Existence Fiction Assumption

Meinong-Studies, Vol. 6, contains papers focusing on the connections between intentionality and nonexistent objects, presenting historical analyses on the background of Meinong’s philosophical position up to the Meinong-Russell-Debate. It also contains systematic studies of fictional characters, of Kripke’s alternative theory of fiction, and of the relevance of fictions playing the role of assumptions in scientific contexts. The volume is completed by biographical sketches of Christian von Ehrenfels, founder of Gestalt-theory and Meinong’s close friend, and of Ernst Mally, disciple of Meinong and successor to his chair.

Eleven original essays discuss a range of puzzling philosophical questions about fictional characters, and more generally about fictional objects. For example, they ask questions like the following: Do they really exist? What would fictional objects be like if they existed? Do they exist eternally? Are they created? Who by? When and how? Can they be destroyed? If so, how? Are they abstract or concrete? Are they actual? Are they complete objects? Are they possible objects? How many fictional objects are there? What are their identity conditions? What kinds of attitudes can we have towards them? This volume will be a landmark in the philosophical debate about fictional objects, and will influence higher-level debates within metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language.

The essays collected in this volume are all concerned with the connection between fiction and truth. This question is of utmost importance to metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophical logic and epistemology, raising in each of these areas and at their intersections a large number of issues related to creation, existence, reference, identity, modality, belief, assertion, imagination, pretense, etc. All these topics and many more are addressed in this collection, which brings together original essays written from various points of view by philosophers of diverse trends. These essays constitute major contributions to the current debates that the connection between truth and fiction continually enlivens, and give a sense of the directions in which research on this question is heading.

The theory of evolution is based solidly upon certain assumptions. This would not be a problem if it wasn't for the fact that most of these assumptions are not warranted by the facts of nature, and therefore have not (and can not ever) be codified as facts of nature. Today these unwarranted, and therefore illegitimate assumptions, have found their way into populating not only our textbooks, but also mainstream America, as confirmed facts of nature, when they are not. This book exposes numerous unwarranted and illegitimate evolutionary assumptions pushed upon the unsuspecting public as codified facts of science when they are not codified facts of nature. According to Dr. Jerry Bergman, this is an "excellent book...it promises to be a very important book in this area (referring to the creation/evolution controversy."

“A powerful, urgent novel that wields issues of gender and class like a blade. . . . This intergenerational novel asks hard questions about who we are, who we can become, and what awaits on the other side of our becoming. Thrity Umrigar is known as a bold and generous writer, and The Secrets Between Us only further establishes her reputation.” — Wiley Cash, author of The Last Ballad Bhima, the unforgettable main character of Thrity Umrigar’s beloved national bestseller The Space Between Us, returns in this triumphant sequel—a poignant and compelling novel in which the former servant struggles against the circumstances of class and misfortune to forge a new path for herself and her granddaughter in modern India. Poor and illiterate, Bhima had faithfully worked for the Dubash family, an upper-middle-class Parsi household, for more than twenty years. Yet after courageously speaking the truth about a heinous crime perpetrated against her own family, the devoted servant was cruelly fired. The sting of that dismissal was made more painful coming from Sera Dubash, the temperamental employer who had long been Bhima’s only confidante. A woman who has endured despair and loss with stoicism, Bhima must now find some other way to support herself and her granddaughter, Maya. Bhima’s fortunes take an unexpected turn when her path intersects with Parvati, a bitter, taciturn older woman. The two acquaintances soon form a tentative business partnership, selling fruits and vegetables at the local market. As they work together, these two women seemingly bound by fate grow closer, each confessing the truth about their lives and the wounds that haunt them. Discovering her first true friend, Bhima pieces together a new life, and together, the two women learn to stand on their own. A dazzling story of gender, strength, friendship, and second chances, The Secrets Between Us is a powerful and perceptive novel that brilliantly evokes the complexities of life in modern India and the harsh realities faced by women born without privilege as they struggle to survive.

This volume advances discussion between critics and defenders of the force-content distinction and opens up new ways of thinking about force and speech acts in relation to the unity problem. The force-content dichotomy has shaped the philosophy of language and mind since the time of Frege and Russell. Isn’t it obvious that, for example, the clauses of a conditional are not asserted and must therefore be propositions and propositions the forceless contents of forceful acts? But, others have recently asked in response, how can a proposition be a truth value bearer if it is not unified through the forceful act of a subject that takes a position regarding how things are? Can we not instead think of propositions as being inherently forceful, but of force as being cancelled in certain contexts? And what do assertoric, but also directive and interrogative force indicators mean? Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition will be of interest to researchers working in philosophy of language, philosophical logic, philosophy of mind and linguistics.

"This enthralling page turner breaks all the molds, and fearlessly exposes the deepest darkest intrigue in history...The Luciferian Agenda for a New World Order. In it, we learn of the Luciferian roots of Modern Science, as the reader is transported back in time to the insidious origins of modern-day Scientism, the current religion of most scientists today. Through an excursion into the roots of Scientism, Mr. Garrett deftly retraces the historical antecedents of Scientism, echoing back to The Secret Mystery Schools of Kabbalistic, Egyptian Hermeticism, onwards into the true nature of Freemason and Alchemical Occultist, Sir Isaac Newton, and then further into the nefarious Vatican Jesuit Priesthood, whose hidden hand can be linked to the creation of The Illuminati, as well as the current Luciferian New Age Religion. Finally, the serpentine path leads up into modern Freemasonic Luciferian, NASA, and then to The Jesuit Controlled Alien Deception about to take hold of the world." --Christian Chesterfield Ph.D.

Nothing is not. Yet it seems that we invoke absences and nothings often in our philosophical explanations. Negative metaphysics is on the rise. It has been claimed that absences can be causes, there are negative properties, absences can be perceived, there are negative facts, and that we can refer to and speak about nothing. Parmenides long ago ruled against such things. Here we consider how much of Parmenides' view can survive. A soft Parmenidean methodology is adopted in which we aim to reject all supposed negative entities but are prepared to accept them, reluctantly, if they are indispensable and irreducible in our best theories. We then see whether there are any negative entities this survive this test. Some can be dismissed on metaphysical grounds but other problems are explained only once we reject another strand in Parmenides and show how we can think and talk about nothing. Accounts of perception of absence, empty reference, and denial are gathered. With these, we can show how no truthmakers are required for negative truths since we can have negative beliefs, concerning what-is-not, without what-is-not being part of what is. This supports a soft ontological Parmenideanism, which accepts much though not all of Parmenides' original position.