Enhanced Army Airborne Forces

At the request of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, a RAND research team examined options to increase the mobility, protection, and firepower of the Army's airborne forces, given likely future missions and threats, identifying a concept for enhancing today's forces by adding a light armored infantry capability. Because the Army requested near-term options, the new concept incorporates equipment and platforms that are already available within the U.S. Department of Defense. The near-term focus also meant that the current Air Force airlift fleet was an important consideration, since Army airborne forces rely on Air Force transport aircraft to deploy. The research team examined notional future brigade- and battalion-sized airborne units, including the numbers and types of vehicles that would be needed to create an airborne light armored force that could be airdropped or air-landed from Air Force transport planes. The primary light armored vehicle possibilities studied were the Stryker (currently used by the Army) and the Light Armored Vehicle, second generation (LAV-II, used by the Marine Corps and the militaries of several other nations). Each family of vehicles would have advantages and disadvantages for the Army's airborne force, with the LAV-II provisionally identified as the preferred candidate. A tabletop exercise with subject-matter experts, using scenarios developed through a review of historical Army missions, identified how the addition of light armor could enhance the performance of airborne units.

Using computer simulations, RAND analysts examined, compared, and contrasted new technologies and systems that would allow light forces to better withstand and overcome attacks from larger, more heavily armed forces in varying terrain.

This report was written as part of a project entitled "Joint Operational Concepts for an Uncertain Future." The focus of the research became an effort to assess the challenges that U.S. Army airborne forces may face in the future and identify capabilities airborne forces will need to effectively address those challenges. This report summarizes threats tothe current U.S. airborne force and explores the concept of an airborne light armored infantry force as a possible means to mitigate those threats. Additionally, the report examines possible vehicle options for such a concept, as well as joint requirements that the concept might generate, particularly in terms of the amount of airlift that an Army airborne unit with an increased number of vehicles could require.

"The Global Response Force (GRF) is built for rapid response to unforeseen or, more specifically, unplanned operations. Selected Army airborne forces provide a large portion of the GRF and are dependent on joint concepts for deployment and access. This study illustrates a method for determining the best access strategies given constraints in aircraft, intermediate staging bases, operational capabilities, and other factors. The study applies this method to each geographic combatant command and develops specific, tailored strategies for each. The access strategies are built from multiple analytic techniques: historical aircraft data and platform specifications to determine capabilities and limitations of the air fleet; several airfield databases, site reports, and expert judgments to determine probable intermediate staging base locations and their likely capabilities; multiple deployment concepts for access to minimize operational risks; and detailed geographic and operational analysis to determine global coverage and reach. In the end, we were able to deduce a preferred strategy for each of the combatant commands. Global access for the GRF is provided partially through the use of well-established staging bases but will necessarily rely on austere basing and complex deployment concepts for particular locations in multiple combatant commands. The study concludes with several recommendations to close those risks, which span the services, combatant commands, and joint staff"--Back cover.

A RAND study analyzed Chinese and U.S. military capabilities in two scenarios (Taiwan and the Spratly Islands) from 1996 to 2017, finding that trends in most, but not all, areas run strongly against the United States. While U.S. aggregate power remains greater than China’s, distance and geography affect outcomes. China is capable of challenging U.S. military dominance on its immediate periphery—and its reach is likely to grow in the years ahead.

Established in 1932, the Vozdushno-desantnye voyska ('air-landing forces', or VDV) of the Red Army led the way in airborne doctrine and practice. Though they were initially handicapped by a lack of infrastructure, due in part to a turbulent political climate in the 1930s, they still conducted major drops during World War II, including at the Dnepr River in September 1943. After the war ended, the VDV became independent of the Air Force and were elevated to the role of strategic asset. The newly rebuilt divisions were now organized and trained to conduct deep insertions behind enemy lines, attacking command-and-control facilities, lines of communication, and key infrastructure targets such as nuclear power plants. This training came into play in numerous Cold War confrontations, including Soviet operations in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). During the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979–89), the VDV proved to be the most formidable of the Mujahideen's opponents, with the development of the air assault concept – the transport, insertion and support of air-landed troops by helicopter rather than parachute. This title explores the development of the VDV from their conception in 1930 to their role in the Cold War and in the later invasion of Afghanistan. Supported by contemporary photography and specially commissioned artwork of uniforms and battlescenes, this title is a comprehensive and engaging guide to the history of airborne forces in the Soviet period.

Contents: The Prewar Experience; Evolution of Airborne Forces During World War II; Operational Employment: Vyaz'ma, January-February 1942; Operational Employment: Vyaz'ma, February-June 1942; Operational Employment: On the Dnepr, September 1943; Tactical Employment; The Postwar Years.

For almost 70 years Soviet and Russian military theorists have been fascinated with the concept of airborne operations. Now Russian theorists tackle the problems posed to such operations by high-precision weaponry. This work, using newly released and formerly classified Soviet and East German archives, provides a detailed record of the performance of Soviet airborne forces during peace and war.