Gertz V Robert Welch Inc

Elmer Gertz recalls his long battle in what legal scholars regard as the second most important libel case in legal history: Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. Gertz's ordeal began in Chicago during the violent peace demonstrations of 1968. A youth, Ronald Nelson, was killed by a Chicago policeman, Richard Nuccio. Gertz represented the Nelson family in civil suits against Nuccio and the Chicago police department. After Nuccio was convicted of murder, the John Birch Society published an article in its journal, American Opinion, claiming that Nuccio was framed by Communists. Gertz was targeted as a prime Communist instigator. After reading and studying the article, Gertz filed suit against Robert Welch, Inc., charging that it had defamed him by publishing highly harmful lies impugning his reputation and patriotism. Gertz writes in detail of his landmark case, which involved two trials, two reviews in the court of appeals, and two battles in the Supreme Court. Although the case was finally decided in April 1981, when a U.S. district court jury awarded him $100,000 compensatory damages and $300,000 punitive damages, Gertz did not receive payment until May 1983, after Robert Welch, Inc., had filed two unsuccessful appeals.

In a stinging dissent to a 1961 Supreme Court decision that allowed the Illinois state bar to deny admission to prospective lawyers if they refused to answer political questions, Justice Hugo Black closed with the memorable line, "We must not be afraid to be free." Black saw the First Amendment as the foundation of American freedom - the guarantor of all other Constitutional rights. Yet since free speech is by nature unruly, people fear it. Consequently, the impulse to curb or limit it has been a constant danger throughout American history. In We Must Not Be Afraid to Be Free, two of America's leading free speech scholar-activists, Ron Collins and Sam Chaltain, provide an authoritative history of free speech in modern America. Each chapter is an engaging narrative account of a landmark First Amendment case that foregrounds the colorful people involved-judges, plaintiffs, attorneys, defendants-and the issue at stake. Cumulatively, the chapters provide a definitive account of how the First Amendment evolved over the course of a century. Tracing the development of free speech rights from a more restrictive era-the early twentieth century-through the Warren Court revolution of the 1960s and up to the current post 9/11 era of heightened security concerns, Collins and Chaltain not only cover the history of an ideal, but explain in accessible language how the law surrounding the ideal transformed. Essential for anyone interested in this most essential of rights, We Must Not Be Afraid to Be Free will be a standard work on free speech for years to come.

Although the government of the United States is traditionally viewed as a democracy, there is considerable disagreement about what democracy means and implies. In a comprehensive study Professor Edelman examines the three democratic paradigms most prevalent in America today: natural rights, contract, and competition. Theories based on these paradigms lead to different ideas of democracy, each of which yields variant interpretations of the Constitution. This close relationship between democratic theories and constitutional interpretations is analyzed in an extensive historical introduction, which focuses on some of the major thinkers in American history. Edelman's discussion shows that neither the Constitution nor the development of American political thought can serve as an authoritative basis for any one theory of democracy. Instead of a particular theory, the historical constant was an appeal to reason inherent in our basic charter. In his methodological section, Edelman argues that we must use reason to clarify the latent values inherent in the differing concepts of democracy and the consequences that flow from them. He analyzes judicial ideas in the light of three concepts deemed central to any democratic theory—citizenship, political participation, and political freedom—and concludes with a balanced account of contemporary democratic theories, the constitutional theories related to them, and a critique of both.

In exploring a series of problems associated with privacy and the First Amendment, Bloustein defines individual and group privacy, distinguishing them from each other and related concepts. He also identifies the public interest in individual privacy as individual integrity or liberty, and that of group privacy as the integrity of social structure. The legal protection afforded each of these forms of privacy is illustrated at length, as is the clash between them and the constitutional guarantees of the First Amendment and the citizen's general right to know. In his final essay, Bloustein insists that the concept of group privacy is essential to a properly functioning social structure, and warns that it would be disastrous if this principle were neglected as part of an overreaction to the misuse of group confidences that characterized the Nixon era.