Future Of American Landpower Does Forward Presence Still Matter The Case Of The Army In The Pacific

The time has come for a reappraisal of the U.S. Army's forward presence in East Asia, given the evolving strategic context and the extraordinarily high, recurring costs of deploying U.S. Army forces from the 50 states for increasingly important security cooperation activities across the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater. Without unduly harming America's commitment to deterrence on the Korean peninsula, a reconfigured Army forward presence could help to achieve U.S. objectives throughout the theater more effectively through more regular, longer-duration engagement with critical allies and partners, while reducing the recurring transportation costs associated with today's practice of sending U.S.-based units to conduct most exercises and training events across the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Certainly, there are some major challenges involved in reconfiguring the Army's forward presence, but these are not insurmountable. Furthermore, to avoid trying would severely limit the effectiveness and the efficiency of the Army's contribution to broader U.S. national security goals.

The time has come for a reappraisal of the U.S. Army's forward presence in East Asia, given the significantly changed strategic context and the extraordinarily high, recurring costs of deploying U.S. Army forces from the 50 states for increasingly important security cooperation activities across the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater. For economic, political, diplomatic, and military reasons, the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater continues to grow in importance to the United States. As part of a broad, interagency, multifaceted approach, the U.S. military plays a critical role in the rebalancing effort now underway. The U.S. Army in particular has a special role to play in bolstering the defense of allies and the deterrence of aggression, promoting regional security and stability, and ameliorating the growing U.S.-China security dilemma. In particular, military security cooperation programs are becoming increasingly important for achieving U.S. security goals. These military-to-military programs and activities are designed to shape the security environment; prevent conflict through deterrence, assurance, and transparency; and build operational and tactical interoperability. As wartime requirements decrease in the coming year following the end of extensive American involvement in Afghanistan and as the U.S. military undergoes a dramatic yet historically typical post-war drawdown, security cooperation activities will comprise the primary way in which a leaner U.S. military contributes to broad American national security objectives in the next decade.

The time has come for a reappraisal of the U.S. Army's forward presence in East Asia, given the evolving strategic context and the extraordinarily high, recurring costs of deploying U.S. Army forces from the 50 states for increasingly important security cooperation activities across the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater. Without unduly harming America's commitment to deterrence on the Korean peninsula, a reconfigured Army forward presence could help to achieve U.S. objectives throughout the theater more effectively through more regular, longer-duration engagement with critical allies and partners, while reducing the recurring transportation costs associated with today's practice of sending U.S.-based units to conduct most exercises and training events across the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Certainly, there are some major challenges involved in reconfiguring the Army's forward presence, but these are not insurmountable. Furthermore, to avoid trying would severely limit the effectiveness and the efficiency of the Army's contribution to broader U.S. national security goals.

This monograph explores the utility of forward presence in Europe, placing the recent decisions -- and, in particular, the arguments against forward presence -- in the context of a decades-long tradition on the part of many political leaders, scholars, and others to mistakenly tie the forward-basing of U.S. forces to more equal defense burden sharing across the entire North Atlantic alliance. In assessing whether and how forward presence still matters in terms of protecting U.S. interests and achieving U.S. objectives, the author bridges the gap between academics and practitioners by grounding his analysis in political science theory while illuminating how forward-basing yields direct, tangible benefits in terms of military operational interoperability. Moreover, this monograph forms a critical datapoint in the ongoing dialogue regarding the future of American landpower, particular in this age of austerity.

The utility of U.S. forward presence in Europe, placing the recent decisions-and in particular the arguments against forward presence-in the context of a decades' long tradition on the part of many political leaders, scholars, and others, mistakenly tie forward basing of U.S. forces to more equal defense burden sharing across the entire North Atlantic alliance. In assessing whether and how forward presence still matters in terms of protecting U.S. interests and achieving U.S. objectives, the author bridges the gap between academics and practitioners by grounding his analysis in political science theory while illuminating how forward basing yields direct, tangible benefits in terms of military operational interoperability. This monograph forms a critical datapoint in the ongoing dialogue regarding the future of American landpower, particular in this age of austerity.

American Landpower is a strategic instrument of state policy and needs to be considered as such. This monograph explores and explains the nature of Landpower, both in general terms and also with particular regard to the American case. The monograph argues that: (1) Landpower is unique in the character of the quality it brings to the American joint team for national security; (2) the U.S. has a permanent need for the human quality in Landpower that this element provides inherently; (3) Landpower is always and, indeed, necessarily strategic in its meaning and implications--it is a quintessentially strategic instrument of state policy and politics; (4) strategic Landpower is unavoidably and beneficially joint in its functioning, this simply is so much the contemporary character of American strategic Landpower that we should consider jointness integral to its permanent nature; and (5) strategic Landpower has an enduring position of dominance on the joint military team because conflict, war, and warfare have demonstrated all too convincingly over the course of 2,500 years that they do not register much of great relative significance with respect to change over time. In short, the strategic Landpower maintained today safely can be assumed to be necessary for security long into the future. No matter how familiar the concept of strategic Landpower is when identified and expressed thus, it is a physical and psychological reality that has persisted to strategic effect through all of the strategic history to which we have access. Other products pertaining to this topic include the following: The Future of American Landpower: Does Forward Presence Still Matter?: The Case of the Army in the Pacific can be found at this link: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01099-4 Senior Conference 50, The Army We Need: The Role of Landpower in an Uncertain Strategic Environment, June 1-3, 2014 can be found at this link: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01102-8 A Russian View on Landpower can be found at this link: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01142-7

This book investigates cultural influences of competitive sports on U.S. and Chinese strategic thinking and tactical behavior. Most competitive sports owe their origins to human fighting. Although they are “ritualized contests,” competitive sports have retained many aspects of human warfare, especially the use of strategy and tactics that moves human contest beyond military clashes to the subjugation of opponents without bloodshed. Cultural influences usually go unnoticed. Indeed, Washington often conducts foreign affairs like football games without knowing that is the case. Likewise, Beijing moves in Weiqi style subconsciously. This book uncovers these influences.