Does Law Matter

The question of how law matters has long been fundamental to the law and society field. Social science scholarship has repeatedly demonstrated that law matters less, or differently, than those who study only legal doctrine would have us believe. Yet research in this field depends on a belief in the relevance of law, no matter how often gaps are identified. The essays in this collection show how law is relevant in both an instrumental and a constitutive sense, as a tool to accomplish particular purposes and as an important force in shaping the everyday worlds in which we live. Essays examine these issues by focusing on legal consciousness, the body, discrimination, and colonialism as well as on more traditional legal concerns such as juries and criminal justice.

New research suggests that cross-country differences in legal origin help explain differences in financial development. This paper empirically assesses two theories of why legal origin influences financial development. First, the political' channel stresses that (i) legal traditions differ in the priority they give to the rights of individual investors vis- ...-vis the state and (ii) this has repercussions for the development of property rights and financial markets. Second, the adaptability' channel holds that (i) legal traditions differ in their ability to adjust to changing commercial circumstances and (ii) legal systems that adapt quickly to minimize the gap between the contracting needs of the economy and the legal system's capabilities will foster financial development more effectively than would more rigid legal traditions. We use historical comparisons and cross-country regressions to assess the validity of these two channels. We find that legal origin matters for financial development because legal traditions differ in their ability to adapt efficiently to evolving economic conditions.

Teaches how and why states make, break, and uphold international law using accessible explanations and contemporary international issues.

We are all familiar with the image of the immensely clever judge who discerns the best rule of common law for the case at hand. According to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, a judge like this can maneuver through earlier cases to achieve the desired aim—"distinguishing one prior case on his left, straight-arming another one on his right, high-stepping away from another precedent about to tackle him from the rear, until (bravo!) he reaches the goal—good law." But is this common-law mindset, which is appropriate in its place, suitable also in statutory and constitutional interpretation? In a witty and trenchant essay, Justice Scalia answers this question with a resounding negative. In exploring the neglected art of statutory interpretation, Scalia urges that judges resist the temptation to use legislative intention and legislative history. In his view, it is incompatible with democratic government to allow the meaning of a statute to be determined by what the judges think the lawgivers meant rather than by what the legislature actually promulgated. Eschewing the judicial lawmaking that is the essence of common law, judges should interpret statutes and regulations by focusing on the text itself. Scalia then extends this principle to constitutional law. He proposes that we abandon the notion of an everchanging Constitution and pay attention to the Constitution's original meaning. Although not subscribing to the “strict constructionism” that would prevent applying the Constitution to modern circumstances, Scalia emphatically rejects the idea that judges can properly “smuggle” in new rights or deny old rights by using the Due Process Clause, for instance. In fact, such judicial discretion might lead to the destruction of the Bill of Rights if a majority of the judges ever wished to reach that most undesirable of goals. This essay is followed by four commentaries by Professors Gordon Wood, Laurence Tribe, Mary Ann Glendon, and Ronald Dworkin, who engage Justice Scalia’s ideas about judicial interpretation from varying standpoints. In the spirit of debate, Justice Scalia responds to these critics. Featuring a new foreword that discusses Scalia’s impact, jurisprudence, and legacy, this witty and trenchant exchange illuminates the brilliance of one of the most influential legal minds of our time.

Provides unique insight into the possibility of creating the rule of law in Russia

The massive differences in country incomes are largely the product of economic growth, which is in turn shaped, influenced, and determined by the legal infrastructure of a given country. There has been a growing interest in exploring the connection between legal rules and economic growth since the 1990s, which can be attributed to the influence of Harvard economist Andrei Shleifer and his colleagues (the so-called LLSV). LLSV substantially contribute to our understanding of the economic consequences of legal rules. However, their studies face serious challenges and leave a number of questions unresolved. This book is part of the academic efforts to fill gaps in LLSV's studies. The contribution of and controversy over LLSV's studies are systematically reviewed. In addition, the book scrutinizes the relationship between law (both corporate and securities law) and stock market development, analyzes the role of property law in economic development, and examines the growth experience of China. Does Law Matter for Economic Growth? will help readers to reach a deeper understanding of the relationship between law and economic growth, by revealing the weaknesses in and problems with LLSV's studies, by offering new evidence (historical, comparative, and empirical) that cast serious doubts over LLSV's conclusions, and by analyzing certain apparent anomalies that can hardly be explained by LLSV's theory. A more cautious stance regarding the law and growth nexus is ultimately reached. Law matters for economic performance, but the extent to which it matters is defined by a broader context within which political, legal, economic, and social variables influence one another and evolve together over time. It is therefore imprudent to embrace legal reform as a panacea for economic backwardness. (Series: European Studies in Law & Economics - Vol. 14)

It's 13th-century Europe and a young monk, Michael Scot, has been asked by the Holy Roman Emperor to translate the works of Aristotle and recover his "lost" knowledge. The Scot sets to his task, traveling from the Emperor's Italian court to the translation schools of Toledo and from there to the Moorish library of Córdoba. But when the Pope deems the translations heretical, the Scot refuses to desist. So begins a battle for power between Church and State--one that has shaped how we view the world today.

A new framework for understanding contemporary administrative law, through a comparative analysis of case law from Australia, Canada, England, Ireland, and New Zealand. The author argues that the field is structured by four values: individual self-realisation, good administration, electoral legitimacy and decisional autonomy.