Dialectic Of Sedimentation And Innovation

One of the most important developments in the episteme of our time is the recognition that all being and all knowing are socially conditioned. This recognition raises the question of subjective creativity: Is creativity or innovation possible? What is the locus of creativity? Is it the subject or the structure of the structures of being of which the subject is part? Any notion of creativity that takes seriously the condition of being is therefore bound to deal with the perennial issue of freedom and determinism. Dialectic of Sedimentation and Innovation examines the contribution of Paul Ricoeur to this question for the purpose of theological consumption. Ricoeur's philosophical reconstruction of the subject as self creates a space midway between the modern self-positing subject and the postmodern deconstructed subject where reason rules but does not tyrannize. It is from this space that he proposes a view of humanity that argues that to be human is to be homo voluntas, homo lingua, and homo capax. Dialectic of Sedimentation and Innovation seeks to theologically appropriate these notions for Africa's quest for a new creative identity.

Scott Ying Lam Yip presents the first specialized narrative study devoted to the identity formation processes in Philippians, based on Paul Ricoeur's narrative theory. Yip demonstrates that the “Christian identity” of the Philippian community is shaped amidst competing narratives with divergent comprehensions, and suggests that it is within an intra-Jewish contestation of testimonies that Paul updates his understanding of God and contends with a group of Jewish Christian leaders regarding the meaning of his suffering. Yip argues that Paul faces a double contestation of narrative in which both the political authorities and a group of Jewish Christian leaders see his imprisonment as futile and unnecessary; alerting him to an emerging crisis in which the Philippian community's conviction in suffering with him has begun to decline. It is thus essential for Paul to synthesise and install a new paradigmatic story of Christ so that his suffering can be discerned as the defining mark of God's renewed manifestation in an era of Christ's eschatological Lordship. Yip explores the means by which Paul - in a contestation of authority for the re-appropriation of God's past work - contrasts the future-oriented temporality of his testimony with the past-oriented one of the Jewish Christian leaders. He concludes that Paul affirms the value of his present suffering in truthfulness and installs his testimony to be the exemplary story for the Philippian community.

Drawing on ethnographic accounts of children's media-referenced play, this book explores children's engagement with media cultures and playground experiences, analyzing a range of issues such as learning, fantasy, communication and identity.

To be human means to be in dialogue. Dialogue is a unitary concept used by the author to address, in a coherent way, three essential issues for clinical practice: 'What is a human being?', 'What is mental pathology'?, and 'What is care?'. In this book Stanghellini argues that to be human means to be in dialogue with alterity, that mental pathology is the outcome of a crisis of one's dialogue with alterity, and that care is a method wherein dialogues take place whose aim is to re-enact interrupted dialogue with alterity within oneself and with the external world. This essay is an attempt to re-establish such a fragile dialogue of the soul with herself and with others. Such an attempt is based on two pillars: a dialectic, person-centered understanding of mental disorders and values-based practice. The dialectic understanding of mental disorders acknowledges the vulnerability constitutive of human personhood. It assumes that the person is engaged in trying to cope, solve and make sense of new, disturbing, puzzling experiences stemming from her encounter with alterity. Values-based practice assumes that the forms of human life are inherently plural. Value-pluralism and recognition are the basis for care. This statement reflects the ideal of modus vivendi that aims to find terms in which different forms of life can coexist, and learn how to live with irreconcilable value conflicts, rather than striving for consensus or agreement. Care is a method wherein dialogues take place whose aim is to re-enact interrupted dialogue with alterity within oneself and with the external world. It includes practices that belong both to logic - e.g., the method for unfolding the Other's form of life and to rescue its fundamental structure - and empathy - e.g., the readiness to offer oneself as a dialoguing person and the capacity to resonate with the Other's experience and attune/regulate the emotional field.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Interactive Storytelling, ICIDS 2014, Singapore, Singapore, November 2014. The 20 revised full papers presented together with 8 short papers 7 posters, and 5 demonstration papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 67 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on story generation, authoring, evaluation and analysis, theory, retrospectives, and user experience.

The term ‘phenomenology’ has become almost as over-used and emptied of meaning as that other word from Continental Philosophy, namely ‘existentialism’. Yet Husserl, who first put forward the phenomenological method, considered it a rigorous alternative to positivism, and in the hands of Merleau-Ponty, a disciple of Husserl in France, phenomenology became a way of gaining a disciplined and coherent perspective on the world in which we live. When this study originally published in 1977 there were only a few books in English on Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. It introduced the reader and suggested how his thought might throw light on some of the assumptions and presuppositions of certain contemporary forms of Anglo-Saxon philosophy and social science. It also demonstrates how phenomenology seeks to unite philosophy and social science, rather than define them as mutually exclusive domains of knowledge.