Game Theory Alive

We live in a highly connected world with multiple self-interested agents interacting and myriad opportunities for conflict and cooperation. The goal of game theory is to understand these opportunities. This book presents a rigorous introduction to the mathematics of game theory without losing sight of the joy of the subject. This is done by focusing on theoretical highlights (e.g., at least six Nobel Prize winning results are developed from scratch) and by presenting exciting connections of game theory to other fields such as computer science (algorithmic game theory), economics (auctions and matching markets), social choice (voting theory), biology (signaling and evolutionary stability), and learning theory. Both classical topics, such as zero-sum games, and modern topics, such as sponsored search auctions, are covered. Along the way, beautiful mathematical tools used in game theory are introduced, including convexity, fixed-point theorems, and probabilistic arguments. The book is appropriate for a first course in game theory at either the undergraduate or graduate level, whether in mathematics, economics, computer science, or statistics. The importance of game-theoretic thinking transcends the academic setting—for every action we take, we must consider not only its direct effects, but also how it influences the incentives of others.

This new edition is unparalleled in breadth of coverage, thoroughness of technical explanations and number of worked examples.

The definitive introduction to game theory This comprehensive textbook introduces readers to the principal ideas and applications of game theory, in a style that combines rigor with accessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with a concise description of rational decision making, and goes on to discuss strategic and extensive form games with complete information, Bayesian games, and extensive form games with imperfect information. He covers a host of topics, including multistage and repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, rent-seeking games, mechanism design, signaling games, reputation building, and information transmission games. Unlike other books on game theory, this one begins with the idea of rationality and explores its implications for multiperson decision problems through concepts like dominated strategies and rationalizability. Only then does it present the subject of Nash equilibrium and its derivatives. Game Theory is the ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students. Throughout, concepts and methods are explained using real-world examples backed by precise analytic material. The book features many important applications to economics and political science, as well as numerous exercises that focus on how to formalize informal situations and then analyze them. Introduces the core ideas and applications of game theory Covers static and dynamic games, with complete and incomplete information Features a variety of examples, applications, and exercises Topics include repeated games, bargaining, auctions, signaling, reputation, and information transmission Ideal for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students Complete solutions available to teachers and selected solutions available to students

Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.

The Simulation Hypothesis, by best-selling author, renowned MIT computer scientist and Silicon Valley video game designer Rizwan Virk, is the first serious book to explain one of the most daring and consequential theories of our time. Riz is the Executive Director of Play Labs @ MIT, a video game startup incubator at the MIT Game Lab. Drawing from research and concepts from computer science, artificial intelligence, video games, quantum physics, and referencing both speculative fiction and ancient eastern spiritual texts, Virk shows how all of these traditions come together to point to the idea that we may be inside a simulated reality like the Matrix. The Simulation Hypothesis is the idea that our physical reality, far from being a solid physical universe, is part of an increasingly sophisticated video game-like simulation, where we all have multiple lives, consisting of pixels with its own internal clock run by some giant Artificial Intelligence. Simulation theory explains some of the biggest mysteries of quantum and relativistic physics, such as quantum indeterminacy, parallel universes, and the integral nature of the speed of light. Recently, the idea that we may be living in a giant video game has received a lot of attention: “There’s a one in a billion chance we are not living in a simulation” -Elon Musk “I find it hard to argue we are not in a simulation.” -Neil deGrasse Tyson “We are living in computer generated reality.” -Philip K. Dick Video game technology has developed from basic arcade and text adventures to MMORPGs. Video game designer Riz Virk shows how these games may continue to evolve in the future, including virtual reality, augmented reality, Artificial Intelligence, and quantum computing. This book shows how this evolution could lead us to the point of being able to develop all encompassing virtual worlds like the Oasis in Ready Player One, or the simulated reality in the Matrix. While the idea sounds like science fiction, many scientists, engineers, and professors have given the Simulation Hypothesis serious consideration. Futurist Ray Kurzweil has popularized the idea of downloading our consciousness into a silicon based device, which would mean we are just digital information after all. Some, like Oxford lecturer Nick Bostrom, goes further and thinks we may in fact be artificially intelligent consciousness inside such a simulation already! But the Simulation Hypothesis is not just a modern idea. Philosophers like Plato have been telling us that we live in a “cave” and can only see shadows of the real world. Mystics of all traditions have long contended that we are living in some kind of “illusion “and that there are other realities which we can access with our minds. While even Judeo-Christian traditions have this idea, Eastern traditions like Buddhism and Hinduism make this idea part of their core tradition — that we are inside a dream world (“Maya” or illusion, or Vishnu’s Dream), and we have “multiple lives” playing different characters when one dies, continuing to gain experience and “level up” after completing certain challenges. Sounds a lot like a video game! Whether you are a computer scientist, a fan of science fiction like the Matrix movies, a video game enthusiast, or a spiritual seeker, The Simulation Hypothesis touches on all these areas, and you will never look at the world the same way again!

This book offers a gentle introduction to the mathematics of both sides of game theory: combinatorial and classical. The combination allows for a dynamic and rich tour of the subject united by a common theme of strategic reasoning. Designed as a textbook for an undergraduate mathematics class and with ample material and limited dependencies between the chapters, the book is adaptable to a variety of situations and a range of audiences. Instructors, students, and independent readers alike will appreciate the flexibility in content choices as well as the generous sets of exercises at various levels.

Recent interest in biological games and mathematical finance make this classic 1982 text a necessity once again. Unlike other books in the field, this text provides an overview of the analysis of dynamic/differential zero-sum and nonzero-sum games and simultaneously stresses the role of different information patterns. The first edition was fully revised in 1995, adding new topics such as randomized strategies, finite games with integrated decisions, and refinements of Nash equilibrium. Readers can now look forward to even more recent results in this unabridged, revised SIAM Classics edition. Topics covered include static and dynamic noncooperative game theory, with an emphasis on the interplay between dynamic information patterns and structural properties of several different types of equilibria; Nash and Stackelberg solution concepts; multi-act games; Braess paradox; differential games; the relationship between the existence of solutions of Riccati equations and the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions; and infinite-horizon differential games.

Comprises lectures given at Tel Aviv University and Oxford University in 1990.