German Foreign Policy Towards Iran Before World War Ii

Early twentieth-century Iran had been dominated by the competing influences of the two great imperial powers of the time - Russia and Britain - making it difficult for a third power to establish a foothold. But an emergent, highly industrialised and assertive Germany in the 1930s became an attractive ally through which Iran could cut loose from domination by Britain and the Soviet Union, allowing it to seek modernity outside the constraints of old imperial interests. This led to the development of close commercial ties between Reza Shah's Persia and Hitler's Germany in the interwar period, an aspect of German foreign policy that is often overlooked. It was the National Bank of Persia, established in 1927 under German management, and with Kurt Lindenblatt as its governor, that was to be the vehicle for Germany's commercial expansion into Iran. The Bank was a vital engine driving industrialisation, even after Lindenblatt retired and was followed by Gholam Reza Amir-Khosrari and a board of directors including Hossein Ala and Abdul Hossein Hazhir. By the mid-1930s, a new German foreign policy approach of active diplomacy fortified initial inroads into the Iranian economy, building upon the foundations laid by individual entrepreneurs, the National Bank and the construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway. Iran evolved into an attractive country for international trade and, at the outbreak of World War II, Germany was Iran's largest trading partner - surpassing both the Soviet Union and Britain. These close ties reveal a complex relationship between Germany and Iran, and an admiration of the Nazi's brand of industrial, scientific and organisational progress. It was, however, a relationship that came to an abrupt end with the Allied invasion of Iran in 1941 that deposed the Shah. Khatib-Shahidi delves into previously untapped German primary sources to explore the nature of German involvement in Iran between the wars, examining how it came to be moulded by a handful of individuals. This book is a revealing resource on the historical ties between Iran and Germany, making it indispensable for students and researchers of European Imperialism and Colonialism in the Middle East as well as of Iranian Political and Economic History.

Introduction -- Chapter 1: Persia, the International Environment, and the German Economic Approach -- Chapter 2: German Foreign Policy Towards Persia -- Chapter 3: German Foreign and Economic Relations in Persia: Their Evolution and the Role of the National Bank -- Chapter 4: Challenges for German Foreign Policy towards Persia and the National Bank -- Chapter 5: The National Bank Controversy and the End of the Taimurtash Era -- Chapter 6: The Lindenblatt Affair and the National Bank -- Chapter 7: Germany's Political Relations Advance Economic Influence in Persia -- Chapter 8: Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.

Early twentieth-century Iran had been dominated by the competing influences of the two great imperial powers of the time - Russia and Britain - making it difficult for a third power to establish a foothold. But an emergent, highly industrialised and assertive Germany in the 1930s became an attractive ally through which Iran could cut loose from domination by Britain and the Soviet Union, allowing it to seek modernity outside the constraints of old imperial interests. This led to the development of close commercial ties between Reza Shah's Persia and Hitler's Germany in the interwar period, an aspect of German foreign policy that is often overlooked. It was the National Bank of Persia, established in 1927 under German management, and with Kurt Lindenblatt as its governor, that was to be the vehicle for Germany's commercial expansion into Iran. The Bank was a vital engine driving industrialisation, even after Lindenblatt retired and was followed by Gholam Reza Amir-Khosrari and a board of directors including Hossein Ala and Abdul Hossein Hazhir. By the mid-1930s, a new German foreign policy approach of active diplomacy fortified initial inroads into the Iranian economy, building upon the foundations laid by individual entrepreneurs, the National Bank and the construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway. Iran evolved into an attractive country for international trade and, at the outbreak of World War II, Germany was Iran's largest trading partner - surpassing both the Soviet Union and Britain. These close ties reveal a complex relationship between Germany and Iran, and an admiration of the Nazi's brand of industrial, scientific and organisational progress. It was, however, a relationship that came to an abrupt end with the Allied invasion of Iran in 1941 that deposed the Shah. Khatib-Shahidi delves into previously untapped German primary sources to explore the nature of German involvement in Iran between the wars, examining how it came to be moulded by a handful of individuals. This book is a revealing resource on the historical ties between Iran and Germany, making it indispensable for students and researchers of European Imperialism and Colonialism in the Middle East as well as of Iranian Political and Economic History.

Most wars between countries end quickly and at relatively low cost. The few in which high-intensity fighting continues for years bring about a disproportionate amount of death and suffering. What separates these few unusually long and intense wars from the many conflicts that are far less destructive? In Logics of War, Alex Weisiger tests three explanations for a nation's decision to go to war and continue fighting regardless of the costs. He combines sharp statistical analysis of interstate wars over the past two centuries with nine narrative case studies. He examines both well-known conflicts like World War II and the Persian Gulf War, as well as unfamiliar ones such as the 1864-1870 Paraguayan War (or the War of the Triple Alliance), which proportionally caused more deaths than any other war in modern history. When leaders go to war expecting easy victory, events usually correct their misperceptions quickly and with fairly low casualties, thereby setting the stage for a negotiated agreement. A second explanation involves motives born of domestic politics; as war becomes more intense, however, leaders are increasingly constrained in their ability to continue the fighting. Particularly destructive wars instead arise from mistrust of an opponent's intentions. Countries that launch preventive wars to forestall expected decline tend to have particularly ambitious war aims that they hold to even when fighting goes poorly. Moreover, in some cases, their opponents interpret the preventive attack as evidence of a dispositional commitment to aggression, resulting in the rejection of any form of negotiation and a demand for unconditional surrender. Weisiger's treatment of a topic of central concern to scholars of major wars will also be read with great interest by military historians, political psychologists, and sociologists.

This new edition of The Caucasus is a thorough update of an essential guide that has introduced thousands of readers to a complex region. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the break-away territories that have tried to split away from them constitute one of the most diverse and challenging regions on earth, impressing the visitor with their multi-layered history and ethnic complexity. Over the last few years, the South Caucasus region has captured international attention again because of disputes between the West and Russia, its unresolved conflicts, and its role as an energy transport corridor to Europe. The Caucasus gives the reader a historical overview and an authoritative guide to the three conflicts that have blighted the region. Thomas de Waal tells the story of the "Five-Day War" between Georgia and Russia and recent political upheavals in all three countries. He also finds time to tell the reader about Georgian wine, Baku jazz and how the coast of Abkhazia was known as "Soviet Florida." Short, stimulating and rich in detail, The Caucasus is the perfect guide to this fascinating and little-understood region.