Economic Theory And Public Decisions
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Economic Theory and Public Decisions
Author | : Robert Dorfman |
Publsiher | : Edward Elgar Publishing |
Total Pages | : 522 |
Release | : 1997 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : STANFORD:36105022320704 |
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Thirty-one essays reflect Professor Dorfman's contributions to the analysis of economic theory and public decision making during the last 40 years. The central concern of much of his career has been social decisions: how they are reached, and how they should be judged. Arrangement is in six sections covering statistics, mathematical methods, economic theory, natural resource and environmental economics, social decisions, and the history of economics. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
Political Theory and Public Choice
Author | : Anthony Downs |
Publsiher | : Unknown |
Total Pages | : 200 |
Release | : 1998 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : UOM:39015040377742 |
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This volume contains a selection of Anthony Downs' essays, written since the 1950s, on politics and political theory. The articles address such issues as democracy, public choice theory, rational political decision-making and political policy.
Deliberation and Decision
Author | : Anne van Aaken,Christian List |
Publsiher | : Routledge |
Total Pages | : 464 |
Release | : 2017-03-02 |
Genre | : Law |
ISBN | : 9781351945493 |
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Deliberation and Decision explores ways of bridging the gap between two rival approaches to theorizing about democratic institutions: constitutional economics on the one hand and deliberative democracy on the other. The two approaches offer very different accounts of the functioning and legitimacy of democratic institutions. Although both highlight the importance of democratic consent, their accounts of such consent could hardly be more different. Constitutional economics models individuals as self-interested rational utility maximizers and uses economic efficiency criteria such as incentive compatibility for evaluating institutions. Deliberative democracy models individuals as communicating subjects capable of engaging in democratic discourse. The two approaches are disjointed not only in terms of their assumptions and methodology but also in terms of the communication - or lack thereof - between their respective communities of researchers. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the recent debate between the two approaches and makes new and original contributions to that debate.
Collective Decision Making
Author | : norman schofield |
Publsiher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
Total Pages | : 458 |
Release | : 1996-09-30 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 0792397118 |
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In the last decade the techniques of social choice theory, game theory and positive political theory have been combined in interesting ways so as to pro vide a common framework for analyzing the behavior of a developed political economy. Social choice theory itself grew out of the innovative attempts by Ken neth Arrow (1951) and Duncan Black (1948, 1958) to extend the range of economic theory in order to deal with collective decision-making over public goods. Later work, by William Baumol (1952), and James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), focussed on providing an "economic" interpretation of democratic institutions. In the same period Anthony Downs (1957) sought to model representative democracy and elections while William Riker (1962) made use of work in cooperative game theory (by John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, 1944) to study coalition behavior. In my view, these "rational choice" analyses of collective decision-making have their antecedents in the arguments of Adam Smith (1759, 1776), James Madison (1787) and the Marquis de Condorcet (1785) about the "design" of political institutions. In the introductory chapter to this volume I briefly describe how some of the current normative and positive aspects of social choice date back to these earlier writers.
The Economic Theory of Representative Government
Author | : Albert Breton |
Publsiher | : Transaction Publishers |
Total Pages | : 246 |
Release | : 2007-12-01 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 9780202365794 |
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This book provides a theory capable of explaining the patterns of public expenditures and taxation that occur under representative government. Economists and political scientists have come to realize that issues of public policy and public finance cannot be solved on the naive assumption that these are problems tackled by a government that exists only to serve the public good. Instead, government must be understood as one of the major economic institutions of society, one that behaves like more familiar economic institutions--the household and the firm--though the market it confronts is a market for policies rather than for goods and services. Albert Breton's pathbreaking work remains important in taking us toward a theory of representative government that enables an understanding of the observed behavior of political institutions. The author's analysis is cast in a relatively simple demand, supply and demand-supply-equilibrium framework, using the tools of marginal and stability analysis to explain the forces that influence and determine the flow of resources as they are allocated between competing ends in the public sector. The book presents a model of demand by citizens, who are assumed to be maximizing their desires for specific public policies and private goods, and a model of the supply of public policies by politicians and bureaucrats, who are assumed to be maximizing the probability of their re-election and the size of their budgets. Breton defines government policies and the institutional framework for collective choices in terms that render them amenable to further analysis. The main accomplishment of Breton's theory is that it provides the ability to analyze the interaction of individuals and generates testable propositions about the behavior of these individuals as well as about the behavior of public expenditures and taxation in more aggregative terms. In this way the book will be useful to students of economics, economists, and those interested in economic theory. Albert Breton is professor emeritus of economics at the University of Toronto. He was once director of research for The Social Research Group in Montreal. His articles have been widely published in major journals and some of his recent books include Rational Foundations of Democratic Politics and Political Extremism and Rationality (with Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon, and Ronald Wintrobe) and Bijuralism: An Economic Approach (with Michael J. Trebilcock).
The Economic Approach to Public Policy
Author | : Ryan Amacher,Robert D. Tollison,Thomas D. Willett |
Publsiher | : Cornell University Press |
Total Pages | : 532 |
Release | : 2019-06-30 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 9781501741012 |
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Can traditional economic theory help to solve today's vexing social problems? This unique collection of thirty-six papers strongly suggests that it can. The economic approach is applied imaginatively by the authors to a wide range of contemporary issues, such as crime, higher education, the environment, revenue sharing, equity, justice, and the distribution of income. The articles also deal with governmental behavior and the role of the economist as governmental adviser. Shaped during the preparation and teaching of college classes, the book is well suited for courses in principles of economics, microeconomics, price theory, and public policy development and analysis. It should also prove a useful reference work for policy makers.
Microeconomics for Public Decisions
Author | : Anne C. Steinemann,William C. Apgar,Howard James Brown |
Publsiher | : South Western Educational Publishing |
Total Pages | : 456 |
Release | : 2005 |
Genre | : Decision making |
ISBN | : UOM:39076002428865 |
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Microeconomics for Public Decisions is a revision of the Apgar/Brown Microeconomics for Public Policy text. It was revised after conducting interviews with students and former students (now practitioners), and asking them what economic concepts and methods they use most frequently in their jobs. Microeconomics for Public Decisions is designed to focus on essential principles and analytical techniques for making decision that affect the public interest. It blends theory with applications and discussions so students will understand how and why microeconomics is important, how to perform economic analyses, and how to evaluate economic analyses performed by others.
Public Decision Making Processes and Asymmetry of Information
Author | : Massimo Marrelli,Giacomo Pignataro |
Publsiher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
Total Pages | : 228 |
Release | : 2001 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 0792372387 |
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The issue of asymmetric information and public decision-making has been widely explored by economists. Most of the traditional analysis of public sector activities has been reviewed to take account of the different incentive problems arising from an asymmetric distribution of relevant information among the actors of the public decision-making process. A normative approach has been developed, mainly employing the principal agent paradigm to design incentive schemes which tackle adverse selection and moral hazard problems within public organizations. Still, this analysis is under way in many fields of public economics. However, a debate is ongoing on the theoretical limitations of this approach and on its relevance for the actual public sector activities. Public Decision-Making Processes and Asymmetry of Information encompasses different contributions to these issues, on both theoretical and practical areas. The innermost problem in the current discussion arises from the fact that this normative analysis is firmly rooted in the complete contracting framework, with the consequence that, despite the analytical complexities of most models, their results rely on very simplified assumptions. Most complexities of the organization of public sector, and more generally, of writing "contracts", are therefore swept away. Once the need for an incomplete contracting approach is recognized, the question becomes how to relax some of the assumptions characterizing the complete contracting framework, without getting ad hoc results. The Introduction to this book, written by Jean Jacques Laffont, sets the general grid to interpret the position of its papers in this debate. The four papers in Part 1 of the book are devoted to developing the analysis of some of the theoretical issues mentioned in the Introduction. Part 2 is devoted to discussing the applications of the theory to different public sector activities.