Democratic Governance And Economic Performance

Conventional wisdom warns that unaccountable political and business agents can enrich a few at the expense of many. But logically extending this wisdom implies that associated principals – voters, consumers, shareholders – will favor themselves over the greater good when ‘rules of the game’ instead create too much accountability. Democratic Governance and Economic Performance rigorously develops this hypothesis, and finds statistical evidence and case study illustrations that democratic institutions at various governance levels (e.g., federal, state, corporation) have facilitated opportunistic gains for electoral, consumer, and shareholder principals. To be sure, this conclusion does not dismiss the potential for democratic governance to productively reduce agency costs. Rather, it suggests that policy makers, lawyers, and managers can improve governance by weighing the agency benefits of increased accountability against the distributional costs of favoring principal stakeholders over more general economic opportunities. Carefully considering the fundamentals that give rise to this tradeoff should interest students and scholars working at the intersection of social science and the law, and can help professionals improve their own performance in policy, legal, and business settings.

Demonstrates the importance of governance and social institutions to economic performance

A theoretical and empirical examination of why political institutions and organizations matter in economic growth.

"In evaluating democratic development, the study focuses particularly on the condition of parties and party systems. In relation to economic governance, the idea of a developmental state provides a template against which the practices of individual states are evaluated.".

This text explores the issues of politics, institutions and the economic performance of nations from an in-depth perspective, challenging conventional theory which claims that democracy promotes economic growth.

​Despite the large amounts of human and financial resources invested to foster democratic governance in developing countries, statistics show that the majority of these countries have not yet achieved significant improvements in living standards. While some regions make strides towards improving the living conditions of their citizens, Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, is still trapped in poverty with more than 40% of its 600 million people living below the internationally recognized absolute poverty line of one US dollar per day. Poor governance and corruption should be highlighted as the most important systemic factors contributing to poverty in developing countries. As a result the institutional foundations of these countries are weakened, public funds are misappropriated, and policies and programs aimed at reducing poverty and fostering sustainable economic growth are undermined. It is therefore not surprising that a 2008 Transparency International report found a direct link between corruption and the failure of the societal institutions designed to achieve the Millennium Development Goals in the majority of developing countries. This book investigates the problems of democratic governance, particularly as they relate to corruption, and also whether democracy should be based on universal principles or local context and historical factors. It also analyses the rule of law, in promoting democratic governance and curbing corruption and if governmental, non-governmental organizations, and civil societies are effective in promoting democratic governance and curbing corruption. This book will go beyond identifying the challenges and offer plausible solutions that could be adapted to various developing countries. It is premised on the importance of bridging theory and practice, which has been lacking in most local and international development publications, making of interest to scholars and policy-makers alike concerned with public administration in developing countries.​

A notable group of social scientists explore the political economy of good governance and how it relates to performance management, the influence of political parties, education and health issues in developing countries, the economic performance of transition economies, and the effects of climate on poverty.

This study examines the relationship between democratic governance and economic development in post-independence India. The author addresses the paradox of India's political economy: why have five decades of democratically guided strategies failed to reconcile economic growth with redistribution.