Democratic Dialogue And The Constitution

Constitutions divide into those that provide for a constitutionally protected set of rights, where courts can strike down legislation, and those where rights are protected predominantly by parliament, where courts can interpret legislation to protect rights, but cannot strike down legislation. The UK's Human Rights Act 1998 is regarded as an example of a commonwealth model of rights protections. It is justified as a new form of protection of rights which promotes dialogue between the legislature and the courts - dialogue being seen not just as a better means of protecting rights, but as a new form of constitutionalism occupying a middle ground between legal and political constitutionalism. This book argues that there is no clear middle ground for dialogue to occupy, with most theories of legal and political constitutionalism combining legal and political protections, as well as providing an account of interactions between the legislature and the judiciary. Nevertheless, dialogue has a role to play. It differs from legal and political constitutionalism in terms of the assumptions on which it is based and the questions it asks. It focuses on analysing mechanisms of inter-institutional interactions, and assessing when these interactions can provide a better protection of rights, facilitate deliberation, engage citizens and act as an effective check and balance between institutions of the constitution. This book evaluates dialogue in the UK constitution, assessing the protection of human rights through the Human Rights Act 1998, the common law and EU law. It also evaluates court-court dialogue between the UK court and the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. The conclusion evaluates the implications of the proposed British Bill of Rights and the referendum decision to leave the European Union.

Identifies how and why 'dialogue' can describe and evaluate institutional interactions over constitutional questions concerning democracy and rights.

Legitimation by Constitution is the phrase, coined by distinguished authors Frank Michelman and Alessandro Ferrara, for a key idea in Rawlsian political liberalism of a reliance on a dualist form of democracy-a subjection of ground-level lawmaking to the constraints of a higher-law constitution that most citizens could find acceptable as a framework for their politics-as a response to the problem of maintaining a liberally just, stable, and oppression-free democratic government in conditions of pluralist visionary conflict. Legitimation by Constitution recalls, collects, and combines a series of exchanges over the years between Michelman and Ferrara, inspired by Rawls' encapsulation of this conception in his proposed liberal principle of legitimacy. From a shared standpoint of sympathetic identification with the political-liberal statement of the problem, for which legitimation by constitution is proposed as a solution, these exchanges consider the perceived difficulties arguably standing in the way of this proposal's fulfillment on terms consistent with political liberalism's defining ideas about political justification. The authors discuss the mysteries of a democratic constituent power; the tensions between government-by-the-people and government-by-consent; the challenges posed to concretization by judicial authorities of national constitutional law; and the magnification of these tensions and challenges under the lenses of ambition towards transnational legal ordering. These discussions engage with other leading contemporary theorists of liberal-democratic constitutionalism including Bruce Ackerman, Ronald Dworkin, and Jürgen Habermas.

Constitutional law is clearly shaped by judicial actors. But who else contributes? Scholars in the past have recognized that the legislative branch plays a significant role in determining structural issues, such as separation of powers and federalism, but stopped there--claiming that only courts had the independence and expertise to safeguard individual and minority rights. In this readable and engaging narrative, the authors identify the nuts and bolts of the national dialogue and relate succinct examples of how elected officials and the general public often dominate the Supreme Court in defining the Constitution's meaning. Making use of case studies on race, privacy, federalism, war powers, speech, and religion, Devins and Fisher demonstrate how elected officials uphold individual rights in such areas as religious liberty and free speech as well as, and often better than, the courts. This fascinating debunking of judicial supremacy argues that nonjudicial contributions to constitutional interpretation make the Constitution more stable, more consistent with constitutional principles, and more protective of individual and minority rights.

Publisher Description

"The book - as the outcome of a research performed by the University of Florence and the United States Institute of Peace of Washington - explores the role of law in the process of democratic transition in South Africa. More specifically it emphasize how constitutional law may contribute to "civilize" apparently reconcilable conflicts, a part from laying down the foundations of the new legal order and institutions. The book - as the outcome of a research performed by the University of Florence and the United States Institute of Peace of Washington - explores the role of law in the process of democratic transition in South Africa. More specifically it emphasize how constitutional law may contribute to "civilize" apparently reconcilable conflicts, a part from laying down the foundations of the new legal order and institutions"--Publisher's description

In times of disenchantment with democracy and 'erosion' of the system of checks and balances, the book proposes to reflect upon the main problems of our constitutional democracies, from a particular regulative ideal: that of the conversation among equals.