Dictators And Democrats

A rigorous and comprehensive account of recent democratic transitions around the world From the 1980s through the first decade of the twenty-first century, the spread of democracy across the developing and post-Communist worlds transformed the global political landscape. What drove these changes and what determined whether the emerging democracies would stabilize or revert to authoritarian rule? Dictators and Democrats takes a comprehensive look at the transitions to and from democracy in recent decades. Deploying both statistical and qualitative analysis, Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman engage with theories of democratic change and advocate approaches that emphasize political and institutional factors. While inequality has been a prominent explanation for democratic transitions, the authors argue that its role has been limited, and elites as well as masses can drive regime change. Examining seventy-eight cases of democratic transition and twenty-five reversions since 1980, Haggard and Kaufman show how differences in authoritarian regimes and organizational capabilities shape popular protest and elite initiatives in transitions to democracy, and how institutional weaknesses cause some democracies to fail. The determinants of democracy lie in the strength of existing institutions and the public's capacity to engage in collective action. There are multiple routes to democracy, but those growing out of mass mobilization may provide more checks on incumbents than those emerging from intra-elite bargains. Moving beyond well-known beliefs regarding regime changes, Dictators and Democrats explores the conditions under which transitions to democracy are likely to arise.

Voting hides a familiar puzzle. Many people take the trouble to vote even though each voter's prospect of deciding the election is nearly nil. Russians vote even when pervasive electoral fraud virtually eliminates even that slim chance. The right to vote has commonly been won by protesters who risked death or injury even though any one protester could have stayed home without lessening the protest’s chance of success. Could people vote or protest because they stop considering their own chances and start to think about an identity shared with others? If what they hear or read affects political identity, a shift in political discourse might not just evoke protests and voting but also make the minority that has imposed the dictator’s will suddenly lose heart. During the Soviet Union’s final years the cues that set communist discourse apart from standard Russian sharply dwindled. A similar convergence of political discourse with local language has preceded expansion of the right to vote in many states around the globe. Richard D. Anderson, Jr., presents a groundbreaking theory of what language use does to politics.

Voting hides a familiar puzzle. Many people take the trouble to vote even though each voter's prospect of deciding the election is nearly nil. Russians vote even when pervasive electoral fraud virtually eliminates even that slim chance. The right to vote has commonly been won by protesters who risked death or injury even though any one protester could have stayed home without lessening the protest’s chance of success. Could people vote or protest because they stop considering their own chances and start to think about an identity shared with others? If what they hear or read affects political identity, a shift in political discourse might not just evoke protests and voting but also make the minority that has imposed the dictator’s will suddenly lose heart. During the Soviet Union’s final years the cues that set communist discourse apart from standard Russian sharply dwindled. A similar convergence of political discourse with local language has preceded expansion of the right to vote in many states around the globe. Richard D. Anderson, Jr., presents a groundbreaking theory of what language use does to politics.

"An examination of how dictators and democrats in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand built and sustained pro-growth political coalitions"--

A groundbreaking new theory of the real rules of politics: leaders do whatever keeps them in power, regardless of the national interest. As featured on the viral video Rules for Rulers, which has been viewed over 3 million times. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith's canonical book on political science turned conventional wisdom on its head. They started from a single assertion: Leaders do whatever keeps them in power. They don't care about the "national interest"-or even their subjects-unless they have to. This clever and accessible book shows that democracy is essentially just a convenient fiction. Governments do not differ in kind but only in the number of essential supporters, or backs that need scratching. The size of this group determines almost everything about politics: what leaders can get away with, and the quality of life or misery under them. The picture the authors paint is not pretty. But it just may be the truth, which is a good starting point for anyone seeking to improve human governance.

An unequivocal endorsement of an assertive and resolute approach to foreign policy by democracies in their dealings with dictatorships. Drawing on the political writings of Kant, the rationale of Churchill's anti-appeasement policy, and the most up-to-date empirical research in international relations, the author forges a rigorous decision-theoretic model to account for the international interactions between despotic and democratic regimes. The model's validity is illustrated across a broad range of historical examples, while its policy-oriented implications, are shown to have far-reaching consequences for conventional perceptions of democratic deterrence posture and the security dilemma.

Explains how dictatorships rise, survive, and fall, along with why some but not all dictators wield vast powers.