Development Of Amphibious Doctrine

Although the U.S. had conducted amphibious operations since the Revolutionary War, it was not until after the Spanish-American War that the military services attempted to codify procedures in doctrine. Early emphasis focused on command relationships and the responsibilities of commanders, eventually expanding to incorporate operational concepts, tactical techniques, and the necessary equipment. In an environment characterized by inter-service rivalry, as well as monetary and materiel constraints, dedicated individuals and organizations overcame numerous obstacles to develop, practice, and successfully execute amphibious operations in World War II. This thesis examines the evolutionary development of amphibious doctrine by the U.S. Marine Corps, Army, and Navy, and the employment of that doctrine during Operations Watchtower and Torch in World War II. The examination includes an analysis of the historical efforts to develop innovative solutions to a wide range of challenges the services faced at the beginning of the 20th Century leading up to World War II. How the leadership solved those challenges informs the efforts of current leadership in addressing contemporary doctrinal, operational, and tactical challenges and those of the future.

FROM our entry into the war at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 until the Japanese surrender in September 1945, every major offensive campaign launched by the United States was initiated by an amphibious assault. Our landings at North Africa in November 1942, at Sicily and Italy in July and September 1943, and at Normandy and Southern France in June and September 1944 ended in the defeat of the German armies in Western Europe by the Allied Expeditionary Force in May 1945. The Pacific offensive, which began in the South Pacific with the landings at the Solomons in August 1942 and in the Central Pacific at the Gilberts in November 1943, carried us 3,000 miles to the Philippine Islands and 5,000 miles through to the inner defenses of the empire in the Volcano and Ryukyu Islands....Amphibious warfare was the primary offensive tactic in our conduct of global war. The tactics and techniques of our landing operations represent a new and significant development in the art of war. Although military history contains many instances of landing operations conducted by both military and navy forces in all parts of the world, from the early time man first crossed the sea to wage war, the landings were generally either limited in scope and purpose or unopposed. The feasibility of amphibious raids, in which assault forces landed from the sea are withdrawn after limited operations, and of unopposed landings, relying on surprise and conducted for the purpose of subsequent military operations ashore, has long been recognized. Until the recent war, however, the effect of modern defensive weapons was considered too decisive to permit successful assault from the sea. The development of radar, aviation, coast defense guns, torpedoes, submarines, mines, defensive obstructions and obstacles, automatic weapons, highly mobile reserves, and the necessary communication facilities to coordinate and control them seemed to present insurmountable difficulties to amphibious attack.

This compelling book provides the first global history of the evolution of combined operations since Antiquity. Beginning with amphibious warfare in the ancient world of the Romans, Vikings, and Mongols, Jeremy Black advances through the Gunpowder Revolution, the rise of maritime empires and the formation of nation-states, the early Industrial Revolution and the adaptation of modern technology to warfare, the twentieth-century world wars, the Cold War, and concluding with the modern age of irregular and asymmetric conflict. Black’s informed and analytical narrative emphasizes conflicts around the world, focusing not only on leading powers but also regional combatants. His case studies include amphibious operations in the Mongol invasions of Japan, the War for American Independence, and the Gallipoli campaign of World War I. He also explores the development and effectiveness of airborne operations as a way to project military power inland. Offering a balanced assessment of strategic, operational, and technical developments over time, Black considers both the potential and limitations of amphibious and airborne warfare—past, present, and future.

This study examines ally- and partner-nation investments in amphibious capabilities, how those capabilities will impact demand for U.S. forces, and the range of U.S. amphibious fleet composites to meet the changing demand.

“Not only a just appraisal of the campaigns waged by Marines in World War II; it is a documentation of the Marine struggle to prove the feasibility of amphibious warfare....Relentlessly accurate and impartial.”—N.Y. Times Originally published in 1951, this book is a widely regarded classic on US Marine amphibious doctrine and operations employed in the Pacific during the Second World War. The authors describe in detail the development of the theoretical aspects of amphibious assault in the inter-war period, but devote the vast majority of the narrative to the various landings and their core strategies, using Japanese documents “to sketch in the background of military decisions made by the enemy.” A must for those who wish to understand the American war against Japan.