Do Interest Rate Controls Work Evidence From Kenya

This paper reviews the impact of interest rate controls in Kenya, introduced in September 2016. The intent of the controls was to reduce the cost of borrowing, expand access to credit, and increase the return on savings. However, we find that the law on interest rate controls has had the opposite effect of what was intended. Specifically, it has led to a collapse of credit to micro, small, and medium enterprises; shrinking of the loan book of the small banks; and reduced financial intermediation. We also show that interest rate caps reduced the signaling effects of monetary policy. These suggest that (i) the adverse effects could largely be avoided if the ceiling was high enough to facilitate lending to higher risk borrowers; and (ii) alternative policies could be preferable to address concerns about the high cost of credit.

Financial repression (legal restrictions on interest rates, credit allocation, capital movements, and other financial operations) was widely used in the past but was largely abandoned in the liberalization wave of the 1990s, as widespread support for interventionist policies gave way to a renewed conception of government as an impartial referee. Financial repression has come back on the agenda with the surge in public debt in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, and some countries have reintroduced administrative ceilings on interest rates. By distorting market incentives and signals, financial repression induces losses from inefficiency and rent-seeking that are not easily quantified. This study attempts to assess some of these losses by estimating the impact of financial repression on growth using an updated index of interest rate controls covering 90 countries over 45 years. The results suggest that financial repression poses a significant drag on growth, which could amount to 0.4-0.7 percentage points.

This paper undertakes a survey of theoretical considerations and an analysis of the experience of five African countries with interest rate liberalization. Despite substantial progress in monetary policy reforms, liberalization has only partially affected the level and variability of interest rates. Several factors—macroeconomic instability, oligopolistic financial markets, the absence of developed capital markets, as well as the sequencing of the liberalization programs and the asymmetric availability of information—explain the increase in the spread between lending and deposit rates as well as the rather inflexible pattern of interest rates during the transition to a market-based financial system.

This paper focuses on negative interest rate policies and covers a broad range of its effects, with a detailed discussion of findings in the academic literature and of broader country experiences.

This Selected Issues paper on Kenya reviews Kenya’s external stability in a context where the exchange rate has strengthened and capital inflows are playing an increasingly important role. Kenya’s external current account deficit has widened, reflecting strong import volumes as well as rising import prices, particularly for oil, but external debt as a percent of GDP has declined steadily. Underlying these developments have been a steady increase in capital inflows and a remarkable rebound of economic growth since 2003 after two decades of stagnation.

For a large part of the past decade, Japan has witnessed a steady deterioration in the health of its banking system. This paper examines what went wrong and why it has taken so long for the system to recover. While the paper traces the roots of the crisis to accelerated deregulation and deepening of capital markets without an appropriate adjustment in the regulatory framework, it identifies weak corporate governance and regulatory forbearance as the two factors behind what might have been an unnecessary prolongation of the distress of the financial system.

Although by regional standards Kenya's financial system is relatively well developed and diversified, major structural impediments prevent it from reaching its full potential. Cross-country comparisons, however, show the importance of a well developed financial sector for long-term economic growth and poverty alleviation. Experience from other developing economies has shown the detrimental effect of government ownership and the positive impact that foreign bank ownership can have on the development of a market-based financial system. Analyzing and decomposing the high interest rate spreads and margins in Kenya helps identify structural impediments that drive the high cost of and low access to financial services. The limited information sharing on debtors, deficiencies in the legal and judicial system, the limited number of strong and reputable banks, and nontransparency and uncertainty in the banking market are major impediments to the development of Kenya's financial system, and to reducing spreads and widening access. This paper--a product of the Finance Team, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the determinants of financial sector development.

Financial repression (legal restrictions on interest rates, credit allocation, capital movements, and other financial operations) was widely used in the past but was largely abandoned in the liberalization wave of the 1990s, as widespread support for interventionist policies gave way to a renewed conception of government as an impartial referee. Financial repression has come back on the agenda with the surge in public debt in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, and some countries have reintroduced administrative ceilings on interest rates. By distorting market incentives and signals, financial repression induces losses from inefficiency and rent-seeking that are not easily quantified. This study attempts to assess some of these losses by estimating the impact of financial repression on growth using an updated index of interest rate controls covering 90 countries over 45 years. The results suggest that financial repression poses a significant drag on growth, which could amount to 0.4-0.7 percentage points.