Economic Warfare And The Sea

'Economic Warfare and the Sea' examines the relationship between trade, maritime warfare, and strategic thought between the early modern period and the late-twentieth century. Featuring contributions from renown historians and rising scholars, this volume forwards an international perspective upon the intersection of maritime history, strategy, and diplomacy. Core themes include the role of 'economic warfare' in maritime strategic thought, prevalence of economic competition below the threshold of open conflict, and the role non-state actors have played in the prosecution of economic warfare.

Today, the First World War is remembered chiefly for the carnage of the Western Front, but at the time the Royal Navy's blockade of Germany was a more frequent source of debate. For, even at a time of war, there were influential voices in Britain who baulked at a concept of economic warfare that hindered the free passage of goods on the high seas, and brought German society to the brink of famine. To further our understanding of these issues, this book looks at the background to the blockade, and the effects of its implementation in 1914. It argues that there was a widely shared, but largely unwritten, strategic culture within British naval circles which accepted that in a war with a major maritime power the British response would be to attack enemy trade. This is demonstrated by the fact that from at least the late 1880s the Royal Navy planned for the use of armed merchantmen to enforce an economic blockade of an enemy. This it did by entering into detailed arrangements with major British shipping companies for the design and subsidy of liners with the potential for use as merchant cruisers, and stockpiling their prospective armament. In line with the contemporary, Corbettian, view that seapower depends upon free communications, the book concludes by asserting that the primary role of the Grand Fleet in the First World War was to guarantee the ability of the merchant cruisers on the Northern Patrol to interdict German seaborne trade, rather than to engage in large set-piece battles.

Economic Warfare and the Sea examines the relationship between trade, maritime warfare, and strategic thought between the early modern period and the late-twentieth century. Featuring contributions from renown historians and rising scholars, this volume forwards an international perspective upon the intersection of maritime history, strategy, and diplomacy. Core themes include the role of ‘economic warfare’ in maritime strategic thought, prevalence of economic competition below the threshold of open conflict, and the role non-state actors have played in the prosecution of economic warfare. Using unique material from 18 different archives across six countries, this volume explores critical moments in the development of economic warfare, naval technology, and international law, including the Anglo-Dutch Wars, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the First World War, and the Second World War. Distinct chapters also analyse the role of economic warfare in theories of maritime strategy, and what the future holds for the changing role of navies in the floating global economy of the twenty-first century.

EconomicWarfare and the Sea examines the relationship between trade, maritimewarfare, and strategic thought between the early modern period and thelate-twentieth century. Using a variety of geographic and chronologicalexamples, it presents a longue duree approach to a crucial theme in maritimestrategic thought.

Before the First World War, the British Admiralty conceived a plan to win rapid victory in the event of war with Germany-economic warfare on an unprecedented scale.This secret strategy called for the state to exploit Britain's effective monopolies in banking, communications, and shipping-the essential infrastructure underpinning global trade-to create a controlled implosion of the world economic system. In this revisionist account, Nicholas Lambert shows in lively detail how naval planners persuaded the British political leadership that systematic disruption of the global economy could bring about German military paralysis. After the outbreak of hostilities, the government shied away from full implementation upon realizing the extent of likely collateral damage-political, social, economic, and diplomatic-to both Britain and neutral countries. Woodrow Wilson in particular bristled at British restrictions on trade. A new, less disruptive approach to economic coercion was hastily improvised. The result was the blockade, ostensibly intended to starve Germany. It proved largely ineffective because of the massive political influence of economic interests on national ambitions and the continued interdependencies of all countries upon the smooth functioning of the global trading system. Lambert's interpretation entirely overturns the conventional understanding of British strategy in the early part of the First World War and underscores the importance in any analysis of strategic policy of understanding Clausewitz's "political conditions of war."

This book studies the clash of international law with the introduction of the submarine to the field of naval warfare. Germany's use of the U-boat for unrestricted warfare against merchant shipping during the First World War revolutionised submarine warfare but it also doomed Germany to failure. Although Britain countered Germany with its own brand of economic warfare, the actions of both sides were at odds with existing international law. Regulatory and humanitarian aspects of international law were also found to be inadequate when faced with the revolutionary changes brought about by the U-boat. This book brings together the disciplines of military history, grand strategy and international law to provide a new perspective on the First World War at sea. (Publisher)