International courts and tribunals are often asked to review decisions originally made by domestic decision-makers. This can often be a source of tension, as the international courts and tribunals need to judge how far to defer to the original decisions of the national bodies. As international courts and tribunals have proliferated, different courts have applied differing levels of deference to those originial decisions, which can lead to a fragmentation in international law. International courts in such positions rely on two key doctrines: the standard of review and the margin of appreciation. The standard of review establishes the extent to which national decisions relating to factual, legal, or political issues arising in the case are re-examined in the international court. The margin of appreciation is the extent to which national legislative, executive, and judicial decision-makers are allowed to reflect diversity in their interpretation of human rights obligations. The book begins by providing an overview of the margin of appreciation and standard of review, recognising that while the margin of appreciation explicitly acknowledges the existence of such deference, the standard of review does not: it is rather a procedural mechanism. It looks in-depth at how the public policy exception has been assessed by the European Court of Justice and the WTO dispute settlement bodies. It examines how the European Court of Human Rights has taken an evidence-based approach towards the margin of appreciation, as well as how it has addressed issues of hate speech. The Inter-American system is also investigated, and it is established how far deference is possible within that legal organisation. Finally, the book studies how a range of other international courts, such as the International Criminal Court, and the Law of the Sea Tribunal, have approached these two core doctrines.

International courts and tribunals are increasingly asked to pass judgment on matters that are traditionally considered to fall within the domestic jurisdiction of States. Especially in the fields of human rights, investment, and trade law, international adjudicators commonly evaluate decisions of national authorities that have been made in the course of democratic procedures and public deliberation. A controversial question is whether international adjudicators should review such decisions de novo or show deference to domestic authorities. This book investigates how various international courts and tribunals have responded to this question. In addition to a comparative analysis, the book provides a normative argument, discussing whether different forms of deference are justified in international adjudication. It proposes a distinction between epistemic deference, which is based on the superior capacity of domestic authorities to make factual and technical assessments, and constitutional deference, which is based on the democratic legitimacy of domestic decision-making. The book concludes that epistemic deference is a prudent acknowledgement of the limited expertise of international adjudicators, whereas the case for constitutional deference depends on the relative power of the reviewing court vis-à-vis the domestic legal order.

This book investigates how international adjudicators defer to State decision-making authority, and what that reveals about the domestic-international interface.

The Interpretation of International Law by Domestic Courts assesses the growing role of domestic courts in the interpretation of international law. It asks whether and if so to what extent domestic courts make use of the international rules of interpretation set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Given the expectation that rules of international law are to have a uniform interpretation and application throughout the world, the practice of domestic courts is considerably more diverse. The contributions to this book analyse three key questions: first, whether international law requires a coherent interpretive approach by domestic courts. Second, whether a common or convergent methodological outlook can be found in domestic court practice. Third, whether a common interpretive approach is desirable from a normative perspective. The book identfies a considerable tension between international law's ambition for universal and uniform application and a plurality of different approaches. This tension between unity and diversity is analysed by a group of leading international lawyers from a wide range of geographical, disciplinary and methodological approaches. Drawing on domestic practice of number of jurisdictions including, among others, Colombia, France, Japan, India, Israel, Mexico, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States, the book puts the interpretative practice of domestic courts in a wider context. Its chapters offer doctrinal, practical as well as theoretical perspectives on a central question for international law.

The focus of this edited volume is the often-overlooked importance of secondary rules of international law. Secondary rules of international law-such as attribution, causality, and the standard and burden of proof-have often been neglected in scholarly literature and have seen fragmented application in international legal practice. Yet the systemic nature of international law entails that coherent and consistent application of such rules is a key element in reinforcing the legitimacy of decisions of international courts and tribunals. Accelerated development of international law and international litigation, coupled with the fragmented nature of the adjudicatory terrain calls for theoretical scrutiny and systemic analysis of the developments in the judicial treatment of secondary rules. This publication makes three important contributions to the study of secondary rules. First, it offers a comprehensive, expert doctrinal analysis of how standard of review, causation, evidentiary rules, and attribution operate in the case law of international courts or tribunals in fields spanning human rights, trade, investment, and humanitarian law. Second, it comparatively evaluates the divergent layers of meanings and normative expectations attached to secondary rules in international law scholarship as well as in the judicial practice of international courts and tribunals. Finally, the book investigates the role that secondary rules play in the development of the primary rules in international law and for the legitimacy of the decisions of international courts and tribunals. Earlier scholarly works have not problematized the role of secondary rules of international law in adjudication thoroughly. Secondary Rules of Primary Importance in International Law seeks to fill this gap by emphasizing the consequential nature of these secondary rules and argues that the outcome of litigation is fundamentally shaped by the exact standard of proof, standard of review, or attribution basis that is chosen by adjudicators. As such, the book offers an important resource for the study and practice of international law against the backdrop of the wide-ranging and fragmented nature of international adjudication.

Explores the contributions of international courts and tribunals in terms of performance by offering a comparative analysis of international courts.

This book examines how the International Court of Justice (ICJ) reviews State behaviour through the prism of the standard of review. It develops a novel rationale to support the ICJ's application of deferential standards of review as a judicial avoidance technique, based on strategic considerations. It then goes on to empirically assess all 31 decisions of the Court in which the standard of review was at issue, showing how the Court determines that standard, and answering the question of whether it varies its review intensity strategically. As a result, the book's original contribution is two-fold: establishing a new rationale for judicial deference (that can be applied to all international courts and tribunals); and providing the first comprehensive, empirical analysis of the ICJ's standards of review. It will be beneficial to all scholars of the Court and those interested in judicial strategy.

An innovative, interdisciplinary and far-reaching examination of the actual reality of international courts, International Court Authority challenges fundamental preconceptions about when, why, and how international courts become important and authoritative actors in national, regional, and international politics. A stellar group of scholars investigate the challenges that international courts face in transforming the formal legal authority conferred by states into an actual authority in fact that is respected by potential litigants, national actors, legal communities, and publics. Alter, Helfer, and Madsen provide a novel framework for conceptualizing international court authority that focuses on the reactions and practices of these key audiences. Eighteen scholars from the disciplines of law, political science and sociology apply this framework to study thirteen international courts operating in Africa, Latin America, and Europe, as well as on a global level. Together the contributors document and explore important and interesting variations in whether the audiences that interact with international courts around the world embrace or reject the rulings of these judicial institutions. Alter, Helfer, and Madsen's authority framework recognizes that international judges can and often do everything they 'should' do to ensure that their rulings possess the gravitas and stature that national courts enjoy. Yet even when imbued with these characteristics, the parties to the dispute, potential future litigants, and the broader set of actors that monitor and respond to the court's activities may fail to acknowledge the rulings as binding or take meaningful steps to modify their behaviour in response to them. For both specific judicial institutions, and more generally, the book documents and explains why most international courts possess de facto authority that is partial, variable, and highly dependent on a range of different audiences and contexts - and thus is highly fragile. An introduction situates the book's unique approach to conceptualizing international court authority within theoretical debates about the authority of global institutions. International Court Authority also includes critical reflections on the authority framework from legal theorists, international relations scholars, a philosopher, and an anthropologist. The book's conclusion questions a number of widely shared assumptions about how social and political contexts facilitate or undermine international courts in developing de facto authority and political power.