Government By Judiciary

It is Berger's theory that the United States Supreme Court has embarked on "a continuing revision of the Constitution, under the guise of interpretation," thereby subverting America's democratic institutions and wreaking havoc upon Americans' social and political lives. Raoul Berger (1901-2000) was Charles Warren Senior Fellow in American Legal History, Harvard University. Please note: This title is available as an ebook for purchase on Amazon, Barnes and Noble, and iTunes.

A review chapter is also included to bring the story up-to-date."--Jacket.

It is Berger's theory that the United States Supreme Court has embarked on "a continuing revision of the Constitution, under the guise of interpretation," thereby subverting America's democratic institutions and wreaking havoc upon Americans' social and political lives. Raoul Berger (1901-2000) was Charles Warren Senior Fellow in American Legal History, Harvard University. Please note: This title is available as an ebook for purchase on Amazon, Barnes and Noble, and iTunes.

Courts are key players in the dynamics of federal countries since their rulings have a direct impact on the ability of governments to centralize and decentralize power. Courts in Federal Countries examines the role high courts play in thirteen countries, including Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Nigeria, Spain, and the United States. The volume’s contributors analyse the centralizing or decentralizing forces at play following a court’s ruling on issues such as individual rights, economic affairs, social issues, and other matters. The thirteen substantive chapters have been written to facilitate comparability between the countries. Each chapter outlines a country’s federal system, explains the constitutional and institutional status of the court system, and discusses the high court’s jurisprudence in light of these features. Courts in Federal Countries offers insightful explanations of judicial behaviour in the world’s leading federations.

Comparative studies examine the constitutional design and actual operation of governments in Argentina, Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, India, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, and the United States. Contributors analyze the structures and workings of legislative, executive, and judicial institutions in each sphere of government. They also explore how the federal nature of the polity affects those institutions and how the institutions in turn affect federalism. The book concludes with reflections on possible future trends.

This book investigates the mechanisms of judicial control to determine an efficient methodology for independence and accountability. Using over 800 case studies from the Czech and Slovak disciplinary courts, the author creates a theoretical framework that can be applied to future case studies and decrease the frequency of accountability perversions.

"This book describes and explains the failure of the federal courts of the United States to act and to provide remedies to individuals whose constitutional rights have been violated by illegal state coercion and violence. This remedial vacuum must be understood in light of the original design and historical development of the federal courts. At its conception, the federal judiciary was assumed to be independent thanks to an apolitical appointment process, a limited supply of adequately trained lawyers (which would prevent cherry-picking), and the constraining effect of laws and constitutional provision. Each of these checks quickly failed. As a result, the early federal judicial system was highly dependent on Congress. Not until the last quarter of the nineteenth century did a robust federal judiciary start to emerge, and not until the first quarter of the twentieth century did it take anything like its present form. The book then charts how the pressure from Congress and the White House has continued to shape courts behaviour-first eliciting a mid-twentieth-century explosion in individual remedies, and then driving a five-decade long collapse. Judges themselves have not avidly resisted this decline, in part because of ideological reasons and in part out of institutional worries about a ballooning docket. Today, as a result of these trends, the courts are stingy with individual remedies, but aggressively enforce the so-called "structural" constitution of the separation of powers and federalism. This cocktail has highly regressive effects, and is in urgent need of reform"--