European Defence Community Lessons For The Future

Lancée en 1950, l'idée de créer une Communauté Européenne de Défense (CED) est contemporaine de celle de fonder une Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier (CECA). Mais le projet est une gageure. Il heurte les cultures nationales en matière de défense, suscite de violentes réactions dues à la perspective de voir se côtoyer des ennemis d'hier au sein des mêmes unités, déclenche l'opposition à la standardisation du matériel, hérisse les adversaires d'une liaison entre la CED et la construction d'une Europe politique. Devant une telle variété de facteurs visant à expliquer la mort du projet, le 30 août 1954, certains ont parlé d'un «meurtre collectif». Page d'histoire, le projet de CED et son échec n'en constituent pas moins, aujourd'hui, une référence qui donne matière à réflexion sur cette question que l'on se plaît à considérer comme vitale pour l'avenir de l'Europe: la sécurité commune. In 1950, in parallel with the plans for the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), there first grew the idea for creating a European Defence Community (EDC). But the project was not a success. It conflicted with the various national defence cultures, sparked off violent reactions against the alignment of former enemies within a single unit, unleashed opposition to the standardisation of equipment, and raised the hackles of those opposed to a bond between the EDC and the construction of a political Europe. In the face of so many different factors contributing to the project's death on 30 August 1954, there was even talk in certain quarters of a «collective murder». As an important event in history, the EDC project and its failure still have echoes today, causing us all to ponder a question which is universally considered as crucial to the future of Europe: a common security policy.

Agreements between nations constitute the fundamental framework for the ordering of international affairs; and their successes and failures have led to some of the great turning points in modern history. The result of a unique collaboration by historians and political scientists, this book delineates, defines and assesses the idea of pacts and alliances as a key model of political organisation. Anchored by leading academics in the field, it presents numerous case studies covering a broad chronological sweep. Through theoretical and empirical methodology, the contributors address pacts and alliances from the fifteenth century onwards including, among others, the Korean-American and Moscow-Cairo alliances, the Sevres Pact, Turkey's accession to NATO and US alliances around the world. Through a close reading of these historical diplomatic relationships, fundamental yet relatively unaddressed research questions are developed and explored. First, what are the common denominators shared by successful alliances? Second, why do pacts and alliances disintegrate? Third, is the eventual demise of pacts and alliances inevitable? Finally, what are the implications of these issues on pact and alliance making today? This is the first volume to address this wide range of issues, and to bring together researchers and theorists from the historical and political disciplines to provide original and groundbreaking theories of diplomacy. Together, these case studies explore why alliances succeed, why they fail and why it matters. Pacts and Alliances in History is therefore not only important reading for the next generation of policymakers, but will also help frame scholars' enquiries as they try to understand key events in international relations and history.

Since the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet threat to Western Europe, Europeans and the United States have had to re-consider the threats to their security, which have become unclear and unpredictable. More recently the shift in the economic and political balance away from the United States and Western Europe towards Asia, a revision in US defence thinking and the economic crisis have created a new situation to which the European Union (EU) and its Member States need to respond. The strong message from this report is that the pressures on European defence are changing radically with reduced budgets and a United States that will look increasingly to the Asia Pacific region. Europe can keep America's engagement by stepping up to the mark itself. European military expenditure is not the only issue; it is also the effectiveness of that spend. By better coordination of forces and most of all by ensuring that forces are capable of, and willing to, deploy Europe can achieve this now. It is also essential that the EU's Member States engage in a profound debate about the circumstances under which they would be prepared to use force. With 21 members of both the EU and NATO, what is good for the EU is good for NATO and Europe as a whole. This is an area where the UK and France should lead efforts to strengthen European defence capabilities. [Report summary]