Dismantling North Korea S Nuclear Weapons Programs

This paper examines the choices available to the United States for dismantling North Korea's nuclear weapons programs. The options range from doing nothing to executing policies of engagement, containment, or preemption. Each option has advantages and disadvantages, and there are numerous factors influencing the problem. The major factors include U.S. national interests, the role of China, the Republic of Korea (ROK)-U.S. alliance, the difficult nature of North Korea, and the U.S. war on terror. Engagement is less risky in the short term because it reduces the risks of miscalculation and escalation by preventing the conditions which support North Korea seeing war as a rational act. However, it is risky in the long term because it allows North Korean nuclear weapons development to proceed unchecked. This could lead to proliferation to terrorists and rogue states. Containment's main advantage is that it takes a direct path to solving the problem. Its major disadvantage is that it could cause North Korea, a failing state, to view war as a rational act. Containment is also not supported by friends and allies in the region. Preemption is the most direct method to ensure elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons. However, the risks associated with this option could lead to catastrophic loss of life and devastation and ultimately to loss of U.S. influence in the region. The optimal course of action is not one policy in particular, but a combination of engagement and containment. Furthermore, preemptive action will invite foreign policy disaster for the United States and should only be used as a last resort. Specific policy recommendations to improve implementation of a hybrid policy of engagement and containment include strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance, supplementing multilateral talks with bilateral talks, offering a formal security guarantee to North Korea, broadening the Proliferation Security Initiative to include China, and improving national intelligence capabilities. If preemption must be used, national leaders must know what conditions would trigger that decision, and they must prepare in advance the necessary protocol for warning and informing friends, allies, and other concerned parties.

Drawing on previously unpublished Russian archival materials, this book is the first detailed history and current analysis of the North Korean nuclear program. The contributors discuss Soviet-North Korean nuclear relations, economic and military aspects of the nuclear program, the nuclear energy sector, North Korea's negotiations with the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, cooperative security, and U.S. policy. Unique in its focus on North Korean attitudes and perspectives, The North Korean Nuclear Program also includes Russian interviews with North Korean officials.

Contents: (1) North Korea¿s Nuclear Test and Withdrawal from the Six Party Talks: Bush Administration-North Korean Agreements and Failure of Implementation; Implementation Process; Verification Issue; Kim Jong-il¿s Stroke, and Political Changes Inside North Korea; Issues Facing the Obama Administration; (2) North Korea¿s Nuclear Programs: Plutonium Program; Highly Enriched Uranium Program; International Assistance; Nuclear Collaboration with Iran and Syria; North Korea¿s Delivery Systems; State of Nuclear Weapons Development; (3) Select Chronology; (4) For Additional Reading.

This book explains the origin and historical development of North Korean nuclear weapon dated from the aftermath of World War II. The story of North Korea's nuclear program began when the United States dropped atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 which led to Japan's immediate defeat. Surprised by the speed of Japan's surrender, North Korea's founding leader Kim Il-sung vowed to secure nuclear capability to avoid suffering the fate of its eastern neighbor. Based on the author's extensive experience in the academia, government, and intelligence circles, the book traces how the nuclear program has evolved since and explores wide-ranging issues including the positive function of nuclear weapon in Pyongyang's local politics, the history of negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang, the prospects of denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula, the diplomatic and military options presented to US President Donald Trump in dealing with the nuclear threat, and the future scenarios of the North Korean regime and the possibilities of a reunified Korea.With the nuclear weapon crisis likely to persist in the foreseeable time, is it feasible for South Korea to achieve reunification in the Korean Peninsula? Will the six-party members like the US, China, Russia and Japan agree with reunification without denuclearization? Can the issues of nuclear weapon and unification be settled simultaneously in the future? The book seeks to address these questions and more.

The authors argue that the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) should pursue firm deterrence of North Korean nuclear weapon use--which might soon pose a serious threat to the United States and the ROK--rather than relying on negotiations.

North Korea remains a puzzle to Americans. How did this country—one of the most isolated in the world and in the policy cross hairs of every U.S. administration during the past 30 years—progress from zero nuclear weapons in 2001 to a threatening arsenal of perhaps 50 such weapons in 2021? Hinge Points brings readers literally inside the North Korean nuclear program, joining Siegfried Hecker to see what he saw and hear what he heard in his visits to North Korea from 2004 to 2010. Hecker goes beyond the technical details—described in plain English from his on-the-ground experience at the North's nuclear center at Yongbyon—to put the nuclear program exactly where it belongs, in the context of decades of fateful foreign policy decisions in Pyongyang and Washington. Describing these decisions as "hinge points," he traces the consequences of opportunities missed by both sides. The result has been that successive U.S. administrations have been unable to prevent the North, with the weakest of hands, from becoming one of only three countries in the world that might target the United States with nuclear weapons. Hecker's unique ability to marry the technical with the diplomatic is well informed by his interactions with North Korean and U.S. officials over many years, while his years of working with Russian, Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani nuclear officials have given him an unmatched breadth of experience from which to view and interpret the thinking and perspective of the North Koreans.

A decade before being proclaimed part of the "axis of evil," North Korea raised alarms in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo as the pace of its clandestine nuclear weapons program mounted. When confronted by evidence of its deception in 1993, Pyongyang abruptly announced its intention to become the first nation ever to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, defying its earlier commitments to submit its nuclear activities to full international inspections. U.S. intelligence had revealed evidence of a robust plutonium production program. Unconstrained, North Korea's nuclear factory would soon be capable of building about thirty Nagasaki-sized nuclear weapons annually. The resulting arsenal would directly threaten the security of the United States and its allies, while tempting cash-starved North Korea to export its deadly wares to America's most bitter adversaries. In Go ing Critical, three former U.S. officials who played key roles in the nuclear crisis trace the intense efforts that led North Korea to freeze—and pledge ultimately to dismantle—its dangerous plutonium production program under international inspection, while the storm clouds of a second Korean War gathered. Drawing on international government documents, memoranda, cables, and notes, the authors chronicle the complex web of diplomacy--from Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing to Geneva, Moscow, and Vienna and back again—that led to the negotiation of the 1994 Agreed Framework intended to resolve this nuclear standoff. They also explore the challenge of weaving together the military, economic, and diplomatic instruments employed to persuade North Korea to accept significant constraints on its nuclear activities, while deterring rather than provoking a violent North Korean response. Some ten years after these intense negotiations, the Agreed Framework lies abandoned. North Korea claims to possess some nuclear weapons, while threatening to produce even more. The story of the 1994 confrontatio