God And The Problem Of Evidential Ambiguity

When it comes to what many of us think of as the deepest questions of existence, the answers can seem difficult to make out. This difficulty, or ambiguity, is the topic of this Element. The Element begins by offering a general account of what evidential ambiguity consists in and uses it to try to make sense of the idea that our world is religiously ambiguous in some sense. It goes on to consider the questions of how we ought to investigate the nature of ultimate reality and whether evidential ambiguity is itself a significant piece of evidence in the quest.

When it comes to what many of us think of as the deepest questions of existence, the answers can seem difficult to make out. This difficulty, or ambiguity, is the topic of this Element. The Element begins by offering a general account of what evidential ambiguity consists in and uses it to try to make sense of the idea that our world is religiously ambiguous in some sense. It goes on to consider the questions of how we ought to investigate the nature of ultimate reality and whether evidential ambiguity is itself a significant piece of evidence in the quest.

God and Evidence presents a new set of compelling problems for theistic philosophers. The problems pertain to three types of theistic philosopher, which Lovering defines here as 'theistic inferentialists,' 'theistic non-inferentialists,' and 'theistic fideists.' Theistic inferentialists believe that God exists, that there is inferential probabilifying evidence of God's existence, and that this evidence is discoverable not simply in principle but in practice. Theistic non-inferentialists believe that God exists, that there is non-inferential probabilifying evidence of God's existence, and that this evidence is discoverable not simply in principle but in practice. Theistic fideists believe that God exists, that there is no discoverable probabilifying evidence (inferential or non-inferential) of God's existence, and that it is nevertheless acceptable-morally if not otherwise-to have faith that God exists. Lovering argues that each type of theistic philosopher faces a problem unique to his type and that they all share two particular problems. Some of these problems take us down an entirely new discursive path; others down a new discursive path branching off from an old one.

The perception that life on other planets would be, problematic for religious people, and indeed for religion itself, is a longstanding one. It is partially rooted in fact: astrobiological speculations have, on occasion, engendered religious controversies. Historical discussions are often far more nuanced, and less one-sided than often imagined. 'Exotheology' is a lively subdiscipline within several religious traditions. This Element offers a wide-ranging introduction to the multifarious 'problems of God and astrobiology', real and perceived. It covers major topics within Christian theology (e.g., creation, incarnation, salvation), as well as issues specific to Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism. It also discusses the very different perspectives offered by other (non)religious traditions, including Mormonism, various 'alien-positive' new religious movements (e.g., Heaven's Gate, Scientology, Raëlism), and the 'Ancient Astronaunt' theories popularized by Erich von Dāniken and the History channel's Ancient Aliens.

God and Evidence presents a new set of compelling problems for theistic philosophers. The problems pertain to three types of theistic philosopher, which Lovering defines here as 'theistic inferentialists,' 'theistic non-inferentialists,' and 'theistic fideists.' Theistic inferentialists believe that God exists, that there is inferential probabilifying evidence of God's existence, and that this evidence is discoverable not simply in principle but in practice. Theistic non-inferentialists believe that God exists, that there is non-inferential probabilifying evidence of God's existence, and that this evidence is discoverable not simply in principle but in practice. Theistic fideists believe that God exists, that there is no discoverable probabilifying evidence (inferential or non-inferential) of God's existence, and that it is nevertheless acceptable-morally if not otherwise-to have faith that God exists. Lovering argues that each type of theistic philosopher faces a problem unique to his type and that they all share two particular problems. Some of these problems take us down an entirely new discursive path; others down a new discursive path branching off from an old one.

Why do religious militants think their actions are right or righteous? What keeps me from acting like them? Why do some religious persons act on their beliefs in charitable, inspiring and deeply humane ways? Is secularism the solution to religious violence, or is it part of the problem? This Element explores the vexed issue of violence done in the name of God, looking at the topic through the lens of peace and conflict studies, religious studies and historical studies. The beliefs of various communities, religious and secular, are explored, looking at how convictions inhibit and enable violence. This Element aims to foster a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the promises and perils of religion so that readers can better respond to a world filled with violence.

This study of Professor William Rowe’s defense of atheism on the basis of evil assesses the literature that has developed in response to Rowe’s work, closely examining two strategies: mystery – the idea that God may have reasons beyond our comprehension for permitting evil; and theodicy - explanations as to why God allows evil to flourish. The book unearths difficulties in both, concluding that the God of theism must be "beyond belief."