Denying History The United States Policies Toward Russia In The Caspian Sea Region 1991 2001

The historical record seen through Offensive Realism presents evidence illustrating that the United States' approach toward the Caspian Sea region between 1991 and 2001 was governed by idealistic principles rather than balance of power considerations. That was led by the false notion that democratic Russia would act in accordance with US goals. The United States denied the competitive nature of international politics, refusing to criticise abuses by Moscow in the region, and failing to intervene when US interests were marginalised. The US failed to prevent Russia from refashioning conditions conducive to the re-absorption of the Caucasus and Central Asia as a sphere of influence; nor did it account for China’s expanded role and trajectory as a challenge to US power. This analysis shows, for example, that Russia’s proximity and willingness to use force exceeded the capabilities of the US’ use of its global predominance to shape regional events.

The historical record seen through Offensive Realism presents evidence illustrating that the United States' approach toward the Caspian Sea region between 1991 and 2001 was governed by idealistic principles rather than balance of power considerations. That was led by the false notion that democratic Russia would act in accordance with US goals. The United States denied the competitive nature of international politics, refusing to criticise abuses by Moscow in the region, and failing to intervene when US interests were marginalised. The US failed to prevent Russia from refashioning conditions conducive to the re-absorption of the Caucasus and Central Asia as a sphere of influence; nor did it account for China’s expanded role and trajectory as a challenge to US power. This analysis shows, for example, that Russia’s proximity and willingness to use force exceeded the capabilities of the US’ use of its global predominance to shape regional events.

Master's Thesis from the year 2009 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict Studies, Security, grade: -, - (American Graduate School in Paris), course: US Foreign Policy, International Relations in the Caspian Sea Region, language: English, abstract: The New Great Game in the Caspian Sea Region received moderate attention from scholars following the collapse of the Soviet Union because it resembled the continuation of rivalry between Washington and Moscow. For the eight Caspian republics, the discovery of vast oil and gas deposits was the key to securing the newly independent states' sovereignty away from Moscow's control toward integration with Europe and the United States. This thesis analyses the US' treatment of the Caspian Sea Region between 1991 and 2001, in order to measure whether its policies were crafted according to Realist tenets in formulating policy designed to advance its security. The historical record seen through Offensive Realism presents evidence that US foreign policy was governed by principles not balance of power considerations, led by the false notion that democratic Russia would act in accordance with US goals. Intent on fostering democracy in Russia the United States denied the competitive nature of international politics, refusing to criticize abuses by Moscow in the region and failing to intervene when US interests were marginalised. The US failed to prevent Russia from refashioning conditions conducive to the reabsorption of the Caucasus and Central Asia as a sphere of influence; nor did it account for China's expanded role and trajectory as a challenge to US power. This analysis shows, for example, that Russia's proximity and willingness to use force exceeded the capabilities of the US' use of its global predominance to shape regional events.

Published in association with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Russia and China have been reacting to the pressures of changing U.S.-Central Asia policy over the past 5 years as has the United States. In response to the "color" revolutions, they achieved broad agreement on the priority of regime security and the need to limit the long-term military presence of the United States in Central Asia. These are also two key areas-defining the political path of Central Asian states and securing a strategic foothold in the region-where the United States finds itself in competition with Russia and China. The Russia-China partnership should not be seen as an anti-U.S. bloc, nor should the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) be viewed as entirely cohesive. Although there is considerable suspicion of U.S. designs on Central Asia, divergent interests within the SCO, among Central Asian states, and especially between Russia and China serve to limit any coordinated anti-U.S. activity. Despite the fissures within the SCO and the competitive tendencies within...

From Kurdistan to Somaliland, Xinjiang to South Yemen, all secessionist movements hope to secure newly independent states of their own. Most will not prevail. The existing scholarly wisdom provides one explanation for success, based on authority and control within the nascent states. With the aid of an expansive new dataset and detailed case studies, this book provides an alternative account. It argues that the strongest members of the international community have a decisive influence over whether today's secessionists become countries tomorrow and that, most often, their support is conditioned on parochial political considerations.

In a series of short stories that both inform and amuse, this book transports the reader across the windswept shores of the Caspian Sea and provides a provocative view of the wars, peace, intrigues, and betrayals that have shaped the political geography of this important and volatile region. The demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the eclipsing of the old Iranian-Soviet regime of the sea have given rise to new challenges for the regional actors and unprecedented opportunities for international players to tap into the area's enormous oil and gas resources, third in size only behind Siberia and the Persian Gulf. This book explores the historical themes that inform and animate the more immediate and familiar discussions about petroleum, pipelines, and ethnic conflict in the Caspian region.

In this new Brookings Marshall Paper, Michael O'Hanlon argues that now is the time for Western nations to negotiate a new security architecture for neutral countries in eastern Europe to stabilize the region and reduce the risks of war with Russia. He believes NATO expansion has gone far enough. The core concept of this new security architecture would be one of permanent neutrality. The countries in question collectively make a broken-up arc, from Europe's far north to its south: Finland and Sweden; Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus; Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; and finally Cyprus plus Serbia, as well as possibly several other Balkan states. Discussion on the new framework should begin within NATO, followed by deliberation with the neutral countries themselves, and then formal negotiations with Russia. The new security architecture would require that Russia, like NATO, commit to help uphold the security of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and other states in the region. Russia would have to withdraw its troops from those countries in a verifiable manner; after that, corresponding sanctions on Russia would be lifted. The neutral countries would retain their rights to participate in multilateral security operations on a scale comparable to what has been the case in the past, including even those operations that might be led by NATO. They could think of and describe themselves as Western states (or anything else, for that matter). If the European Union and they so wished in the future, they could join the EU. They would have complete sovereignty and self-determination in every sense of the word. But NATO would decide not to invite them into the alliance as members. Ideally, these nations would endorse and promote this concept themselves as a more practical way to ensure their security than the current situation or any other plausible alternative.