Economic Sanctions Ideals And Experience

Essay on unilateral and multilateral-agreed economic sanctions (embargoes, boycotts) and their role in international relations - reviews definitions and relevant political theories; considers historical antecedents, such as the League of Nations sanctions against Italy; reviews the success and failure of sanctions in the post-War period against Argentina, Egypt, Iran, Islamic Republic, Israel, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), the USA and the USSR, in the area of trade, technology and financing; comments on international law, company law and judicial decisions. Diagrams.

Peter van Bergeijk brings together 40 leading experts from all continents to analyze state-of-the-art data covering the sharp increase in (smart) sanctions in the last decade. Original chapters provide detailed analyses on the determinants of sanction success and failure, complemented with research on the impact of sanctions.

Economic Sanctions are increasingly used as a legal, non-military technique of combating abusers of international peace. However it remains unclear how the success or failure of these sanctions is measured. This book examines the seldom-explored United Nations’ economic sanctions deliberation process and exposes systematic problems in the measurement of the success or failure of these sanctions. Centering on the key concepts of "peace and security," the author brings the reader’s attention to the discrepancies that exist in the process of decision-making, implementation, and evaluation of UN imposed economic sanctions. She engages international law and development methods to provide proof for the lack of consensus in measures of success and failure, which in turn suggests that sanction implementation on a uniform domestic front are unattainable. This thorough analysis concludes with suggestions for improving the sanctions process, only to clear the path for negating them as a whole and suggest alternative non-coercive measures for mitigating conflict situations and threats to peace and security.

As the challenge of preventing military conflict has become increasingly complex in the post-Cold War era, economic sanctions are being applied with growing frequency. Sanctions are also being used to enforce international law, to deter aggression and terrorism, to defend democracy and human rights, and to prevent nuclear proliferation. This study addresses questions about the utility, appropriateness and success or failure of sanctions, as well as their impact on the poor and innocent. Specific case studies, focusing on recent conflicts such as those in Haiti, Iraq, South Africa and the former Yugoslavia, demonstrate the principal aspects of economic sanctions.

Economic sanctions continue to play an important role in the response to terrorism, nuclear proliferation, military conflicts, and other foreign policy crises. But poor design and implementation of sanctions policies often mean that they fall short of their desired effects. This landmark study, first published in 1985, delves into the rich experience of sanctions in the 20th century to harvest lessons on how to use sanctions more effectively. This volume is the updated third edition of this widely cited study. It chronicles and examines 170 cases of economic sanctions imposed since World War I. Fifty of these cases were launched in the 1990s and are new to this edition. Special attention is paid to new developments arising from the end of the Cold War and increasing globalization of the world economy. Analyzing a range of economic and political factors that can influence the success of a sanctions episode, the authors distill a set of commandments to guide policymakers in the effective use of sanctions.

Economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool is used by sender countries to change policy or behavior of a target country. The economic sanctions are multilevel phenomena that not only affects both sides of the action but also have implications for third parties, reshaping the political and economic relations of the sender and target countries with the other states. The effects of the economic sanctions imposed by the West on Russia and Turkey have direct implications for the balance of power in the region and globally. Therefore, this paper aims to examine how did economic sanctions (re)shape the economic relations between Russia and Turkey. In doing so, the paper applies explanatory sequential mixed methods. First, logarithmic regression model was conducted by time series data over the period ranging from 1992 to 2018. The paper confirms that economic sanctions imposed on target countries that already have trade relations increase the bilateral trade between them, especially for Turkish case. Subsequently, content analysis was conducted reviewing annual data starting from 1992 but mostly focusing on 2014-2018 period. The analysis shows that because the sender countries are important trade partners in the target countries, to counterbalance the effects of economic sanctions target countries choose to diversify their trade. According to the results, Russia diversified towards Asia and Central Asia while Turkey increased its trade with the EU which is mutual ally of the US and Turkey. Excluding the 2015 plane crisis between Russia and Turkey, the Western sanctions imposed on both countries increased the bilateral trade between them. However, these two countries are the first choice of each other when it comes to trade partner diversification.

This book develops a unified theory of economic statecraft to clarify when and how sanctions and incentives can be used effectively to secure meaningful policy concessions. High-profile applications of economic statecraft have yielded varying degrees of success. The mixed record of economic incentives and economic sanctions in many cases raises important questions. Under what conditions can states modify the behaviour of other states by offering them tangible economic rewards or by threatening to disrupt existing economic relations? To what extent does the success of economic statecraft depend on the magnitude of economic penalties and rewards? In order to answer these questions, this book develops two analytic models: one weighs the threats economic statecraft poses to the Target’s Strategic Interests (TSI); while the other (stateness) assesses the degree to which the target state is insulated from domestic political pressures that senders attempt to generate or exploit. Through a series of carefully crafted case studies, including African apartheid and Japanese incentives to obtain the return of the Northern Territories, the authors demonstrate how their model can yield important policy insights in regards to contemporary economic sanctions and incentives cases, such as Iran and North Korea. This book will be of much interest to students of statecraft, sanctions, diplomacy, foreign policy, and international security in general.