Preparing For Blockade 1885 1914

Today, the First World War is remembered chiefly for the carnage of the Western Front, but at the time the Royal Navy's blockade of Germany was a more frequent source of debate. For, even at a time of war, there were influential voices in Britain who baulked at a concept of economic warfare that hindered the free passage of goods on the high seas, and brought German society to the brink of famine. To further our understanding of these issues, this book looks at the background to the blockade, and the effects of its implementation in 1914. It argues that there was a widely shared, but largely unwritten, strategic culture within British naval circles which accepted that in a war with a major maritime power the British response would be to attack enemy trade. This is demonstrated by the fact that from at least the late 1880s the Royal Navy planned for the use of armed merchantmen to enforce an economic blockade of an enemy. This it did by entering into detailed arrangements with major British shipping companies for the design and subsidy of liners with the potential for use as merchant cruisers, and stockpiling their prospective armament. In line with the contemporary, Corbettian, view that seapower depends upon free communications, the book concludes by asserting that the primary role of the Grand Fleet in the First World War was to guarantee the ability of the merchant cruisers on the Northern Patrol to interdict German seaborne trade, rather than to engage in large set-piece battles.

Today, the First World War is remembered chiefly for the carnage of the Western Front, but at the time the Royal Navy's blockade of Germany was a more frequent source of debate. For, even at a time of war, there were influential voices in Britain who baulked at a concept of economic warfare that hindered the free passage of goods on the high seas, and brought German society to the brink of famine. To further our understanding of these issues, this book looks at the background to the blockade, and the effects of its implementation in 1914. It argues that there was a widely shared, but largely unwritten, strategic culture within British naval circles which accepted that in a war with a major maritime power the British response would be to attack enemy trade. This is demonstrated by the fact that from at least the late 1880s the Royal Navy planned for the use of armed merchantmen to enforce an economic blockade of an enemy. This it did by entering into detailed arrangements with major British shipping companies for the design and subsidy of liners with the potential for use as merchant cruisers, and stockpiling their prospective armament. In line with the contemporary, Corbettian, view that seapower depends upon free communications, the book concludes by asserting that the primary role of the Grand Fleet in the First World War was to guarantee the ability of the merchant cruisers on the Northern Patrol to interdict German seaborne trade, rather than to engage in large set-piece battles.

Tracing the history of economic sanctions from the blockades of World War I to the policing of colonial empires and the interwar confrontation with fascism, Nicholas Mulder combines political, economic, legal, and military history to reveal how a coercive wartime tool was adopted as an instrument of peacekeeping by the League of Nations.This timely study casts an overdue light on why sanctions are widely considered a form of war, and why their unintended consequences are so tremendous.

This book explains both the strategic and the operational aspects of exercising control of the sea. The struggle for sea control consists of three mutually related and overlapping phases: obtaining, maintaining and exercising sea control. It is in the phase of exercising sea control when one’s strategic or operational success is exploited; otherwise, the fruits of victories achieved would be wasted. This work describes the strategy of a stronger side in wartime after a desired degree of control has been obtained, which is followed by a discussion on the objectives and main methods used in exercising sea control. The remaining chapters explain and analyze in some detail each of the main methods of exercising sea control: defence and protection of one’s own and destruction/neutralization of the enemy’s military-economic potential at sea, capturing the enemy’s operationally important positions ashore, destroying/weakening the enemy’s military-economic potential ashore and supporting one’s ground forces in their offensive and defensive operations on the coast. This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, sea power and naval history.

At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the international community came together to find a way forward in the aftermath of the First World War. The conference is often judged a failure, as the resulting Treaty of Versailles did not bring long-term peace with Germany. By following the activities of British delegate and wartime Minister of Blockade Lord Robert Cecil, this book examines the struggles and successes of the conference, as delegates from around the world grappled with the economic, political and humanitarian catastrophes overwhelming Europe in 1919. After the Great War describes, for the first time, the significant role of economic warfare at the Peace Conference and in the post-war settlement. Lord Cecil's sometimes difficult partnership with US President Woodrow Wilson forged a new, permanent, international diplomatic organization – the League of Nations – and supplied it with the power to create collective blockades against aggressive states. Leaders of the Allied economic war before the Armistice became, in Paris, leaders of humanitarian-minded international outreach to their former enemies in Germany and Austria. After the Great War promotes a new understanding of these underappreciated internationalists in Paris, many of whom transitioned into leading the League of Nations even before the Peace Conference ended. Often derided as an idealistic fantasy, international peace enforced by economic sanctions appeared a realistic possibility when the Treaty was signed at the end of June 1919.

Gabriela A. Frei addresses the interaction between international maritime law and maritime strategy in a historical context, arguing that both international law and maritime strategy are based on long-term state interests. Great Britain as the predominant sea power in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries shaped the relationship between international law and maritime strategy like no other power. This study explores how Great Britain used international maritime law as an instrument of foreign policy to protect its strategic and economic interests, and how maritime strategic thought evolved in parallel to the development of international legal norms. Frei offers an analysis of British state practice as well as an examination of the efforts of the international community to codify international maritime law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Great Britain as the predominant sea power as well as the world's largest carrier of goods had to balance its interests as both a belligerent and a neutral power. With the growing importance of international law in international politics, the volume examines the role of international lawyers, strategists, and government officials who shaped state practice. Great Britain's neutrality for most of the period between 1856 and 1914 influenced its state practice and its perceptions of a future maritime conflict. Yet, the codification of international maritime law at the Hague and London conferences at the beginning of the twentieth century demanded a reassessment of Great Britain's legal position.

In Britain, memory of the First World War remains dominated by the trench warfare of the Western Front. Yet, in 1914 when the country declared war, the overwhelming expectation was that Britain’s efforts would be primarily focussed on the sea. As such, this volume is a welcome corrective to what is arguably an historical neglect of the naval aspect of the Great War. As well as reassessing Britain’s war at sea between 1914 and 1918, underlining the oft neglected contribution of the blockade of the Central Powers to the ending of the war, the book also offers a case study in ideas about military planning for ’the next war’. Questions about how next wars are thought about, planned for and conceptualised, and then how reality actually influences that thinking, have long been - and remain - key concerns for governments and military strategists. The essays in this volume show what ’realities’ there are to think about and how significant or not the change from pre-war to war was. This is important not only for historians trying to understand events in the past, but also has lessons for contemporary strategic thinkers who are responsible for planning and preparing for possible future conflict. Britain’s pre-war naval planning provides a perfect example of just how complex and uncertain that process is. Building upon and advancing recent scholarship concerning the role of the navy in the First World War, this collection brings to full light the dominance of the maritime environment, for Britain, in that war and the lessons that has for historians and military planners.

For the Central Powers, 1916 was a year of trial and error, of successes and failures, of innovation and of drastic changes. Tactics developed, while war aims mutated to suit the inertia of trench warfare. Advances were effectively countered with the development of new weaponry, or indeed aided by their inclusion. Across all fronts, whether at home or in Poland, citizens and soldiers alike stood fast against Entente forces. On the Western Front, bitter fighting continued apace. To the east the armies of Austro-Hungary, Germany and Bulgaria battled Entente forces. Meanwhile at sea, the German High Seas Fleet ambushed the Royal Navy off the coast of Denmark. On the Home Front, the poor harvest of 1916, coupled with a lack of transport, led to a winter of stark deprivation. As a consequence, the German government introduced what was effectively a system of rationing entitled, ‘sharing scarcity.’ While to the south, Ottoman forces fought Allied soldiers for control of Kut and Erzurum, a fortified trading port in eastern Turkey. Germany in the Great War: Verdun & Somme is the third publication in a five-part series. In addition to the author’s introduction and a chronology of events, five hundred contemporary photographs, many of which have never before been published in this country, are included.