Designing Sound Fiscal Relations Across Government Levels In Decentralized Countries

This paper discusses how decentralized countries can achieve sound fiscal relations between the central government and lower government levels. The concepts of “vertical gap” and “vertical balance” provide an analytical framework for identifying and addressing key challenges. These concepts can help policymakers ensure that the financing of subnational governments (composed of transfers received from the center, own revenues, and borrowing) is both efficient and adequate given the allocation of spending responsibilities. More generally, the paper offers some perspectives about the optimal design of decentralization systems by examining the sequencing and economic principles underlying revenue and expenditure assignments, the use of transfers, and borrowing.

Most countries, developed and developing, are fiscally decentralized with regional and local governments of varying importance. In many of these countries, some of these sub-national governments differ substantially from others in terms of wealth, ethnic, religious, or linguistic composition. This book considers how fiscal arrangements may strengthen or weaken national solidarity and the effectiveness with which public services are provided. In particular, the nation's ability to cope with changes created by decentralization is explored.

This book examines and analyzes issues related to public finance in subnational governments, along with a discussion of case studies on decentralization. Most of the analysis applies to all public goods and services provided by subnational governments, with some placed on the role of subnational governments in the management of environmental resources, notably water and waste Coverage includes optimal arrangements for sharing fiscal responsibilities among different levels of government, the potential impact of decentralization on the quality of public goods delivery, local governments’ expenditure and revenue choices, and the effect of decentralization on accountability, governance and policy outcomes. The scope of discussion extends to both public finance theory and applied policy debates. The first chapter, on trends in financing of public services, opens with an explanation of the how and why of government intervention in the economy, the nature and purposes of transfers between and among governments and trends in decentralization. Case studies examine the impact of decentralization in such areas as service delivery, water and sanitation, education and health, and on poverty and income inequality. Chapter 2 examines public budgets: governance structures, norms and organizational practices, building up understanding of budgets, budget cycles, fiscal revenues from fees and taxes, expenses, debt and political economy issues, rules mandating balanced budgets in government and more. Chapter 3 discusses issues of accountability and policy outcomes, offering important lessons from recent international experience, including ways to strengthen political, administrative and financial accountability. The concluding chapter recounts lessons from recent international experience and surveys implications for the nexus approach to management of environmental resources. The information, analysis and expert advice presented here is particularly relevant for developing and emerging countries, where well designed decentralization reforms have a higher potential to improve efficiency in the provision of public services, and to enhance the development of integrated and sustainable strategies for the use of water, soil and waste resources and applications that advance the nexus approach.

Fiscal decentralization has been, and remains high on the policy agenda of many countries. It is mainly driven by political pressures, which tend to be especially evident in countries with multiple ethnicities, and/or wide regional disparities in incomes or resource endowments. More generally, decentralization pressures frequently reflect a desire for more participatory government and greater voice of local constituents in the allocation of budgetary resources. Regardless of its motivation, fiscal decentralization can have important macroeconomic implications. Therefore, Fund advice to member countries (whether in the context of surveillance, program design, or technical assistance) has often focused on the design and implementation of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. This paper distills the main lessons from the Fund’s engagement with member countries in this area, drawing in particular, (but not exclusively) on technical assistance (TA) provided by the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) to ten countries which are broadly representative of the range of members that have requested assistance in this area.

The question of what makes fiscal decentralization work is faced by many policymakers around the world. This book draws on both the relevant literature and policy and technical advice provided by the IMF to a wide range of member countries, and discusses the key factors that help make decentralization sustainable, efficient, and equitable from a macroeconomic perspective. It focuses on institutional reforms (in the revenue and expenditure assignments to different levels of government, the design of intergovernmental transfers, and public financial management systems) that are suited to different countries' circumstances, and their appropriate sequencing.

This paper provides background to the Board paper on Macro Policy Lessons for a Sound Design of Fiscal Decentralization. It summarizes the findings and recommendations of the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) for ten countries to which it provided advice on fiscal decentralization. The selected countries (Bolivia, People’s Republic of China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Kosovo, Liberia, FYR Macedonia, Mexico, and Nigeria) represent different regions, varying institutional arrangements, and diverse stages of the decentralization process.

This paper discusses how decentralized countries can achieve sound fiscal relations between the central government and lower government levels. The concepts of “vertical gap” and “vertical balance” provide an analytical framework for identifying and addressing key challenges. These concepts can help policymakers ensure that the financing of subnational governments (composed of transfers received from the center, own revenues, and borrowing) is both efficient and adequate given the allocation of spending responsibilities. More generally, the paper offers some perspectives about the optimal design of decentralization systems by examining the sequencing and economic principles underlying revenue and expenditure assignments, the use of transfers, and borrowing.