George Ball Vietnam And The Rethinking Of Containment

Looks at Ball's role as the lone presidential advisor to President Johnson who opposed American military intervention in Vietnam, and summarizes Ball's criticisms of U.S. policy

Beginning with the Cold War and concluding with the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Hannah Gurman explores the overlooked opposition of U.S. diplomats to American foreign policy in the latter half of the twentieth century. During America's reign as a dominant world power, U.S. presidents and senior foreign policy officials largely ignored or rejected their diplomats' reports, memos, and telegrams, especially when they challenged key policies relating to the Cold War, China, and the wars in Vietnam and Iraq. The Dissent Papers recovers these diplomats' invaluable perspective and their commitment to the transformative power of diplomatic writing. Gurman showcases the work of diplomats whose opposition enjoyed some success. George Kennan, John Stewart Service, John Paton Davies, George Ball, and John Brady Kiesling all caught the attention of sitting presidents and policymakers, achieving temporary triumphs yet ultimately failing to change the status quo. Gurman follows the circulation of documents within the State Department, the National Security Council, the C.I.A., and the military, and she details the rationale behind "The Dissent Channel," instituted by the State Department in the 1970s, to both encourage and contain dissent. Advancing an alternative narrative of modern U.S. history, she connects the erosion of the diplomatic establishment and the weakening of the diplomatic writing tradition to larger political and ideological trends while, at the same time, foreshadowing the resurgent significance of diplomatic writing in the age of Wikileaks.

Diplomat and "wise man" George Ball wielded enormous influence in American foreign policy for more than 40 years. Drawing on Ball's personal archive as well as extensive interviews with Ball and dozens of his associates, Bill traces Ball's involvement with foreign policy, from the 1940s to Ball's death in 1994. 19 illustrations.

“America’s road to disaster in Vietnam has been endlessly chronicled, but Sean L. McLaughlin takes a fresh approach to that familiar story.” —James Hershberg, George Washington University Despite French President Charles de Gaulle’s persistent efforts to constructively share French experience and use his resources to help engineer an American exit from Vietnam, the Kennedy administration responded to de Gaulle’s peace initiatives with bitter silence and inaction.The administration’s response ignited a series of events that dealt a massive blow to American prestige across the globe, resulting in the deaths of over fifty-eight thousand American soldiers and turning hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese citizens into refugees. This history of Franco-American relations during the Kennedy presidency explores how and why France and the US disagreed over the proper western strategy for the Vietnam War. France clearly had more direct political experience in Vietnam, but France’s postwar decolonization cemented Kennedy’s perception that the French were characterized by a toxic mixture of shortsightedness, stubbornness, and indifference to the collective interests of the West. At no point did the Kennedy administration give serious consideration to de Gaulle’s proposals or entertain the notion of using his services as an honest broker in order to disengage from a situation that was rapidly spiraling out of control. Kennedy’s Francophobia, the roots of which appear in a selection of private writings from Kennedy’s undergraduate years at Harvard, biased his decision-making. This book explores how the course of action Kennedy chose in 1963, a rejection of the French peace program, all but handcuffed Lyndon Johnson into formally entering a war he knew the United States had little chance of winning.

A survey of the historical literature on intelligence and national security during the Cold War.

An insightful look into the immediate and long-term impact of the Vietnam War on a wide range of people and social groups, both Americans in the United States and in Vietnam. This collection of essays by highly respected social historians looks at the Vietnam War era through the eyes of the ordinary citizens caught up in those tumultuous times. Focusing on the period between 1961 and 1975—from the dramatic U.S. military escalation to the fall of Saigon—it offers fresh insight on the impact of the war on individuals on the home front and the battlefront. Each chapter of Vietnam War Era: People and Perspectives examines how a particular group of Americans interacted with the war and its related issues, among them military advisors and soldiers, the silent majority and antiwar activists, women, labor unions, African Americans, students, government leaders, veterans, the media, and religious communities. The authors draw clear connections between the stories of individual lives and the larger social movements that defined the era's human drama.

Allies at Odds examines America's Vietnam policy from 1961 to 1968 in an international context by focusing on the United States' relationship with its European partners France, West Germany, and Great Britain. The European response to America's Vietnam policy provides a framework to assess this important chapter in recent American history within the wider perspective of international relations. Equally significant, the respective approaches to the "Vietnam question" by the Europeans and Americans reveal the ongoing challenge for nation-states of transcending narrowly defined state-centered policies for a global perspective pursuant of common goals among the trans-Atlantic allies. Blang explores the failure of France, West Germany, and Great Britain to significantly influence American policy-making.

The unknown story of the election that set the tone for today’s fractured politics “A fresh, authoritative analysis of a pivotal election year.”—Kirkus Reviews The 1968 presidential race was a contentious battle between vice president Hubert Humphrey, Republican Richard Nixon, and former Alabama governor George Wallace. The United States was reeling from the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert F. Kennedy and was bitterly divided on the Vietnam War and domestic issues, including civil rights and rising crime. Drawing on previously unexamined archives and numerous interviews, Luke A. Nichter upends the conventional understanding of the campaign. Nichter chronicles how the evangelist Billy Graham met with Johnson after the president’s attempt to reenter the race was stymied by his own party, and offered him a deal: Nixon, if elected, would continue Johnson’s Vietnam War policy and also not oppose his Great Society, if Johnson would soften his support for Humphrey. Johnson agreed. Nichter also shows that Johnson was far more active in the campaign than has previously been described; that Humphrey’s resurgence in October had nothing to do with his changing his position on the war; that Nixon’s “Southern Strategy” has been misunderstood, since he hardly even campaigned there; and that Wallace’s appeal went far beyond the South and anticipated today’s Republican populism. This eye-opening account of the political calculations and maneuvering that decided this fiercely fought election reshapes our understanding of a key moment in twentieth-century American history.