Forms Of Feeling

First published in 1985. This book is aimed at readers who wish to learn how to engage in psychotherapy: for beginners, for experienced practitioners, for disciplined research workers, as for the author, the word 'psychotherapy' has a very broad meaning. The author describes this as an 'autobiography': the development of ideas, attitudes, and meanings which have arisen and been transformed through joy, sorrow, chaos, and relative tranquillity in a journey of forty years through the world of academic psychiatry, of analytical psychotherapy, of scientific research, and of life in a therapeutic community. To a large extent this book is an expression of individual experience.

First Published in 1985. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

An interdisciplinary approach to the foundations of moral agency, focusing on different forms and roles of fellow feeling.

A manual of practical psychology. The values to be derived from such a work are necessarily suggestive, and nothing is more powerfully helpful to any one than suggestions. So when considering in this book the subjects of mind and will, ably and interestingly presented by Mr. Atkinson, the reader must be benefitted, for it is the law of suggestion that attributes, elements of greatness within respond to suggestions from without. No one, therefore, can carefully read this book without awakening responsiveness and obtaining a further knowledge and control of the faculties therein treated.

A proposal that extends the enactive approach developed in cognitive science and philosophy of mind to issues in affective science. In The Feeling Body, Giovanna Colombetti takes ideas from the enactive approach developed over the last twenty years in cognitive science and philosophy of mind and applies them for the first time to affective science—the study of emotions, moods, and feelings. She argues that enactivism entails a view of cognition as not just embodied but also intrinsically affective, and she elaborates on the implications of this claim for the study of emotion in psychology and neuroscience. In the course of her discussion, Colombetti focuses on long-debated issues in affective science, including the notion of basic emotions, the nature of appraisal and its relationship to bodily arousal, the place of bodily feelings in emotion experience, the neurophysiological study of emotion experience, and the bodily nature of our encounters with others. Drawing on enactivist tools such as dynamical systems theory, the notion of the lived body, neurophenomenology, and phenomenological accounts of empathy, Colombetti advances a novel approach to these traditional issues that does justice to their complexity. Doing so, she also expands the enactive approach into a further domain of inquiry, one that has more generally been neglected by the embodied-embedded approach in the philosophy of cognitive science.

This book is the first complete intellectual biography of Hermann Cohen (1842-1918) and the only work to cover all his major philosophical and Jewish writings. Frederick C. Beiser pays special attention to all phases of Cohen's intellectual development, its breaks and its continuities, throughout seven decades. The guiding goal behind Cohen's intellectual career, he argues, was the development of a radical rationalism, one committed to defending the rights of unending enquiry and unlimited criticism. Cohen's philosophy was therefore an attempt to defend and revive the Enlightenment belief in the authority of reason; his critical idealism an attempt to justify this belief and to establish a purely rational worldview. According to this interpretation, Cohen's thought is resolutely opposed to any form of irrationalism or mysticism because these would impose arbitrary and artificial limits on criticism and enquiry. It is therefore critical of those interpretations which see Cohen's philosophy as a species of proto-existentialism (Rosenzweig) or Jewish mysticism (Adelmann and Köhnke). Hermann Cohen: An Intellectual Biography attempts to unify the two sides of Cohen's thought, his philosophy and his Judaism. Maintaining that Cohen's Judaism was not a limit to his radical rationalism but a consistent development of it, Beiser contends that his religion was one of reason. He concludes that most critical interpretations have failed to appreciate the philosophical depth and sophistication of his Judaism, a religion which committed the believer to the unending search for truth and the striving to achieve the cosmopolitan ideals of reason.

Originally published by Viking Penguin, 2014.