Legitimation By Constitution

Legitimation by Constitution is the phrase, coined by distinguished authors Frank Michelman and Alessandro Ferrara, for a key idea in Rawlsian political liberalism of a reliance on a dualist form of democracy-a subjection of ground-level lawmaking to the constraints of a higher-law constitution that most citizens could find acceptable as a framework for their politics-as a response to the problem of maintaining a liberally just, stable, and oppression-free democratic government in conditions of pluralist visionary conflict. Legitimation by Constitution recalls, collects, and combines a series of exchanges over the years between Michelman and Ferrara, inspired by Rawls' encapsulation of this conception in his proposed liberal principle of legitimacy. From a shared standpoint of sympathetic identification with the political-liberal statement of the problem, for which legitimation by constitution is proposed as a solution, these exchanges consider the perceived difficulties arguably standing in the way of this proposal's fulfillment on terms consistent with political liberalism's defining ideas about political justification. The authors discuss the mysteries of a democratic constituent power; the tensions between government-by-the-people and government-by-consent; the challenges posed to concretization by judicial authorities of national constitutional law; and the magnification of these tensions and challenges under the lenses of ambition towards transnational legal ordering. These discussions engage with other leading contemporary theorists of liberal-democratic constitutionalism including Bruce Ackerman, Ronald Dworkin, and Jürgen Habermas.

Constitutional politics has become a major terrain of contemporary struggles. Contestation around designing, replacing, revising, and dramatically re-interpreting constitutions is proliferating worldwide. Starting with Southern Europe in post-Franco Spain, then in the ex-Communist countries in Central Europe, post-apartheid South Africa, and now in the Arab world, constitution making has become a project not only of radical political movements, but of liberals and conservatives as well. Wherever new states or new regimes will emerge in the future, whether through negotiations, revolutionary process, federation, secession, or partition, the making of new constitutions will be a key item on the political agenda. Combining historical comparison, constitutional theory, and political analysis, this volume links together theory and comparative analysis in order to orient actors engaged in constitution making processes all over the world. The book examines two core phenomena: the development of a new, democratic paradigm of constitution making, and the resulting change in the normative discussions of constitutions, their creation, and the source of their legitimacy. After setting out a theoretical framework for understanding these developments, Andrew Arato examines recent constitutional politics in South Africa, Hungary, Turkey, and Latin America and discusses the political stakes in constitution-making. The book concludes by offering a systematic critique of the alternative to the new paradigm, populism and populist constituent politics.

Constitutions are often seen as the product of the free will of a people exercising their constituent power. This, however, is not always the case, particularly when it comes to ‘imposed constitutions’. In recent years there has been renewed interest in the idea of imposition in constitutional design, but the literature does not yet provide a comprehensive resource to understand the meanings, causes and consequences of an imposed constitution. This volume examines the theoretical and practical questions emerging from what scholars have described as an imposed constitution. A diverse group of contributors interrogates the theory, forms and applications of imposed constitutions with the aim of refining our understanding of this variation on constitution-making. Divided into three parts, this book first considers the conceptualization of imposed constitutions, suggesting definitions, or corrections to the definition, of what exactly an imposed constitution is. The contributors then go on to explore the various ways in which constitutions are, and can be, imposed. The collection concludes by considering imposed constitutions that are currently in place in a number of polities worldwide, problematizing the consequences their imposition has caused. Cases are drawn from a broad range of countries with examples at both the national and supranational level. This book addresses some of the most important issues discussed in contemporary constitutional law: the relationship between constituent and constituted power, the source of constitutional legitimacy, the challenge of foreign and expert intervention and the role of comparative constitutional studies in constitution-making. The volume will be a valuable resource for those interested in the phenomenon of imposed constitutionalism as well as anyone interested in the current trends in the study of comparative constitutional law.

The essays in this collection were first presented at an October 1991 conference on comparative constitutionalism under the auspices of the Jacob Burns Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, and the Cardozo-New School Project on Constitutionalism. Essays are organized in sections on the rebirth of constitutionalism, the legitimation of constitution making, the identity of the constitutional subject, the struggle between identity and difference, and the role of property rights. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

This book develops a constitutional theory of international organization to explain the legitimation of supranational organizations. Supranational organizations play a key role in contemporary global governance, but recent events like Brexit and the threat by South Africa to withdraw from the International Criminal Court suggest that their legitimacy continues to generate contentious debates in many countries. Rethinking international organization as a constitutional problem, Oates argues that it is the representation of the constituent power of a constitutional order, that is, the collective subject in whose name authority is wielded, which explains the legitimation of supranational authority. Comparing the cases of the European Union, the World Trade Organization, and the International Criminal Court, Oates shows that the constitution of supranationalism is far from a functional response to the pressures of interdependence but a value-laden struggle to define the proper subject of global governance. The book will be of interest to students and scholars of international organization and those working in the broader fields of global governance and general International Relations theory. It should also be of interest to international legal scholars, particularly those focused on questions related to global constitutionalism.

"Legitimation by Constitution" is the phrase, coined by distinguished authors Frank Michelman and Alessandro Ferrara, for a key idea in Rawlsian political liberalism of a reliance on a dualist form of democracy-a subjection of ground-level lawmaking to the constraints of a higher-law constitution that most citizens could find acceptable as a framework for their politics-as a response to the problem of maintaining a liberally just, stable, and oppression-free democratic government in conditions of pluralist visionary conflict. Legitimation by Constitution recalls, collects, and combines a series of exchanges over the years between Michelman and Ferrara, inspired by Rawls' encapsulation of this conception in his proposed liberal principle of legitimacy. From a shared standpoint of sympathetic identification with the political-liberal statement of the problem, for which legitimation by constitution is proposed as a solution, these exchanges consider the perceived difficulties arguably standing in the way of this proposal's fulfillment on terms consistent with political liberalism's defining ideas about political justification. The authors discuss the mysteries of a democratic constituent power; the tensions between government-by-the-people and government-by-consent; the challenges posed to concretization by judicial authorities of national constitutional law; and the magnification of these tensions and challenges under the lenses of ambition towards transnational legal ordering. These discussions engage with other leading contemporary theorists of liberal-democratic constitutionalism including Bruce Ackerman, Ronald Dworkin, and Jürgen Habermas.