From The Morgenthau Diaries Years Of War 1941 1945

Revised and condensed version issued in a 1 v. ed. in 1970 under title: Roosevelt and Morgenthau. [1] Years of crisis, 1928-1938.--[2] Years of urgency, 1938-1941.--[3] Years of war, 1941-1945.

Revised and condensed version issued in a 1 v. ed. in 1970 under title: Roosevelt and Morgenthau. [1] Years of crisis, 1928-1938.--[2] Years of urgency, 1938-1941.--[3] Years of war, 1941-1945.

Contrary to what is often reported in history books, the Morgenthau Plan was a major element in postwar planning led by Washington, before the war was even over. This book traces the roles played by Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury to President Roosevelt, and his assistant Harry Dexter White, in the planning for the postwar world. Close attention is given to the discussions leading up to the Second Quebec Conference in 1944 where Winston Churchill's acceptance of the plan was obtained. It is clear that the effects of the policy were understood in advance. The book follows the devastating consequences of the policies based on the plan and their contribution to the postwar collapse of the European economy. Damning evidence shows that the Allies intentionally brought starvation and disease to large civilian populations, while condemning millions of Germans to slave labor in neighboring countries and knowingly sending surrendered Russians to be sent back home for certain execution. The motives of revisionist historians are suspect, as they should be. It is obvious that the conclusions that can be drawn from this account could be abused. They could be used to condemn all Americans for the policies of some of their leaders. They could also be used by people trying to justify the behavior of the National Socialists or by anti-Semites. However, it should be pointed out that the American people paid an extremely high price for their Secretary of Treasurys interference in foreign affairs. It should also be pointed out that one of the severest critics of Western postwar policy was the Jewish publicist Victor Gollancz. This account is based primarily on unclassified information that has been available to the public for decades. Although many accounts of the Morgenthau Plan accept the euphemisms, understatements and outright fabrications offered by the individuals concerned, this account will demonstrate that it was not impossible for a conscientious researcher to uncover a more accurate picture of the truth. However, most scholars have decided to accept at face value statements that on close inspection are obviously false. Some of these misstatements concerning the Morgenthau Plan are understandable. It is less understandable when a respected biographer like Robert E. Sherwood intentionally distorts the historical record. The contradictions between what really happened and what Americans believe and have been told are manifold. It is ironic that Nazis who committed the most terrible crimes frequently received more humane treatment at the hands of the Allies than Germans who had opposed Nationalist Socialism. It is also striking to note the evidence that key individuals had Communist leanings, and it was the Soviet Union that benefited most from the Morgenthau Plan. Many of the subjects dealt with in this manuscript are fertile ground for a researcher wanting to make a name for himself. They are nearly virgin territory. Why have so many of these subjects been treated as taboo? When will our historians feel free to explore the implications that America's progressive establishment was frequently in alignment with Communist goals?

A collection of brief biographical sketches presenting the American experience in the World War II era. It contains the stories of soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines who served in the European and Pacific theatres and demonstrates the profound impact of the war on American society.

This book offers a major rereading of US foreign policy from Thomas Jefferson's purchase of Louisiana expanse to the Korean War. This period of one hundred and fifty years saw the expansion of the United States from fragile republic to transcontinental giant. David Mayers explores the dissenting voices which accompanied this dramatic ascent, focusing on dissenters within the political and military establishment and on the recurrent patterns of dissent that have transcended particular policies and crises. The most stubborn of these sprang from anxiety over the material and political costs of empire while other strands of dissent have been rooted in ideas of exigent justice, realpolitik, and moral duties existing beyond borders. Such dissent is evident again in the contemporary world when the US occupies the position of preeminent global power. Professor Mayers's study reminds us that America's path to power was not as straightforward as it might now seem.

Discusses the domestic pressure which influenced Roosevelt's foreign policy and American foreign relations.

The Good Neighbor Policy was tested to the breaking point by Argentina-U.S. relations during World War II. In part, its durability had depended both upon the willingness of all American republics to join with the United States in resisting attempts by extrahemispheric sources to intervene in New World affairs and upon continuity within the United States foreign-policy establishment. During World War II, neither prerequisite was satisfied, Argentina chose to pursue a neutralist course, and the Latin American policy of the United States became the subject of a bitter bureaucratic struggle within the Roosevelt administration. Consequently, the principles of nonintervention and noninterference, together with “absolute respect for the sovereignty of all states,” ceased to be the guideposts of Washington’s hemispheric policy. In this study, Randall Bennett Woods argues persuasively that Washington’s response to Argentine neutrality was based more on internal differences—individual rivalries and power struggles between competing bureaucratic empires—than on external issues or economic motives. He explains how bureaucratic infighting within the U.S. government, entirely irrelevant to the issues involved, shaped important national policy toward Argentina. Using agency memoranda, State Department records, notes on conversations and interviews, memoirs, and personal archives of the participants, Woods looks closely at the rivalries that swayed the course of Argentine-American relations. He describes the personal motives and goals of men such as Sumner Welles, Cordell Hull, Henry Morgenthau, Harry Dexter White, Henry A. Wallace, and Milo Perkins. He delineates various cliques within the State Department, including the contending groups of Welles Latin Americanists and Hull internationalists—and describes the power struggles between the State Department, the Treasury Department, the Board of Economic Welfare, the Caribbean Defense Command, and other agencies. Of special interest to students of contemporary history will be Woods’s discussion of the careers and views of Juan Peron and Nelson Rockefeller—for American policy contributed in no small way to Peron’s rise, and Rockefeller was the man chiefly responsible for the U.S. rapprochement with Argentina in 1944-45. Woods also gives special attention to the impact of the Wilsonian tradition—especially its contradictions—on policy formation. The last chapter, dealing with Argentina’s admission to the U.N., sheds some light on the origins of the Cold War. Wood’s investigation of the Argentine problem makes a significant contribution toward the understanding of U.S.-Latin American relations in the era of the Good Neighbor Policy, and provides new insights into the evolution of hemispheric policy as a whole during World War II. It reflects the growing emphasis on bureaucratic politics as a principal determinant of U.S. diplomacy.

The most terrible emergency in Britain's history, the Second World War required an unprecedented national effort. An exhausted country had to fight an unexpectedly long war and found itself much diminished amongst the victors. Yet the outcome of the war was nonetheless a triumph, not least for a political system that proved well adapted to the demands of a total conflict and for a population who had to make many sacrifices but who were spared most of the horrors experienced in the rest of Europe. Britain's War is a narrative of these epic events, an analysis of the myriad factors that shaped military success and failure, and an explanation of what the war tells us about the history of modern Britain. As compelling on the major military events as he is on the experience of ordinary people living through exceptional times, Todman suffuses his extraordinary book with a vivid sense of a struggle which left nobody unchanged - and explores why, despite terror, separation and deprivation, Britons were overwhelmingly willing to pay the price of victory.